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Abstract 
Since 1979, the organisation of Chinese health care has 
undergone extensive changes as the result of government health 
reforms. These changes have particularly affected the '3-tier 
health network' of rural health care organisation. The '3 tier 
health network' which is a vertically organised linkage of 
village, township and county health units, has formed the basic 
health structure for the rural areas since the early 50's. The '3 
tier network'(3TN) has been subject to the introduction of a 
market competitive system which is the economic responsibility 
system. Township hospitals have been placed under the control of 
township government, and a decision has been made to introduce a 
county level hospital of Chinese traditional medicine(CTM) for 
each county. Changes in the basis of health care financing and the 
encouragement of private practice have accompanied the decline of 
the co-operative medical system (CMS), a system of health 
insurance set up in the 1960's. On the basis of the empirical 
study described below, this thesis argues that there is an urgent 
need to evaluate these reforms, and develop policies for China's 
800 million rural residents, focussing in particular on the 3TN. 
In 1989,7 counties, 12 townships and 30 villages were 
chosen by a structured random sampling technique in Jiangxi 
Zhejiang and Shandong provinces in East-China. A survey was 
carried out, covering health organisation, health personnel, the 
economics of rural health and health services for rural residents 
in county, township and village. In this survey, a comparison was 
made of the various types of health system, including those that 
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have come into being since reform policies were instituted. In 
addition, the survey also considered the general influences of 
health reforms on the health service for rural residents and the 
management situation of the 3TN. 
This study found that in general the health reforms 
weakened the 3 tier health network in the rural areas. The health 
status of rural residents has deteriorated due to privatisation of 
the rural health care market. The main effects observed were the 
financial crises of township hospitals, high turnover and lack of 
health personnel in the rural areas, a standstill in preventive 
health, and the limited utilisation of health services by rural 
residents, since private health care replaced the CMS. The thesis 
argues that the main cause of these negative developments is 
health policies because the process of health policy making is 
'top-down' in China, lacks community participation and is affected 
by political factors. The policies made during health reform 
actually worsened the already uneven allocation of health 
resources between urban areas and the rural areas. Urban areas 
have an inequitably large share and the gap continues to widen. 
The thesis suggests that Chinese health policy and 
organisation should put the stress on the rural areas once more, 
as happened during the 1960's and 70's. The reestablishment of the 
CMS is a better way to guarantee the health of rural residents and 
to implement primary health care. This method of health financing 
could be applied not only in China but throughout the developing 
world. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Terms of special interest used throughout the study are 
defined as follows: 
1. Annual income 
Pure income from which productive expenditure such as 
cost of fertilizer, and taxes have been deducted. 
2. Barefoot doctors 
A part-time health worker who offers preventive and 
curative services in the village, who usually has nine years of 
general education and a minimum of six months medical training, 
and is not paid by central government. 
3. Barefoot doctor training courses 
These are offered by county hospitals, county health 
school or township hospitals for more than three months, and teach 
both preventive and curative knowledge and skills. 
4. Brigades and administrative village 
These are the primary administrative units in rural 
areas. The brigade is organized for production and related 
activities. After 1982, most brigades changed their names to 
"administrative village" and the land of the brigades has been 
leased to individual households. A brigade usually has a 
population ranging from 1,000 to 5,000. 
5. Communes and township governments 
These are the second level of administration. After 
1982, most communes became "township governments". Township 
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governments are less involved with peasants' economic activities 
in comparison with the earlier communes. A township usually has a 
population ranging from 10,000 to 50,000. 
6. Cooperative medical system (CMS) 
A medical insurance scheme, financed by individual 
prepayment and collective welfare funds, organized by the village 
management committee or the township management committee, 
supervised by both the management committee and the township 
health centres. 
7. Coverage rate of child immunization 
Refers to the percentage of children who have been 
immunized against measles, polio, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, 
and tuberculosis. 
8. Economic responsibility system 
In 1983, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
(CCPCC) issued the first document which proposed the application 
of the economic responsibility system to agriculture, industrial 
enterprises and rural township industry. The Ministy of Public 
Health introduced this system as a health reform in the various 
health care organisations. This meant that each department and 
each person had her/his own economic target. The individual was 
responsible to the department, the department was responsible to 
the hospital, the hospital was responsible to the health bureau. 
Layer upon layer of hierarchical responsibility existed. If people 
exceeded their target, they could earn more money and decide how 
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to use this extra money by themselves. If targets were not met, a 
fine could be imposed. All of these responsibilities, such as 
economic targets, were determined by contract. When this system is 
in operation, the directors of the work unit bear responsibility 
for all decision making, including personnel matters, and finance. 
Implementing this system indicates a greater degree of freedom in 
health organisations and greater responsibility of each health 
work unit than that which existed before health reform. 
9. Rural doctors 
One kind of barefoot doctor who has more medical 
training, and has passed the provincial examination for rural 
doctor certification. The rural doctors' medical knowledge and 
skills are assumed to be equal to middle medical school graduates. 
The rural doctors still work at the village level, and may get 
small monthly subsidies from provincial or local government. 
10. Three tier rural health network 
Health care delivery in China's rural areas is organized 
on three levels. At the top are the more than 2,000 counties, each 
of which has its own general hospital, epidemic station, maternal 
and child health station, institutes for the prevention and 
control of tuberculosis and mental disease, institutes for 
pharmaceutical quality control and health schools. These are 
funded from the national budget. At the middle are hospitals at 
the township level, established by the township itself and 
financed by both county and provincial subsidies and user fees. 
Some township hospitals have now reformed their management system. 
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The main change is that the financial responsibility for the 
township hospital has been transferred from the county health 
bureau to township government (see Chapter 5). The bottom of the 
rural health network is the village health station. 
County County health 
government bureau 
! -County hospital 
! 
-County 
Chinese 
! traditional hospital 
'-Epidemic station 
! 
-Maternal 
and children 
! health station 
Institutes of preventive 
! -tuberculosis and mental 
disease 
Institute of medicine 
quality control 
! 
-Countv 
health school 
Township jownship hospital: Medical and preventive service 
government 
Village Village health station: Rural doctor, health worker 
Committee 
Three tier rural health network 
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11. Total infectious disease rate 
This refers to the incidence of 24 infectious diseases 
including cholera, typhoid, bacillary dysentery and hepatitis, 
which by law must be reported to the epidemic station. 
12. Township hospital 
The township hospital is a general health work unit, 
which is responsible for the whole townships health administrative 
work, curative and preventive services, family planning and 
supervision of the villages health workers medical practice. A 
township hospital is mostly staffed by physician assistants. Each 
unit consists of between 10 to 30 patient beds. 
During health reform, the township hospitals were of two 
types, one was reformed, and another was unreformed. To describe a 
hospital as 'reformed' means that it is independent of the county 
health authorities; such hospitals make their own decisions about 
staffing, budgeting and administration. Their staff are under 
contract for specified tasks and hours of work, and the hospitals 
themselves are under contract to the township authorities to 
provide medical services. By contrast, unreformed hospitals still 
received their subsidies from the county health authorities and 
had their deficits made up from the county government. 
13. Village health stations (Brigade health station) 
This is a health service unit staffed by rural doctors 
and health workers (barefoot doctors), including all types of 
ownership. In this study, they were of three types, solo, group 
and collectives. The solo village health stations were run by 
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individual doctors, the group village health stations were run by 
a group of doctors, and the collective village health stations 
were managed directly by the villages committee. Whereas the first 
two types were essentially private practices, the last was a 
health station 'of the village', whose doctors were paid by the 
village committee, as well as earning their income from clinic 
fees. The staff of the village health station must cover a number 
of primary health tasks. The village health station therefore has 
a number of functions beyond the simple provision of curative 
services, which include: 1. assisting the village committee to 
make and plan community health care; 2. preventing common or 
frequently occurring disease; 3. pursuing Maternal and Child 
Health management, for example by implementing ante natal 
examinations, visiting women after delivery, monitoring children's 
growth and development, - 4. children's immunisation; 5. infectious 
disease prevention and epidemic reporting; 6. improvement in the 
water supply system; 7. management of health propaganda, health 
education and inhabitant health; 8. monitoring of occupational 
health in rural industry; 9. family planning work. Clearly, the 
demands on the village health station are great, and resources 
generally are small. 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
Part One The Development of Health Care in the World 
The purpose of this section is to review basic health 
care structures in the developing world, with particular reference 
to those of primary health, and the growth of market systems. 
These are compared with the development of health care in 
Chinese rural areas. The discussion is mainly focused upon equity 
and community participation because equity is an underlying theme 
against which many of the objectives such as privatisation in the 
health market and distribution of health resources with PHC can be 
judged, and community participation has been considered 
generally, and for the last 20 years to be of major importance in 
the health programmes of developing countries. These concepts have 
a very close relationship for example, in the context of PHC, 
community participation is the one which focuses on the ability of 
people to improve their health and health care, by exercising 
effective decisions to force the shift in resources, usually with 
a view to achieving equity (Rifkin 1988; Bracht and Tsouros 1990). 
1.1 The basic health situation in the developing world 
From a historical viewpoint, health services of 
developing countries were generally very sparsely distributed and 
limited in the late 1800s. Such as existed were often provided by 
medical missionaries or by the early forerunners of 'colonial 
medicine'. After the turn of the century, they mirrored those of 
the colonial powers. Curative services became more widespread. In 
India, in the 1930's, tuberculosis was treated largely in 
sanatoria, following the pattern in Great Britain and Europe. 
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During these years the emphasis was on curative medical care, 
although this was accompanied by a steadily increasing 
understanding of the particular etiology and process of tropical 
diseases (Smith and Bryant 1988). 
With the development of curative medical care, people 
found that many tropical diseases could not be controlled by the 
methods appropriate to medical care in the developing countries. 
It was also necessary to consider the environmental and climatic 
factors and to develop a broad-based preventive medicine. We can 
see this change is illustrated by Patrick Manson and Ronald Ross's 
public dispute which was about colonial medical policy. Manson and 
Ross were two dominant figures in the newly emerging medical 
specialism of tropical medicine in Britain in the early 1900s. 
Ross acted within the preventive and sanitary tradition. He had a 
lifelong commitment to practical sanitary reform, for example the 
prevention of malaria through sanitary measures: the removal of 
nuisances and the provision of piped water and sewers in the 
colonies. Manson was representative of a curative, reductionist, 
and research-based 'laboratory medicine'. He announced his 
oppsition to large-scale anti-mosquito and general public health 
measures because he argued that such large schemes as Ross desired 
were neither economically nor politically possible (Worboy, S M. 
1988). Though a controvery existed in making health policy during 
that time, there were clearly alternatives for the improvement of 
health in developing countries. 
Since the 1950s, with the development of the world 
economy post-war, concern for technological development has 
dominated not only the economies of the developed countries but 
also their relationships among themselves and particularly, with 
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the developing countries (Rifkin and Walt 1986). In the world as 
whole, health resources have increased, health services have been 
strengthened and human health status has been improved. This later 
period brought a rapid increase of vertical programmes for disease 
control. The predominant targets were communicable diseases--- 
yaws, tuberculosis, schistosomiasis. The vertical approach 
brought substantial advances in the control of a number of 
diseases, and this undoubtedly contributed to the considerable 
improvements in health that have occurred over the past seveal 
decades. Nonetheless, it gradually became apparent that multiple 
vertical programmes as a long-term approach entailed serious 
inefficiencies and redundancies (Lambo 1993, Smith and Bryant 
1988). 
Technological development can improve the quality of 
health service, but technology is only half of the solution. Of 
all preventive techniques, immunization is probably the most 
attractive. Yet, in many developing countries, despite the 
existence of this powerful technological tool, six vaccine- 
preventable diseases (measles, pertussis, tetanus, poliomyelitis, 
diphtheria and tuberculosis) continue to be responsible for much 
child mortality and morbidity (WHO 1985). The emphasis on the 
transfer of Western techmology and organization into developing 
countries was diminished (WHO, 1978) because to become practical 
these techniques need government, society, various community 
organizations and individuals to cooperate and understand. 
In the mid-1970s, it was realized that although in many 
countries the health situation had improved, in many others it had 
changed little or not at all, and in none could it be said to be 
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satisfactory. Health benefits do not apply equally throughout the 
world. In developing countries (most are in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America), incomes are low and most people are poor, health 
resources are limited and unevenly distributed. Most residents of 
developing countries do not enjoy good health, or good health 
services. Social and health standards are lower than those in the 
developed countries of Europe and North America. People living in 
the rural areas of developing countries were, and still are, 
'trapped in the vicious circle of poverty, malnutrition, disease, 
and despair that saps their energy, reduces their work capacity, 
and limits their ability to plan for the future', (Mahler, 1988). 
The depth of their deprivation can be expressed by a few 
statistics, which summarize the world health socioeconomic 
situation, based on data for 1980 or for the latest available year 
prior to 1980. Whereas the average life expectancy at birth is 
about 72 years in the developed countries, it is about 55 years in 
the developing countries. Whereas only between 10 and 20 out of 
every 1000 infants born in the developed countries die during 
their first year, the infant mortality rate in most developing 
countries ranges from nearly 100 to more than 200 per 1000. 
Whereas the death rate for children between 1 and 5 years old is 
only about I per 1000 in most developed countries, it averages 
about 20 in many developing countries (WHO, 1981). 
1.2 Health for All by the Year 2000 
How can the infrastructure of health services be 
developed, especially under market conditions which prevail in the 
world today? What are the most suitable policies and targets? How 
can the gap between the developing and the developed countries be 
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reduced? It is now widely realized that a new approach to health 
in the world is needed, an overall effort rather than a series of 
sporadic attempts to deal with individual disease problems. In 
1977, the World Health Assembly decided that the social goal of 
all governments and WHO should be the attainment by all the 
peoples of the world of a state of health that would permit them 
to live economically and socially productive lives (WHO, 1977)f 
'Health for All by the Year 2000' is not a single finite target, 
but a process leading to progressive improvement in the health of 
people to which governments have committed themselves (Mahler, 
1981). This is probably the most optimistic statement of purpose 
ever made by the world community (WHO, 1981). What does "health 
for all" mean? It means simply the realization of WHO's 
constitutional objective of "the attainment by all peoples of the 
highest possible level of health"; and that as a minimum all 
people in all countries should have at least such a level of 
health that they are capable of working productively and of 
participating actively in the life of the community in which they 
live (Mahler 1988 and Kelley Gill 1992). The meaning of health 
today therefore, differs from that of previous times. Health does 
not mean a simply the absence of disease but means the "physical, 
mental and social well being of the individual". In addition, it 
has removed 'health' from the sole control of the medical 
professional and has highlighted the importance of the 
environmental and social context (Rifkin and Walt 1986). The 
'social' model of health has overtaken the biomedical one. 
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1.3 PHC is the key to implement "HFA/2000". 
1.3.1 Definition of Primary Health Care 
WHO's global strategy for health improvement has been 
entitled "HFA/2000". An international health conference held in 
Alma-Ata(USSR) in 1978, under the joint sponsorship of WHO and the 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and attended by delegates 
from 134 governments and representatives of 67 nongovernmental 
organizations and United Nations agencies, issued a declaration 
which stated that primary health care is the key to attaining 
health for all by the year 2000 (WHO 1978). According to the 
declaration of Alma-Ata, the definition of PHC is as follows. * It 
is essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound, 
and socially acceptable methods and technology made universally 
accessible to individuals and families in the community through 
their full participation and at a cost that the community and 
country can afford to maintain at every stage of their development 
in the spirt of self-reliance and self-determination (Mahler 
1988). It forms an integral part both of the country's health 
systems of which it is the nucleus and of the overall social and 
economic development of the community (WHO 1978). This definition 
was underlined by some criteria that distinguished it from the 
earlier and often narrower conception of PHC: political 
commitment; equitable distribution; community involvement; focus 
appropriate technology; and a multi-sectoral on prevention, 
approach (Kenneth Lee 1983). 
The primary health care targets of WHO formed the basis 
of health policy in all countries, particularly in the developing 
countries. However major differences exist between developing 
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countries in terms of their political philosophy, socioeconomic 
development, history, natural resources, and geography. All of 
these differences will shape and influence the finance, structure, 
and processes of health care delivery. Although an international 
definition exists, the term PHC means different things in 
different places. In most developing countries a variety of models 
of delivery exist, public, private, and voluntary. Therefore 
implementation and definition vary, and this variety needs to be 
recognised within the overall framework of WHO targets. 
1.3.2 The importance of equity 
The concept of equity is complex. It needs to be 
distinguished from equality. When referring to services provided 
to the population, equity may be expressed as equality, taking 
into account the needs of all identifiable subgroups. From the 
policy viewpoint, equity amounts to avoidance of discrimination 
against any section of the population. In other words, 'equity' is 
concerned more with treating people fairly, than equally. 
(Montoya-Aguilar C. 1986). In contrast, the term "inequity" has a 
moral and ethical dimension. It refers to differences which are 
unnecessary and avoidable, but in addition are considered unfair 
and unjust (Whitehead 1992). 
Equity is one pillar on which PHC rests because one of 
the measures of success for achieving PHC is the equitable 
provision of health care to all people. Implied in the concept is 
the need to address both the issue of the social causes of disease 
and the existing distribution of resources. "The main criterion 
for moving toward primary health care in all cases is the increase 
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in social and economic justice in the use of health resources" 
(Kleczkowski, Elling and Smith 1984). 
It is necessary to be aware of just how extensive are 
differentials in health found in the world today. In every part of 
each Region, and every type of political and social system, 
differences in health have been noted between different social 
groups in the population and between different geographical areas 
in the same country. We already know that the gaps in health 
services are bigger and bigger between the developing countries 
and the developed countries. So, from the practical point of view 
of designing effective and efficient health policies, large and 
persistent differences on such a scale have to be taken seriously 
and provision made for reducing them (Whitehead 1992). 
Equity in Health and Equity in Health Care should be 
distinguished. Equity in health implies that ideally everyone 
should have a fair opportunity to attain their full health 
potential and, more pragmatically, that none should be 
disadvantaged from achieving this potential, if it can be avoided 
(Mooney 1982). Equity is therefore concerned with creating equal 
opportunities for health, and with bringing health differentials 
down to the lowest level possible (Whitehead 1992). 
Equity in health care is defined as: Equal access to 
available care for equal need, equal utilization for equal need 
and equal quality of care for all (Leenan 1985). Looking at each 
of these themes in turn, a. Equal access to available care for 
equal need means equal entitlement to the available services for 
everyone, a fair distribution of health resources based on 
peoples' health care needs either between countries or within 
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countries. Income, age, race and sex, cannot count as relevant for 
allocating or denying people access to health care. 
Yet, equal access for equal need is a different 
principle from that of allocating resources to achieve equal 
outcome in health. Because of the relative scarcity of resources, 
all needs can never be met and therefore health care has to be 
rationed. Equal need would require far wider intervention in, and 
probably restructuring of, socioeconomic conditions and might be 
an appropriate objective for the political economy as a whole (Max 
Price 1988; Rathwell 1992)). 
b. Equal utilization for equal need means that use of 
services should not be restricted by social or economic 
disadvantage, there is a case for aiming for equal utilization 
rates for equal need. For instance, in relation to immunization 
and other preventive services, positive discrimination may be 
justified in providing outreach and other imaginative schemes to 
make it easier for people to use services in low take-up areas 
(Giraldes 1988) . 
c. With regard to the concept of equal quality of care, 
it is very important that providers will strive to put the same 
commitment with the services they deliver for all sections of the 
community, so that everyone can expect the same high standard of 
professional care, for example, doctors should not give shorter 
consultations to lower-class patients and refer them less 
frequently to specialist services. 
The concept of equity in relation to health and health 
care can mean different things to different people. Equity does 
not mean that everyone should have the same health status because 
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there is bound to be some natural variation between one individual 
and another such as ill health due to age or sex-specific 
problems. Thus, some portion of the health differential 
attributable to natural biological variation can be considered 
inevitable, rather than in equitable (Giovanni Berlinger 1992, 
Whitehead 1992), but we know that these actual differences in 
health status between countries and between groups within 
countries could be reduced, by improving the level of health of 
disadvantaged nations and groups as a whole (WHO 1985). The 
principles for action in implementing equity policies should be 
concerned with improving living and working conditions that are 
root causes, and equity policy should be directed towards enabling 
healthier lifestyles and be based on the principle of making high 
quality health care accessible to all (Oscar Gish 1990, Whitehead 
1992). 
1.3.3 Community Participation 
a. Definition of community, community health care, participation 
and community participation. 
It might be argued that a basic difference between 
traditional health care delivery and PHC is that PHC is community 
based. In the words of the Alma Ata declaration PHC is health care 
affordable, accessible and acceptable to a community with their 
full participation (WHO 1978). One view states that community 
involvement (a term sometimes preferred to community participation 
because it implies active rather than passive engagement in health 
activities) is core to eventual community self-reliance, which can 
be assessed by the level of involvement in and the degree of 
decentralisation in decision-making as well as the development of 
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effective mechanisms for expression of peoples's needs and 
demands. Community participation (or involvement) is the essence 
of primary health care (WHO, 1981, Mahler 1981 and Rifkin, 
Muller, Bichmann 1988). 
We should have a clear understanding of the use of the 
terms 'community' and 'participation' before we discuss the means 
whereby community participation may be achieved. Midgley suggests 
that 'A community is a group of people living in the same 
geographical area sharing definable basic values and organizations 
and/or a group of people sharing the same basic interest'. The 
former is the one most often used in the health literature 
(Midgley 1986). Rifkin and others have described three 
characteristics that appear to be common in the concept of 
participation or involvement. First participation has to be 
active. Secondly, participation implies that people have the right 
and the responsibility to make choices and therefore have power 
over decisions which affect their lives. Thirdly, mechanisms have 
to be in place to allow the choices to be implemented. Considering 
this, Rifkin et, al. suggest the following definition: "Community 
participation is a social process whereby specific groups with 
shared needs living in a defined geographic area actively pursue 
identification of their needs, take decisions and establish 
mechanisms to meet their needs" (Rifkin, Muller and Bichmann 
1988). The WHO definition of community participation suggested in 
the Alma-Ata declaration is: Community participation is the 
process by which individuals and families assume responsibility 
for their own health and welfare and for those of the community 
and develop the capacity to contribute 
to their and the 
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community's development (Bracht and Tsouros 1990). To sum up, the 
principle of community participation is that 'people have the 
right and therefore should have the opportunity to participate 
individually and/or collectively in the planning, implementation, 
and evaluation of their health and environments' because city 
plans and/or health programmers do not often reflect local people 
aspirations and needs (Bracht and Tsouros 1990). 
Community health care goals and interventions would (in 
addition to individual and family goals) include, for example: 
those related to basic education, skills training and adult 
literacy; employment and occupational safety; adequate and safe 
housing; adequate and safe food supplies; adequate and safe water 
supplies; environmental control and sanitary disposal of wastes; 
population, community development and recreational needs; public 
health eduaction, information and legislation; disease 
surveillance, prevention and control; collection and utilization 
of simple health and demographic data access to health care and 
essential drugs and, promotion of individual, family and community 
self-care activities. These goals include some important social 
needs as well as those which are required for monitoring and 
evaluation (Monelosso 1992). 
b. The how of community participation 
The recent global economic crisis has made it even more 
clear that governments have and will continue to have, only a 
limited capacity for the provision of health services to their 
populations. It is equally clear that the primary health care 
approach demands a much broader attack on the various determinants 
of health which lie outside the traditional concerns of the health 
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services. This is in turn demands new forms of dialogue between 
communities, health professionals, and social and political groups 
to mobilize the necessary action on many fronts for health and 
social development (Smith and Bryant 1988). The scenario at the 
operational level would be to 'integrate' the efforts of 
coordinated social/community organizations, health teams and local 
development agencies. Client communities would play an increasing 
role in implementing these multidisciplinary, multisectoral 
activities (Monekisso 1992). Such a community infrastructure would 
include local leaders, health committees, voluntary organizations, 
community health care workers who are professionals and the 
representatives of community who share a common political or 
economic situation or are living in the same place (Piette 1990). 
According to WHO, community participation should relate 
all levels, district or local, intermediate and central (WHO 
1987). There are two main approaches to community participation, 
the first is the participation through consultation in formal 
decision-making mechanisms: people participate in policy-making, 
planning and/or implementation of decisions which relate to 
health, health promotion, the evnironment and care services. 
Community participation can result in different degrees of 
influence at different levels in decision-making structures, for 
example the representatives of the community directly attending 
official decision-making bodies; seeking advice from community lay 
organizations and social groups about new plans; keeping the 
public informed about policy decisions or new developments 
(Biacht 
and Tsouros 1990). The second is that community level activities 
are undertaken as part of community action and certain 
kinds of 
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groups engage in them, such as self-help group for people with 
AIDS, diabetes or social movements concerned with health (Nutbeam 
1986). Another model has described the process of participation as 
top-down or bottom-up. It means that in the community programme's 
intial phase it is the health planner (an external agent) who is 
the driving force in the community work with a stated goal. The 
health planner is in a position to introduce specific problems to 
the community members and aid them in formulating their goals and 
suggested solutions. According to the theory, the community 
representatives (internal agents) gradually become more and more 
involved and after some time begin to take over responsibility for 
the programme. This approach, which is based on a decision-making 
process that focuses on community needs rather than the planner's 
needs, offers a kind of 'bottom-up' approach (Bjaras 1991). 
We already know that community participation is very 
important. Community member participation can achieve many 
benefits such as pre-testing the feasibility and acceptability of 
new programs or ideas; gaining wide spread support and securing 
the efforts of volunteers; forcing co-ordination between loosely 
structured agencies and organizations both public and private and 
negotiating conflicts between political factions and special 
interest groups. Yet different countries and cities have different 
ways of engaging the community and its representatives in 
decision-making, planning or implementation of activities, in the 
health services, care of the environment and those activities 
which are the responsibility of municipalities, such as housing 
and social services (Bracht and Tsouros 1990). 
In some countries, community participation programs, in 
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spite of promotional efforts by international agencies, have not 
succeeded. The experience in Latin America, with the exception 
perhaps of Cuba and Nicaragua, is that community participation has 
failed to improve the quality of life of the majority. The most 
important reason is that the Latin American political systems have 
been characterized by instablity, authoritarianism and military 
intervention, which destroys democratic leadership and grassroot 
organizations. So the most basic statement that needs to be 
formulated is the following: the degree of success of any form of 
community participation is inversely correlated to the degree of 
social stratification of the society (Ugalde 1985). 
It is worth mentioning that community participation in 
decision making is not easy to implement in highly stratified 
societies. Community representatives may want to share power with 
the authorities; in this case they play at best a defensive role. 
If the representatives want to change the rules of the game, thev 
become protesters, which is unlikely to be well accepted by the 
authorities (Piette 1990). The case of Cuba and China are 
particularly interesting in this respect. Massive community 
mobilization is very efficient for implementing PHC. Community 
level health activities do help people to get basic health 
services. Yet this remains a strategy of implementation only. The 
health care delivery system was designed without community inputs. 
The health policy-making is always from'top-down'. An 'external 
approach' characterises local health activities completely 
(Ugalde 1985). In China, health policies are made by the Ministry 
of Public Health and the State Council. The whole process is 
controlled by a few officials, and advice is rarely sought from 
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community organization even professional health groups. Health 
policy-making was influenced often by political factors, for 
example the cooperative medical system diminished during recent, 
market based health reform (see part two). 
c. The place of community health care workers 
Types of health manpower very between and within 
countries according to, for instance, the population's needs, the 
resources available for satisfying them, historical traditions, 
and the power of different professional groups. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that many types of manpower are, or could be, 
potential substitutes for each other, in both technical and 
financial terms. The point about substitutability, now generally 
accepted and a concept familiar to economists, is that in many 
areas of primary health care, people with a limited training, 
appropriate for tackling the major local health problems, can 
function very well as alternatives to medical practitioners. For 
instance, for some time now, the use of various local health 
workers such as health auxiliaries, and more recently community 
health workers, has been advocated as a means both of improving 
the community's access to basic and primary health care and of 
increasing the actual amounts of care received. 
The concept of the 'health auxiliary' and 'community 
health workers, however, have been subject to varying 
interpretations. According to Kenneth Lee's definition: "these 
types of health personnel mean people who are paid to assist and 
be supervised by a professional worker and, hence, both complement 
and supplement professional staff" (Kenneth 1983). However, with 
changes in the model of health care delivery and the multiple- 
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needs of PHC, traditionally trained health personnel have found 
it difficult to adapt to the orientation required for a successful 
implementation of effective community-level primary health care 
because their training has followed a traditional medical 
education model with a strong emphasis on academic criteria 
(Chimere 1992). Community health care workers (local health 
workers) require a set of skills that are not characteristic of 
clinically trained health personnel. Non-clinical skills are 
required to be exercised in a substantial proportion of community 
health worker's jobs. Bar-on (1990) in a study of social workers 
involved in assessment of client needs and co-ordination of 
services discovered that only one-third of the practitioners' time 
was spent interacting with the client. Most of their time was 
spent interacting with managers and administrators, other 
professionals and members of clients' informal networks. Community 
health workers, like social workers appear to need a diverse range 
of skills that extend beyond the realm of narrowly defined 
clinical practice. In regard to organization and community 
development a community health worker will frequently mediate the 
relationship between two organizations for the purpose of sharing 
resources (for example meeting rooms), coordination of activities 
(for example a joint policy submission), constructing joint 
activities (for example a campaign coalition) or even negotiating 
responses to new policy directions such as the introduction of 
some fees for services. Frequently, these skills are undeveloped 
when community health workers first move into community health 
centres. Typically, they learn to do this 'by the seat of the 
pants', that is through informal learning from colleagues and 
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through a process of trial and error. They often just keep trying 
different contacts until 'something happens'. Very little is known 
about the ways successful community health workers choose, 
establish, maintain, prioritize or end these informal 
relationships that are so important to community based practice 
(Walker 1992) - 
In the developing countries, community health workers 
have been trained specifically for rural areas. These community 
health workers have different names in different countries and 
undertake many primary health tasks. In Indonesia communities are 
actively involved in primary health care through close interaction 
with health centres, selection of village kaders (community health 
workers), involvement of village councils, and self-help 
activities. Such activities are often included in village 
community health development efforts (Smith and Bryant 1988). In 
India, in October, 1977, on Ghandi's birth day, the Indian 
government launched a widespread new health care experiment the 
Community Health Volunteer (CHV). The aim of the health volunteer 
programme was train I volunteer from each village Each community 
would provide basic health services such as minor treatments, 
preventive measures and liaison with specialized health 
institutions (Jobert, 1985). There is little doubt that the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) re-focused and, in some 
cases, revolutionized professional views on manpower 
for the 
delivery of primary health care. Barefoot doctors were farm 
workers trained in simple diagnostic and treatment techniques; 
they gave simple medical care or advice, but they also continued 
to do farm work. Rather they were essentially agricultural workers 
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and were paid as such, notwithstanding that they gave at least a 
part of their time to health work in health stations or in the 
fields (e. g. providing health education and preventive medicine, 
and dealing with medical emergencies) (Sidel and Sidel 1980). 
It is an important measure to train community health 
workers for solving the shortage of health personnel in the rural 
areas of a developing country. The training contents and methods 
are various in the developing countries. Usually study and service 
are combined. The training time is divided into stages. The 
periods are one month, several months and orie year. The trainIng 
place is usually the medical school or a rural health training 
center. Occasionally, training occurs at the hospital. The city 
also sends medical teams to the rural areas to help in the 
training of health workers (Mei Ren Liang 1989). 
1.4 Health services delivery in the market system 
As stated already- HFA -is a new approach to health 
in 
the world. PHC is the key to implement this new approach. The 
government, society, community and individuals have the same duty 
to realize a global goal. However recent years have seen changes 
in long-standing ideological beliefs and political systems and 
institutions, including a dramatic shift in the attitudes of some 
countries toward the role of government. Government is no lonqer 
viewed as the sole planner and supplier of all elements of 
economic and social life. These results have been manifested in a 
variety of ways: some countries have begun to restructure their 
national economies and system from centrally planned to market- 
based economies; some countries are attempting to introduce 
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market-based elements into their economies with inclusion of the 
pri,,. -ate sector as a significant element while maintaining certain 
social principles to govern how the market may operate; others 
ha-\, -e had a significant private sector which is now taking on a 
greater role with increased responsibilities (Nowbrander and 
Parker 1992). How do these changes affect the health sector? How 
are health services delivered in the market system? As far as the 
privatisation of health services is concerned, --are the underlying 
assumptions correct? The answers to these questions are likely to 
be useful to Chinese health policy makers. 
1.4.1 What is the market approach? 
Economics is simply the study of human action, and that 
quite clearly includes the purchase and provision of public good. 
The economic acitivities are in a marketplace (Grant 1991). The 
market relies on the consumer's ability to decide which 
combination of goods and services best meets his or her needs and 
desires within given income-constraints. On the financing side the 
market approach is characterised by a multitude of goods 
competing with each other. The market economies produce and 
deliver a wide range of consumer goods and services with 
impressive efficiency (Naylor 1987). According to the market 
principle health care is provided by a multitude of health care 
providers each competing with other to serve patients. Prices are 
set by the market process to equalize supply and demand. In 
reality the pure market approach does not lead to socially 
desirable results in the case of health care because contrary to 
need the ability to pay is unevenly distributed between patients 
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(Schneider 1992), but health care is commonly thought of as a 
'public good', i. e. basic needs are to be met for all people, 
which is different from commercial goods exchanged depending on 
an individual's economic condition (Naylor 1987). Everyone has 
equal opportunity to obtain the good even though societies have 
limited resources for health care. Health care, is the one of 
welfare goods that can be improved in the public approach, 
through, amongst other things, redistribution of income according 
to needs and health care planning (Young 1990). 
1.4.2. Health service delivery and the type of financing 
In the health care market, there are various models of 
health services delivery, with different methods of financing. What 
are these models advantages and disadvantages? Which model is 
suitable for Chinese health care? It is useful to view these models 
of health services and activities. 
a. Free government care 
National health systems which provide free service to 
the entire population and are financed from a central government 
budget exist in many countries, for example, the NHS in the U. K. 
(Harrison 1990). In some cases, only certain groups of the 
population, such as the poor or health workers may use public 
services without charge, as in Zimbabwe. Other groups defined by 
employment, such as the police or armed forces, may also have 
facilities and services designated for their use which are 
financed from general government revenues and do not charge 
patients using the services, as in Ghana (Newbrander and Parker 
1992). In China, there is a mixture of health system. In 1949, a 
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communist government came to power. In 1952, P. R. China's State 
Council issued the document "Regulations concerning the National 
Health Insurance for National Working Staff". The basic 
characteristics of the system are that the health system belongs 
to the nation and people; the main source of finance is from the 
government budget; the government controls almost all health 
organization (the construction, the distribution and the scope) 
(Du le Xun 1988). Free government care provides coverage of urban 
residents and public service employees through various insurance 
schemes. There is establishment of a cooperative insurance system 
for a proportion of rural residents. The rest of the population 
has to utilise a full fee-for-service system (Yang P. L. and Lin, 
V. 1991). 
Free government health care is one kind of welfare 
service, but where this is accompanied by an abolition of prices, 
the necessary means to weigh value against cost is lost. The 
result is a sector of arbitrary size. Users will always demand 
more than is supplied, leading to waiting lists and to rationing 
by suppliers. Another main objection to free health services is 
that, competition is absent and this contributes to inefficiency 
of services. This argument provided one of the main rationales 
behind the U. K. health care system reforms. The NHS embarked on a 
series of apparently radical changes in its orgnization and 
operation after April, 1991: these included the introduction of 
provider market competition, where hospitals compete for service 
contracts from districts acting as purchasing agencies, GP budget 
holders and private patients and insurance plans. Importantly 
however, the new style health market is an internal market and is 
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not free-market (Culyer 1985; Harrison 1991; Robinson 1989), and 
in this maintains a degree of central control so that it is still 
plausible to speak of a National Health Service in the UK. 
b. Social security insurance 
Health insurance of Western Europe is part of social 
security insurance. The social insurance program is the most 
popular health system in the world. It provides one insurance 
mechanism for everyone in society. Social health insurance links 
employment. The funds to support health insurance come from 
emplover-employee payroll taxes or premiums. People have to pay 
their own premiums and are also forced to pay taxes for someone 
else's health care; each person pays for him/herself and for 
everyone else as well. This is called also "compulsory health 
insurance". Social health insurance is the best way to guarantee 
fairness in health care. It places the entire population in one 
risk pool and spreads the risk from the disabled and elderly to 
the healthy and young. Normally the government subsidises health 
services and a small percent of fee-for-service payment is from 
patients when they see the doctor (Shi Zhong Dao 1989, Han De Hui 
1993, and Bodenheimer 1992). 
Social health insurance has the best chance to solve the 
cost and access crises simultaneously. To control the 
inevitable 
inflationary impact of extended access, a single public insurer 
can set fees, fix budgets and reduce administrative cost 
(Evans 
1986). 
According to a World Bank study on the financing of 
health services in developing countries, there 
has been intensive 
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discussion of options for raising more resources for the health 
sector. The main option is compulsory health insurance (Abel-Smith 
1986). The primary reason has been that many, if not most, 
developing countries for example, Tanzania find themselves no 
longer able to raise the additional revenue required to finance 
their health services through taxation, let alone find the extra 
resources needed to achieve "Health for all by the year 2000" 
under present economic difficulties. A report on the potential of 
compulsory health insurance to cover those in the formal sector of 
employment is currently being prepared (Abel-Smith 1992). 
During recent years, some European countries have 
initiated a reform introducing markets within social health 
insurance systems In the decentralized Swedish health services 
several county councils have started such reforms. This has 
happened independently of local political majorities. The problems 
that the reform is expected to solve are officially formulated in 
terms of lack of freedom of choice for patients; low accessibility 
to primary health care; decreasing productivity; and finally, 
unclear incentives for higher productivity and quality within the 
health services (Diderichsen 1993) In light of the above sorts of 
problems including U. K., it is tempting to say that the solutions 
in most of the Western European countries is to promote a movement 
of health services towards greater market competition (Young 
1990). 
C. Private health insurance 
Insurance is a social mechanism by which people reduce 
the adverse financial consequences of an unpredictable event by 
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paying small amounts in advance to an institution, which in turn 
pays all or part of the cost incurred by the event. Insurance 
allows people to pool their risks in order to prevent catastrophic 
financial losses (Bodenheimer 1992). We know that many nations 
provide health insurance through government (e. g. U. K., Canada) or 
through employee-oriented private funds set up for particular 
occupational groups or workplaces (e. g. Germany). In contrast 
private health insurance relies most heavily on companies that 
sell insurance as a business venture. The health service is a 
commercial good, which can buy and sell in a free market. The 
provision of health services by the for-profit private sector 
where private insurance covers the cost of care, is common 
(Nowbrander and Parker 1992). In this competitive commercial 
insurance, insurers who wish to survive must employ the 
underwriting principle that, by its very nature, discriminates 
against those who need care the most and cuts the poor-who cannot 
afford the premiums-out of the insurance process. United States, 
most Latin American and African countries have implemented this 
kind of insurance (Bodenheimer 1992). 
it is useful to consider the U. S. experience. 
Historically, U. S. health insurance was developed by health 
providers through Blue Cross and Blue Shield to increase the 
purchasing power of potential patients, but due to fierce 
competition from commercial insurers, almost the entire health 
insurance apparatus, including the Blues, has now become 
commercial in essence (Bodenheimer 1990). What have been 
consequences of this type of insurance in the U. S. A.? The 
Economist writes that "Americans are obsessed about their health. 
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They spend twice as much per head on it as French or Germans, 
three times as much as the British. Doctors earn, on average 
200,000 US dollars per year ----- Yet Americans are less healthy and 
looked after than other rich Westerners. Their average life 
expectancy is shorter and their infant mortality higher. For the 
inner city black poor, things are much worse. Such a child born in 
Washington, D. C., has less chance of reaching his first birthday 
than a child born in Jamaica" (American Health Care 1989) . The 
reason is that thirty-five million people, or 15 percent of the 
population, are without health insurance today ----- an increase of 
10 million, or 25 percent; since 1977. Five million people 
annually report that they do not seek medical care because thev 
are unable to pay for it (Mundinger 1985). What are the main 
problems in U. S. private health insurance? Bodenheimer states: "the 
major problems with the private insurance industry's domination of 
U. S. health care sector are the industry's responsibility for 
health care inflation, the industry's waste of billions of dollars 
in administrative and marketing costs, the unfairness of the 
insurance principle, and the insurance industry's frightening 
degree of financial and political power (Bodenheimer 1990). How 
will the private health insurance problems be solved and American 
people health be improved? The U. S. has moved to implement health 
reform. The basic principle of the Clinton reform proposals are 
that health insurance should cover everyone in society; 
administrative costs should be cut- health service prices should 
be affordable and people can choose between health insurance 
plans; the quality of health service should be improved; Society 
and insurance organisations have the duty to be responsible 
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(Maddox 1993, Li Hong 1993) - It is tempting to say that the health 
reform in the U. S. is a return to a public system of health care 
and embodies some good elements from the social insurance program 
of European countries. 
d. Risk sharing (Risk-pool) 
How do people obtain basic health services and pool 
their risks to prevent a few individuals from suffering 
catastrophic financial losses at times of major illness if they 
are not covered by governments free health care or any kind of 
insurance(social security insurance and private health insurance). 
For example, in the U. S. A. particular patient groups (Diabetes 
and AIDS) among the uninsured are among the medically uninsurable, 
whom private companies refuse to insure because of preexisting 
health conditions (Brown and Dallek 1990), and in China, most 
rural residents are not covered by any kind of health insurance. 
Faced with this difficult circumstance, the primary mechanism for 
reducing financial obstacles to health care is through risk 
sharing arrangements. For the individual, sickness many occur 
randomly and unpredictably. But, since only some of the 
contributors will get sick, each contributor in a risk sharing 
scheme can pay substantially less than s/he would have to if s/he 
became ill and was not covered. Risk sharing schemes therefore 
ensure than the catastrophic costs that may confront any 
individual will not be an obstacle to meeting their medical care 
needs (Price 1988). There are nineteen states in the U. S. A. which 
have established high-risk pools for the medically uninsurable 
(Brown and Dallek 1990). There is another popular form of risk 
sharing in the U. S. A. for basic health service delivery, i. e. 
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Health Maintenance Organisations (HMO). The HMO is essentially a 
form of prepaid medical care. Patients enrol on an annual basis, 
paying a set fee, usually paid by the employer. In return the HMO 
will provide all the health care that is deemed to be required. 
The HMO will have its own health centres, and will either contract 
with hospitals for in-patient care, or, in the case of larger HMOs 
will provide these facilities itself. HMO physicians will be 
salaried, and probably employed on a full-time basis (Rayner 
1988). In China's rural areas, the Cooperative Medical System is 
an example of a risk-sharing scheme. The rural residents pool 
some money together for their health care. The CMS ensures the 
basic health needs of rural residents in China (see 
Definitions)(Xiang Zheng 1988). 
The risk sharing scheme is a special type of health 
service market. It is non-profit making. Characteristics of fund 
collecting in this scheme are: a. Prepayment for health service--- 
--the coverage includes service items calculated at base on 
cost/benifit and the amount of money that people prepaid. b. The 
fund paid jointly from participant, employer and local government. 
c. Premiums were compulsory. 
The risk sharing scheme is not a free health service, 
but it guarantees that participants can obtain basic health 
services and medicine when they need. Because this model includes 
a prepaid system that runs under limitation of budget, it can use 
the fund more reasonably and with increased service efficiency. 
Health service users and suppliers are linked together in the risk 
sharing system, unlike an insurance system in which financial 
matters are controlled by the insurance company, and there exists 
53 
a triangular relationship that sabotages the economic 'brakes' 
that health service user and supplier may place upon each other. 
In addition, the health worker in the risk sharing system is 
salaried, which is different from payment according to quantity of 
health service under a health insurance system because the latter 
can be an incentive for doctors to supply unnecessary services and 
medicine (Hsiao 1993). 
Risk pools do allow uninsurable people to become 
insurable. The main problem with risk pool is that the risk is 
spread only over the sickest portion of the population, thereby 
necessitating high premiums, for example, traditionally, in 
comparison to fee-for-service based insurance, HMO premiums are 
higher, but its coverage for anyone person is more extensive. In 
the high-risk pool for the medically uninsurable, the premium is 
high, which means that low-income people cannot afford the 
policies. The pools therefore are limited in scope. Some cases of 
risk pool are also vulnerable to "Moral hazard", similar to the 
CMS in China, which causes a chronic loss of money to the pools. 
So in the US, risk pools are usually geared to help middle-class 
uninsurable persons, and in China, the CMS is partially made up by 
collective fund, and/a state subsidy (in preventive medicine) 
(Cohodes 1986, Luo Yi-Qun 1985, Rayner 1988). 
e. Fee-for-service (FFS) 
Fee-for-service is the traditional method for obtaining 
health care. People have to pay each time they use the service. 
Health services are commercial goods, so the price changes are 
completely dependent on the market. People who need more health 
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care must pay more than people who need less health care. This is 
typical of the private health system. There are now many 
developing countries implementing fee-for-service. One of the most 
important, from the point of view of this thesis is China's rural 
areas now, most rural residents have to pay every time in their 
visit the doctor (Xiang Zheng 1988). 
Every country is looking for a ideal model to perfect 
its own health care. To observe the potential of various models, 
the governments are introducing the market competitive system and 
the privatisation of health care enterprises in order to improve 
the working efficiency of health system. The stated aim is to 
create more choices to the patient in order to satisfy various 
levels of need. However the leading proponent of private health 
insurance, the U. S. A. is now implementing health reform, based on 
some examples of Social Security Insurance in Western European 
countries. Developing countries will choose a particular model 
depending on their own condition. Whether the privatisation of 
health service can improve the quality and quantity of health care 
and its working efficiency or not, is a worthwhile topic for 
discussion. 
1.4.3 The change of health market system-privatization 
a. Definition of privatization 
In very general terms, privatization consists of a 
society moving from publicly to privately produced goods and 
services. Privatization generally entails making changes in some 
of the 'rules of the game'; i. e., changing some laws or 
regulations, on the nature, scope or existence of specific 
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government programs, and doing so in such a manner as to allow or 
encourage private sector entities to enter into domains in which 
they previously were not involved, or were not heavily involved 
(Fiedler 1990). Within the health sector, the privatization 
options are (1) private sources of funds (Price 1988). (2) the 
disposal of public hospitals and state owned health centres to the 
private sector. (3) substitution of fully subsidised health care 
services to the user pays philosophy, either as a part charge or a 
full charge to the individual. (4) the contracting out of public 
services to the private sector (Glennie 1991). 
The respective roles of the public and private sectors 
in the financing of health services vary among developing as well 
as developed countries, in 13 Asian countries private sector 
activity is strong: the private, public and insurance components 
as a per cent of total health expenditure were 48,42 and 10, 
respectively. The range of private health expenditure was 8-71% 
with a median 58% (Griffin 1992). For 21 African countries, 
private expenditure on health ranged from 14 to 81 % of total 
health expenditure with a median of 51% (World Bank 1987). BV 
contrast, public spending accounts for more than three-quarters of 
health spending, on average, in the OECD(Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) countries and accounts for more than 
60 per cent of spending in all countries expect the United States 
and Turkey where is above 40% (Newbrander and Parker 1992). 
b. The impetus for privatization 
In recent years, privatization has been most commonly 
discussed as a public goal motivated by (1) pragmatic 
considerations --- to reduce the burden on treasury and taxpayers, 
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and the belief that the private sector will be a supplementary 
force to an inadequate public sector (Naylor 1987). (2) to avoid 
some of the bureaucratic barriers to progress faced by public 
agencies, privatization of the public health system introduces 
competition which would lead to gain in efficiency and 
effectiveness. The people who support privatization think that 
state-run organizations are inefficient and impersonal with 
employees who share no financial incentive to provide a quality 
service (Donnelly 1991). (3) to give patient more choice within 
the health system (Glennie 1991). (4) to charge directly in the 
form of user fees and co-insurance and thereby reduce abuse of 
prepaid health service because the free health service and social 
security health insurance are too comprehensive and suffer from 
rampant-"Moral hazard" (Naylor 1987). 
In addition, the impetus toward privatization often 
comes from the providers themselves who wish to expand the private 
sector's share of the market, since if offers the greatest 
opportunities for incomes. These kind of health services have been 
seen in many African countries and in China, in the relaxation of 
restrictions on private medical practice by government physicians, 
such as in Sudan, the public provider is allowed to use the public 
facilities and staff in the evening to see private patients; in 
China, public hospitals in cities have opened their doors to 
private patients, but many people especially the rural patients 
find it difficult to pay for the health services they have used 
(Xiang Zheng 1988, Newbrander and Parker 1992). 
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c. Is privatisation a viable option? 
(1) As has been pointed out, health care should be a 
right and each person is entitled to a fair share of such services 
as determined by medical need rather than by income, or social 
status. But most of the hospitals which operate on a fee-for- 
service basis are profit-making enterprises. The private health 
system offers financial incentives to doctors to perform more 
investigations and treatment than are necessary or justifiable. 
Unlike other markets, the demand for health is strongly influenced 
by the provider. In the fee-for-services sector, health expenses 
form a much higher proportion of poorer households' income than of 
richer households'. Privatization of the health system limits poor 
people' needs, and produces inequality of access to health 
services (Fein 1986). Even so some people have joined risk 
arrangements such as, private health insurance. By its very 
nature, private health insurance cannot insure 100 percent of the 
population; it must exclude the poorest and least healthy. 
Insurance is based on inequality-segmentation of risk. In the free 
market, people are victims of the 'unfettered inequities' of the 
insurance principle (Daniels 1979, Bodenheimer 1990). 
(2) As has been mentioned above, a private health system 
is a profit-making enterprise. There is a risk that this style of 
approach could result in the overuse of technology because of 
financial incentives available to doctors. The administrative cost 
of running a private health insurance system including those in 
the physician's office is very high. Whereas in Britain less than 
6% of health care spending goes on administration, in the US the 
figure is some 22% (an estimated 77.7 billion dollars in 1983) 
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(Parker 1988). Therefore a private health system poses problems of 
cost control. 
In view of total health care cost, the UK's NHS, where 
there is government ownership of facilities, and Canada's national 
health insurance system, in which the provincial and federal 
governments pay and tightly regulate health care providers, cost 
containment has been largely successfu. Health care costs account 
for nearly 11 percent of the GNP in the US but only 6 percent in 
U. K. and 8 percent in Canada (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1986). 
(3) The privatisation of health services introduces 
market competition in to the health system, but it cannot be used 
as a means to improve government effectiveness because of the 
complex nature of health care delivery, and the wide variety of 
professional disciplines represented. In addition, the information 
gap between consumers and providers and the uncertainties 
associated with illness impede the decision process in health 
care. It is particularly difficult to measure the providers' 
performance (Smith and Lipsky 1992, Naylor 1987). So the health 
care market is imperfect on both the demand and supply sides. 
Consumers do not understand the product, and are uncertain as to 
how satisfy their needs from a free health care market when they 
are ill. 
(4) Privatization affects community health care and 
PHC. We know that a government run department of Public Health 
can change priorities from alcohol and drug abuse prevention, to 
AIDS education, to the care of chronic mental patients and 
counselling in successive budget cycles without batting an eye. 
This fits with a growing feeling that successful community health 
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care and primary health care should by their very natures be 
collaborative and intersectorial. It is very difficult for a 
private health system to undertake this work. Many established 
private health agencies either are reluctant or refuse to serve 
the developmentally disabled and the chronic mentally ill--two 
groups for which government desperately needs community services 
because of deinstitutionalization (Donnelly 1991, Smith and Lipsky 
1992). 
All countries need a process for making health policy 
choices and priorities in PHC that will serve to determine who 
gets what, and that delineates as clearly as possible what kinds 
of health services will not be provided and why. These choices 
should not be left to the free market because health service 
delivery in a free market is geared to profit from services and 
rarely considers the person's real need (Young 1990). 
To sum up the privatization of health services, we can 
see that privatization probably increases working efficiency (the 
contract system) and reduces the phenomena of 'moral hazard, but 
it concentrates too much upon profit-making and has very high 
administrative and marketing costs. Its unfairness principle 
affects the working class in industrialised countries and the poor 
in developing nations more deeply than any other sectors of the 
population. Privatization is non-collaborative and non- 
intersectorial, and therefore cannot improve primary health care 
structure which are very important to developing countries. The 
privatization of health services seems unsuitable for an imperfect 
health care market especially in poor areas, for example, health 
care privatization in Chile came about in an unusually strong 
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period of economic growth that was fuelled by heavy borrowing. 
That short-term boom ended, followed by recession, high 
unemployment, and a skewed distribution of income which reduced 
consumers' purchasing power to pay for private health services 
(Scarpaci 1987). The claim that imposing direct charge and user 
fees can reduce the abuse of medicine is only superficially 
correct. Such schemes predominantly act as deterrents for the poor 
and the elderly, result in increasing medical fees to recoup 
losses and ultimately only redistribute costs rather than 
effecting savings. Finally, countries seeking to increase the role 
of the private sector must ensure that they do not simply shift 
the cost burden from the government to elsewhere, and that they 
make adequate provision for safeguards for providing care to the 
poor and underserved (Benatar 1987). 
1.5 Summary of Part One 
As has been pointed out health conditions in the 
developing countries are much poorer than in the developed 
countries. The distribution of health resource is unbalanced. This 
imbalance is not only exists between the developed countries and 
the developing countries but also within countries, for example 
urban areas and rural areas. According to WHO principles, health 
should be every person's right. Every person should have the same 
opportunity to receive basic health services. The gap in health 
status between the developed countries and the developing 
countries should be reduced. To solve this problem, WHO issued a 
global target "Health for All by the Year 2000". Afterwards, WHO 
made a declaration which stated that Primary Health Care is the 
key to attaining this global target. Priorities in the PHC should 
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be set depending on each country's condition, but an important 
principle to secure implementation is equity. The process of PHC 
needs to involve the whole society, through community 
participation. Community participation should be related at all 
levels, and the objectives include not only health education, 
immunisation, family planning but also policy making. Chinese 
health policy making is usually "Top-down" in character. To 
increase effectiveness community participation is required which 
means from the "Bottom-up". Community health workers are the key 
to sucessful community participation. They differ from 
traditionally trained health personnel, and they need a diverse 
range of skills that extend beyond the realm of narrowly defined 
clinical practice. They are organizers, propagandists and 
promoters of community health activities. 
Countries should pay attention to the change in the 
world health care market when they realize WHO's global target. 
Every country, but especially developing countries should select 
the appropriate health service model. From experiences over the 
last thirty years, it has become clear that various health service 
models have advantages and disadvantages. The current trend 
observed is for the introduction of market competion and 
privatisation by governments into a previously free health system. 
The purpose of these reforms is to increase the efficiency of 
health services and reduce the financial burden of government. It 
appears that the fee-for-service or and private health insurance 
system cannot satisfy the peoples' need. It is necessary that 
governments support their health care systems and expand the 
coverage of health services. The test of this change is whether 
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the privatisation of health services can increase the quality and 
quantity of health services. In comparison, the privatisation of 
health services may increase working efficiency, but it reduces 
equity of health services and affects the implementation of PHC. 
Privatisation does not promote a positive means of perfecting the 
health care market, and is particularly unsuitable for developing 
countries and poor areas. 
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Part Two: Chinese Health Care Transformation in 1978-1990 
From 1978-1990, following the third Plenary Session of 
the 11th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the Chinese 
government implemented widespread economic reform(CCPCC Decision, 
January 1990). In the medical field, changes have been both a 
reflection of, and response to the economic reforms. Modernisation 
and new investment in science and technology have produced an 
emphasis upon the quality of care and the promotion of fundamental 
research into disease. Changes in the rural economy , in 
particular the responsibility system, have altered the system of 
cooperative funding for medical care (Hillier, 1988). So before I 
discuss "the three tier health network transformation in rural 
China", it is necessary to introduce the history of Chinese rural 
health care (1949-1978), and then to review the impact of health 
reforms in different sectors of Chinese health care, in order to 
realize the overall changes in Chinese health care organization, 
particularly in rural health care. 
1.7. Historical Perspectives on Rural Health Care(1949-1978) 
In 1949, China was described as having the greatest and 
most intractable health problems of any country in the world. The 
extent of morbidity and mortality from infectious and parasitic 
disease was enormous. The infant mortality was 200 per 1000. The 
death rate was 20 per 1000. The life expectancy was only 35 years. 
There were about 430 hospitals, although most of China's 2000 
counties had a small health clinic (Wu Yan Ming, 1988; Hillier and 
Jewell, 1983). 
After 1949, the structure of the health care systein was 
pyramidal, with the Ministry in Beijing at the apex down through 
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provincial and County Bureaux of Public Health with a 3-level 
network at the base linking the village to the township and county 
hospital. This model of health service delivery was similar to 
that designed by the League of Nations Health Organisation experts 
in the 1930's (Wang Jun Le, 1988), and has proved to be remarkably 
robust. 
As soon as the Communist government took power, 
immediate action was taken-centrally controlled and directed, 
towards the eradication of parasitic and infectious disease. Mass 
environmental 'clean-ups', and inoculation campaigns continued 
throughout the fifties, supported by a growing number of epidemic 
prevention stations. Towards the end of the 1950's during the 
'Great Leap Forward', when the Commune (township) became the 
fundamental economic unit, and the basis of agricultural 
production, free health care, based on commune and village clinics 
was introduced (Hou, 1958). 
From 1958-1963, the unsucessful agricultural policies of 
the Great Leap Forward wiped out many of the developments in 
health care organisation and left the rural areas of China 
severely disadvantaged relative to the cities (Hillier and Jewell, 
1983). Free, commune based health care ceased, and treatment was 
to be obtained only after a journey of several days and long 
queuing at the county hospital (SYC, 1983). 
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), radical 
changes in the health care system were proposed by a political 
commitment to 'putting the stress on rural areaso. This 
generalised directive undermined the detailed planning, which the 
Ministry of Public Health(MOPH) favoured. The cities were required 
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to send teams of doctors and students to work in the countryside, 
as part of mobile medical teams. The basic 3-level network of 
rural health care was revived, with the major emphasis on 
supporting and staffing the village clinics and expanding their 
numbers. Central government support for rural hospitals and 
clinics increased, and whereas in 1965 only 18% of hospital beds 
were in small town clinics and hospitals, by 1971 this had reached 
41% (SYC, 1983) . 
The production brigade (village) became the focus of two 
important developments, the barefoot doctor, and the Cooperative 
Medical System. Although medical auxiliaries and village health 
workers had existed since even before the Revolution, they now 
became a key focus for solving problems of rural health care. 
Young peasants were selected by their village, given a short 
practical training in all aspects of primary care, both preventive 
and curative. This enabled appropriate staffing levels for the 
expanding rural services to be achieved in a short space of time. 
It was claimed that they treated 80% of illnesses in the villages, 
limiting expensive hospital referrals. By 1972, there were about 2 
million barefoot doctors, a figure which has never been matched 
since (Hillier and Xiang Zheng, 1994). 
Each area or unit was designed to be self-financing and 
responsible for its own needs. In this way it was thought the 
incentives for improvement were strong and the control of waste 
and mismanagement easier. Risks were shared and the scheme 
represented a redistribution of resources within the brigade. The 
CMS can be seen as an effective method of providing low cost 
services for millions of people. Some 85% of brigades were in the 
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scheme by 1975 covering 650 million people, about 76% of China's 
rural population (World Bank, 1984). 
These developments were consolidated in the years 
following the Cultural Revolution. An infrastructure of basic 
level health care existed, with a referral system upwards for 
serious illness, there was decentralised responsibility for 
provision and financing; low cost care and basic health workers. 
Preventive health care was organised at grassroots level, carried 
out locally and supported by a chain of epidemic prevention 
stations and maternal and child health centres. This appealed to 
overseas visitors, who saw an attempt at rational and equitable 
heatlh care organisation, balancing the needs of town and 
countryside. 
But the difficulties encountered in the late seventies, 
before the economic reforms, were already undermining the rural 
health care system. Although some degree of redistribution had 
been achieved, overall investment by localities was low. In 
addition, health care facilities nationally, both in town and 
countryside, were failing to keep pace with population growth, and 
with the changing pattern of disease (Hillier and Xiang Zheng, 
1994). Whilst parasitic and infectious diseases still took their 
toll, morbidity and mortality from chronic complaints like heart 
disease and cancer were also increasing. The localisation of 
primary health care tasks at village level, although admirable in 
promoting horizontal and grassroots integration placed a huge 
burden on the primary care health workers-the barefoot doctors. 
Their numbers were declining by the late 70's, they were down from 
2 million in 1975 to 1.8 million by 1978. This was still however, 
over an average of 2 per village (Hillier and Xiang Zheng, 1994). 
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1.8 Changing Health Policies 
1.8.1 The background of the developments in health care 
During 1978-1989, Chinese health care organization 
changed dramatically. The number of doctors increased from an 
average of 0.5 per 1000 population to 1.01 per 1000 population, 
the number of beds from 1.84 beds per 1000 to 2.05 beds per 1000. 
The biggest growth was in the number of in-patients which 
increased from 25 million per year to 50 million or so. The 
capital value of hospitals enlarged threefold. 
The morbidity of infectious diseases dropped from 20 per 
1000 in 1978 to 4 per 1000 in 1989. Morbidity statistics, indicate 
that the pattern of diseases, in order of importance, are 
gastrointestinal disease, followed by respiratory disease and, 
accidental injury. The three main causes of death, in order of 
importance, are coronary heart disease, cerebrovascular disease 
and cancer. The mortality from infectious diseases dropped from 3 
per 100,000 to 1.4 per 100,000, the infant mortality declined from 
47 per 1000 to 13.9 per 1000 in the cities, 23.6 per 1000 in the 
rural areas. The death rate was 6.5 per 1000, the life expectancy 
was 69.1 years in 1989 (Zhi Jun-Bo, 1989). 
1.8.2 The content of changing health policies 
During health reform, health policies underwent two big 
changes. One was the reform of the structure of health management. 
The other was the reform of managerial methods. 
The main contents in the reform of the structure of 
health managment as outlined in the document of the State Council 
were (State Council of the PRC, April 1985; State Council of the 
PRC, February 1989): 
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a. Retention of State ownership as the overall method of 
control, co-existing with other health systems. 
b. The encouragement of a plurality of systems of ownership 
in the rural areas(including the private health system). 
c. The control and management of the township hospital to be 
transferred from county health bureau to the township government. 
d. Decision making in most hospitals to become the director's 
responsibility. The hospital director to control personnel matters 
and finance. 
The main reforms in managerial methods were 
a. To introduce a competitive market system which was called 
the economic responsibility system. This system had advantages in 
terms of specifying roles, responsibilities and benefits over 
simple positional responsibility, as found in the more 
traditional managerial approaches. Targets were set and technical 
and financial regulations clarified. 
b. Health workers were permitted to earn extra money 
afterhours or to hold two or more posts concurrently, and to set 
up specialised outpatient clinics. 
c. Charges were raised, and patients who used new equipment, 
or had more complex tests were charged more. 
d. Free services in preventive work were allowed to continue 
for the most part but there were to be some charges in connection 
with this work. Health insurance was to be developed, for example 
children's immunisation insurance and mother and infant 'safe 
delivery' insurance. 
e. Health units were to be allowed to do non-medical work in 
order to increase their finances (State Council of the PRC 1985r 
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1989) . 
The State Council document summarises the major 
changes. However examined in more detail, there are a further five 
major health policies which have had notable influences on Chinese 
health care organization during 1978-1990. 
a. A report of the Ministry of Public Health concerning 
permission for doctors to undertake private practice was approved 
by the State Council on August 20,1980. This gave legal status to 
private practitioners. When they had passed an examination, they 
would be granted a licence from the county or city bureau of 
public health. Those wishing to sell medicines required an 
additional permit from the bureau of business enterprise (MOPH, 
1980). The number of private doctors increased from 50,560 in 1983 
(Fu Xing-Zhi, 1986) to 157,943 in 1988 (ZGWSTJ, 1988). 
b. In 1982, the Ministry of Public Health introduced the idea 
of a pluralistic rural health system. This allowed for a mixture 
of health delivery services ranging from the cooperative medical 
system to private practice for example collective village health 
stations, group village health stations and solo village health 
stations (Nai-Su Zhu 1989). 
c. In 1985, the State Council issued document No. 62 Which 
was named "Some Policies of Health Work Reform". The document had 
eight items, which involved all aspects of health care. It 
stressed the relaxed policies and decentralization and set out 
proposals for a number of ways to collect funds for health care. 
For example, the fourth item was about supporting private doctors 
running their own businesses, the sixth item confirmed the 
pluralistic rural health system as a major policy to be 
implemented (State Council, 1985,4). 
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d. In the same year the Ministry of Public Health and the 
State Bureau of Chinese Traditional Medicine issued the 22 item 
"Health Reform Digest for 1985-1990". The contents confirmed the 
preceding directives on health reform, and stressed that these 
would be carried on (MOPH, 1987). 
e. The State Council issued Document No. 10 in Feb. 1989, 
entitled "An Opinion about Further Relaxation of Health Reform 
Policies". The main contents covered permission for health workers 
to earn extra money after-hours, the relationship between cost and 
quality in medical service and permission for health units to do 
non-medical work. The aim of the document was to relax labour 
policies and improve the living conditions of health workers (Yang 
Hong-An, 1989,8). 
1.8.3 Three health stages during health reform 
1. Early in the decade, in 1978-1981, the main focus was on 
medical modernization. The modernising trends meant that new 
investment was put into urban areas to build hospitals and to buy 
equipment. The emphasis on "medical modernization", extended to 
the question of health organization. However the aim was over 
ambitious. Because China was still recovering from the effects of 
the Cultural Revolution, there were not enough investment for 
thoroughgoing modernization of the health care system. Towards 
the end of 1981, the Ministry of Public Health felt that the pace 
of development was too rapid. Unrealistic targets had been set, 
for example the ambition of eliminating some infectious diseases 
by 1985. At the same time the Ministry of Public Health started to 
initiate reform in the rural areas by beginning to implement the 
pluralistic rural health system. This decision confused many among 
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the local health administrators. They interpreted the policy as 
complete laissez-faire. As a result, health administrators lost 
their direction, and became passive rather than active in 
maintaining any type of health care delivery (Nai-Su Zhu, 1989). 
In fact, most village health stations became private enterprises. 
Although the modernising reforms were planned to extend to one 
third of counties (701 counties) chosen as model counties, in fact 
only 300 counties began the implementation (Qian Xin-Zhong, 1980) - 
2. The Period of Rectification 1981-1985: During 1981-1985, 
the Ministry of Public Health revised the policy which it had 
initiated three years earlier and suggested some new guiding 
principles for reforming health organization. These were aimed at 
the rectification of earlier reforms to slow down the pace of 
expansion. Contracts for some hospital buildings were cancelled 
because there were not enought resources to support these (Qian 
Xin-Zhong, 1981). In the rural areas, the remaining model 
counties began to implement health reform. 
3. By 1985, the reform of the rural health system was 
basically finished. The Ministry of Public Health decided to begin 
health reforms in the urban areas. The main tasks were to 
introduce a market competitive system which means that the 
economic targets are set by contract in hospitals (including 
county and township hospitals), and to implement the responsiblity 
system. This stressed the need to separate Party and State work, 
and therefore to separate the Party secretary and hospital 
director's work in city hospitals and institutes (Cui Yue-Li, 
1985). 
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The health policies were all made by the central 
government. The process of policy-making progresses thus: The 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee decides the direction, 
the State Council builds organizations which are in charge of 
various sections, then the Ministry of Public Health makes 
specific health policies. Normally, these policies need to be 
approved by the State Council or they are issued directly by the 
State Council to confer greater authority on them. If the general 
direction decided by the CCPCC is not appropriated, the health 
policies made by the Ministry of Public Health will automatically 
become unreasonable and unfeasible. The decline of the CMS which 
is referred to below was due to the political need to wipe out all 
matters associated with the Cultural Revolution completely. (see 
1.12.3)(Nai-Su Zhu, 1989) The development of Chinese Traditional 
Medicine without consideration of its financial viability on a 
national scale (see Chapter 4.3)(Hu Zhao Ming, 1986) is a further 
example of topdown policy-making mentioned in part 1. Community 
participation in policy-making does not exist. This is despite the 
fact that China is so big that there are different situations in 
various areas, and consequently it is very difficult to make the 
right policies without advice from local government, community 
organisations, professional organisations and individuals. This is 
why the process of reform requires monitoring. 
1.9 Health Reform in Hospitals 
1.9.1 Problems with hospital facilities 
Though initially the main focus of health reform was on 
the rural areas, a nationwide modernizing health strategy had 
supposedly been pursued since 1980. At that time, the health 
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resources of the whole country were insufficient to meet the needs 
of the population. At the end of 1983, the number of beds in 
hospitals was only 2.07 per 1000 population, whilst the number of 
patients suffering from infectious disease amounted to 15 mill-ion 
per year. Thus the supply of hospital beds was inadequate. and was 
a long queue (The State Council, 1985,4). 
The main reason for this situation was capital scarcity. 
The average total health expenditure of hospitals was 13 billion 
yuan per annum, but hospitals received only 3 billion yuan in 
financial support from central and local government (province and 
city). Hospitals were obliged to derive income from taking on 
contracts with factories and enterprise units or suburban 
governments and townships to treat their patients. However, 
patient charges only accounted for one third or one fourth of 
hospital costs. Hospitals were losing 0.95 to 1.8 billion yuan per 
annum (Zhi Jun-Bo, 1987,6). 
A further reason was that there were no analysis of cost 
effectiveness and cost-benefit in hospitals, the charges for 
patients were lower than the cost of treatment, and there was very 
serious waste of resources in hospitals. These points will be 
developed further in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
There was no standard job-description for health workers 
and no standard hiring quotas were set up in hospitals. In order 
to solve national employment problems, many health workers were 
taken on, but there was no corresponding increase in beds, and 
many workers were underemployed. 
Finally, most hospital directors had lacked 
management experience and knowledge although they had been 
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installed under the 'reforms'. The administrative organizations 
were overstaffed and inefficent in their work. There were usually 
7-10 managers (including the director and Party secretary) in 
hospitals (Ji Yun-Long, 1979). Non-medical staff, managers and 
back-up personnel accounted for 19.6 per cent of total health 
staff (ZGWSTJ, 1988). 
The number of government owned hospitals has been 
decreasing. There were 60,400 hospitals in 1987, a decrease of 7 
percent compared with 1978. Most of the hospitals which have 
closed were small township hospitals with less than 50 beds. 
Total beds in all hospitals increased from 1.856 million in 1978 
to 2.404 million in 1987, a rise of 29.5 percent. Beds were 
concentrated in county or city hospitals, while rural hospitals 
remained overcrowed or somewhat inaccessible. When the government 
hospitals decreased, the number of non-government hospitals in 
factories, mines and other enterprises, shot up by 37.1 percent 
1980-1988 (ZGWSTJ, 1988, Hillier and Xiang Zheng, 1994). 
1.9.2 Reform methods in more detail 
Since 1985, health reform in the urban areas has been 
undertaken, rural health reform was by that time nearly 
completed. The main urban reforms had four aspects: firstly, in 
government hospitals, the director of the hospital or institute 
bore responsibility for all major decision making. Main areas of 
responsibility included personnel and financial matters. The main 
management tool was the contract system (see definition). Using 
the contract system means that the local ministry of public health 
laid down economic targets for the hospital. Actually, a market 
competitive system was introduced into hospitals. If the hospital 
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achieved the target and made more money, it could decide on the 
disposal of this surplus (Cui Yue-Li, 1985). 
Secondly, hospitals were able to rectify their prices 
(in practice, this meant raising prices). Hospitals could charge 
patients more when using new equipment, and price was related to 
quality. For example, the registration fee* to see a professor 
was raised to 5 yuan per time, the registration fee to see a 
senior doctor was 2 yuan. The hospitals could charge an inpatient 
admission fee of 7 yuan per day in Shanghai and Beijing. 
Guangdong province, one of the richest provinces can charge much 
more than other provinces in its hospitals. 
Thirdly, the Ministry of Public Health permitted health 
workers to earn extra money after-hours. Health workers could work 
longer hours and go to county and twonship hospitals to treat 
patients (Fu Xing-Zhi, 1988). 
1.9.3 The positive consequences of the health reform in hospitals 
The most obvious positive consequence was the increase in 
the quantity of out-patients and in-patients recieving treatment 
by 20 percent, as a result of implementing the contract system and 
the economic incentives. There was a more rational and increasing 
use of medical equipment, for example the rate of CT usage rose by 
at least 400 percent. Previously, hospitals had the equipment, but 
it often lay idle (Ding You-He, 1983). 
Next, hospital management was strengthened, and working 
efficiency improved. Research into hospital organization in 37 
*Registration fee means patients pay for each hospital visit 
themselves. 
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counties of Hubei province was carried out. Those directors of 
hospitals in the 25 counties which had implemented the 
responsibility system thought their decision-making powers had 
increased. 96% of directors felt they could control the use of 
equipment, 88% of directors had full financial control, 72% 
controlled personnel matters. Prior to these reforms, such 
control always rested with the hospital's Party Secretary (X iang 
Zheng, 1989). 
Finally, hospital income was increased. In 1 986, 
Chongqing city in Sichuan province raised the standard charge for 
in-patients by 0.5 yuan per day, examination fees were raised by 
35 percent. The local ministry of public health increased its 
income by 7 million yuan in one year (Zhao Ge-Ming, 1987). 
1.9.4 The negative consequences of the health reform in hospitals 
1. Health service quality decreased. Because of 
increasing numbers of patients, hospitals could not ensure 
accessible health facilities and back-up services for all 
patients. The director of the hospital was mainly concerned with 
earning money for the organisation. In 1988, the bureau of public 
health in Tianjin investigated the quality of its health 
services. Compared with the results in 1984, the percentage of 
patients satisfied with their health service decreased from 80% to 
55% in 1988 (Yan Hui-Zhong, 1989). 
2. Professional quality was reduced. Unprofessional 
behaviour occured amongst doctors. Because they wanted to earn 
extra money, they prefered to 'moonlight' at county and suburban 
hospitals and ignored the quality of service in their own 
hospital. Some doctors asked for gifts from patients, or passively 
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accepted the patient's gift. According to the Tianjin quality 
control investigation, the percentage of doctors accepting gifts 
increased from 20% in 1984 to 74% in 1988. By 1989 this behaviour 
was almost commonplace. The percentage of doctors actively 
requesting gifts was 10% in 1984 , and increased to 21% in 1988 in 
Tianjin. This phenomena caused widespread criticism and impaired 
the doctors' reputations (Yan Hui-Zhong, 1989, Hou Lian-Sheng, 
1989,7). 
3. Medical expenditure by patients has increased year by 
year. One of the reasons was that doctors wrote out "expensive 
prescriptions" in order to profit from selling medicine. In 
Beijing Union Hospital, each prescription cost on average 5.15 
yuan in 1986. In 1987, this went up to 7.23 yuan, and 9.67 yuan in 
1988. The in-patient fee was, on average, 637.65 yuan per patient 
in 1986,757.75 yuan per patient in 1987,931.52 yuan per patient 
in 1988 (Zhi Jun-Bo, 1988). According to a sample survey of 
China's hospitals, unreasonable lexpensive prescriptions' 
accounted for 2 percent of all prescriptions. An unofficial 
estimate suggests the figure maybe 10fold higher. Similarly, the 
figure for unnecessary tests had reached 20% (Huang Zhe-Min, 
1989). 
So the competitive system brought economic vigour to 
hospitals, but at the same time, the quality of services 
decreased. Therefore there is a conflict of objectives between 
implementing a competitive system in hospitals whilst trying to 
retain the social benefits of health services, especially in 
developing countries characterised by a scarcity of health 
resources. 
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1.10 The State of Health Finances 
1.10.1 Scarcity of government health investment 
Chinese health care is seen as an aspect of social 
welfare. Thus patient charges were set below the cost of health 
services. Since 1949, medical fees have been reduced 3 times, and 
the proportion of medical cost covered by patient charges has 
become less and less. According to the Ministry of Finance, which 
calculates the balance of income and cost in all medical units, 
the financial deficit was 0.95 billion yuan in 1984 (Fu Xing-Zhi, 
1987). How did the Ministry of Public Health make up the deficit? 
The Ministry of Public Health wanted the government to increase 
health investment. After 1978, when health investment stood at 
2.02% of government expenditure, the government increased health 
investment to 2.49% in 1980, and 2.97% in 1985. In capital 
construction costs, the proportion for health investment increased 
from 0.64% in 1978,1.44% in 1980 and 1.68% in 1985 (ZGWSTJ, 
1988). 
After 1985 however, government health investment 
decreased because of economic problems in China. Health 
investment was 6.428 billion yuan, accounted for 2.79% of 
government financial expenditure in 1986, and decreased to 5.946 
billion yuan in 1987,2.45% of government financial expenditure 
(ZGWSTJ, 1988). This was less than the investment in education and 
was far from the 5% standard of GNP which was recommended by WHO 
(Zhi Jun-Bo, 1987,6). According to the final accounts, the total 
financial subsidy accounted for one third of health expenditure in 
1984, and was reduced to one fifth in 1989. The remaining health 
costs had to be found by the health work unit itself. An analysis 
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of salaries showed that the salary of health workers was in 
fifth position out of 13 professions in 1982, but it had fallen 
to tenth position by 1987. The salary of a health worker was 36 
yuan less than the national average for all equivalent workers 
(Huang Zhe-Min, 1989). 
1.10.2 Three options to solve this problem 
In view of this situation, how should China develop its 
health care? There are three options. Option one, the government 
could increase health investment and continue to be responsible 
for all aspects of health care. Option two, the government could 
give some financial aid, whilst patient charges could be 
increased. The proportion of free services should reduce in 
order to save the balance of costs no longer recieved from the 
government. Option three, the health work units could become 
independent and set their own charges or implement privatisation. 
Under the current conditions, option one is too difficult for the 
government to undertake. Option three is too expensive for the 
patients. Option two conforms to reality better (Zhi Jun- 
Bo, 1987,3). It formed the background to the 62nd document in 
1985, and the 10th document in 1989 which were issued by the State 
Council. The main points concentrated on two forms of payment by 
patients, to increase standard charges for patients and to 
reduce the proportion of free services without changing the 
characteristic of health care. 
1.10.3 The uneven allocation of health investment 
There appeared to be an uneven allocation of health 
investment between rural and urban areas. In other words, the 
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reforms themselves did nothing to improve the imbalance. Urban 
expenditure is estimated in excess of 80 yuan per capita, more 
than triple the rural expenditure. Also striking are the patterns 
of public expenditure on health. State subsidies for health in 
urban areas exceed by a factor of almost ten those for rural 
areas, approximately 70 yuan per capita compared to less than 7 
yuan per capita. Private expenditures per capita amount to less 
than 6 yuan in urban areas but over 10 yuan in rural areas 
(Jamison, 1985). As of 1988 most urban workers continued to pay 
only a fraction of their medical bills, while the majority of 
rural residents continued to bear almost the full cost themselves. 
Moreover, urban residents still have better access to hospitals 
and specialty clinics than rural residents (Beijing Review, 1988). 
1.11 Health Personnel 
After 1949, the numbers of health personnel grew very 
rapidly, reaching 4,313,011 persons by the end of 1985, compared 
with 540,000 persons in 1949, an almost 7-fold increase Mi Man- 
Chun, 1988). In 1949, there were 15,234 undergraduate students in 
medical and pharmacy colleges. By 1988, the number of medical 
undergraduate students had reached by 191,527, an 12.5-fold of 
1949 (ZGWSTJ, 1988). 
1.11.1 The structure of health personnel 
There is a shortage of middle level professional staff. 
In 1988, the proportion of high level professional staff who 
graduated from medical university and college was 25.9%; middle 
level professional staff who graduated from middle medical school 
(nurse, midwife), 47.8%; primary health worker (assistant 
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nurse), 26.3%. But the standard proportion of health personnel was 
1: 3: 1 (high: middle: primary). It was obvious that the proportion of 
middle level professional staff was too low (Zhu Ao-rong, 
1988,10). In 1987, there were 0.6 million nurses in China. But 
nurses were only working above county hospital level. There were 
no nurses in primary health organizations. If nurses were to be 
allocated to all hospitals on the basis of standard proportion, 
there would be a shortfall of at least 1 million nurses in China 
(Cui Yue-Li, 1987). 
There is no continuous education system. Most doctors do 
not get the opportunity to further their studies after graduation. 
There were very few advanced medical schools in China (Li Man- 
Chun, 1988). 
1.11.2 The uneven distribution of health personnel 
The geographical distribution of health personnel is 
uneven. In 1988, there are 7.69 per thousand health personnel in 
the urban areas, 2.12 per thousand in the rural areas. The number 
of senior doctors was 3.25 per thousand in the urban areas, 0.84 
per thousand in the rural areas (ZGWSTJ 1988). In addition, there 
was an obvious gap between rich areas and remote areas and those 
on the borders or inhabited by national minority. Coastal areas 
were generally better served than those inland. 
There is a lack of co-ordination of medical education 
planning between medical professional staffs and health 
administrators. Whilst most health administrators are professional 
staff who have graduated from medical universities and colleges, 
they lack a knowledge of health management. In Yunnan provincel 
for example only 1.92% of health administrators had ever studied 
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health management (Zhu Ao-Rong 1988,10). 
There is a lack of coordination in hospitals between 
medical staffs, public health and MCH workers. For example, in 
Shandong province, the number of clinic practitioners accounted 
for 65% of all medical professionals, the number of preventive 
health workers only accounted for 8%. In Jilin province, the MCH 
workers accounted for 3% of all health workers (Dong Hui-Jun, 
1989). 
These problems had developed because of the following: 
1. The training of health personnel is divorced from 
practice. Three different government departments are involved. 
Health personnel planning is done by the Health Department, 
training is carried out by the Education Department, allocation 
of health personnel is made by a Central and Local Planning 
Committee. The three departments are independent of each other 
and lack coordination. 
2. The teaching institutions are dependent only on the 
Ministry of Education. Their only concern is student through-put. 
They do not need to consider health service needs. 
3. There were strong pressures to achieve higher status 
for the non-elite. As a result, many good middle medical schools 
became universities and colleges during health reform. This 
aggravated the poor-coordination of health personnel planning. 
4. There was no policy about training health personnel 
for the rural areas. The higher medical school did not train 
the students which the rural areas needed. 
5. There was a shortage of educational investment (Da 
Lian Conference, 1989,11). 
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Looking at the last section concerning the allocation of 
health investment and this section, the same phenomenon can be 
observed. This is the inequity in utilisation of health resources 
between urban areas and rural areas. The urban residents enjoy 
better access to health services than those of rural areas. This 
inbalance has become a serious obstacle in the development of 
rural health care. 
1.12 Primary Health Care Change in the Rural Areas 
1.12.1 The decline of the CMS 
During health reform, Chinese rural health care 
developed more slowly than urban health care. The number of 
hospitals above county level increased from 8,000 to 12,000, a 
50% increase between in 1978-1989. But the number of township 
hospitals decreased by 14.2% from 55,000 to 47,000. The number of 
beds increased in city hospitals by 57.4% (1.127 million beds). In 
township hospitals, it decreased by 3.3% from 0.747 million to 
0.723 million. Therefore, one effect of the reform was to 
lessen hospital resources in the countyside. However, the most 
important change was the disintegration of the Cooperative Medical 
System (ZGWSTJ, 1988). 
At the end of 1978, as health reform was beginning, the 
CMS covered 82% of villages in China. The three tier primary 
health networks were in place. Following the third plenary session 
of the 11th Party Central Committee in 1978, new policies were 
designed to stimulate the economy and overcome the low levels of 
productivity in industry and agriculture, particularly the latter. 
These policies were a hybrid attempt to combine socialist planning 
with a competitive market system. Collective agriculture, based on 
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the team and commune system was abolished. Instead, individual 
household production of grain and a diversification of rural 
enterprises was encouraged. This effectively ended collective 
projects. The changes in rural economic structure made it 
difficult for collective financial and popular support for the CMS 
to continue (Ding You-He, 1980,7). 
In 1979, the Ministry of Public Health's policy for the 
rural areas was to continue to insist on the CMS as the basic 
funding form. In line with the ideology of modernisation, which 
also accompanied the reforms, however, it was emphasised that the 
professional level of barefoot doctor's (BFD) needed to be 
improved, by rotational training of BFD. A new and important 
objective was approved which differed from previous policies. This 
was to strengthen the health work units at county level e. g. the 
county hospital, epidemic staion, MCH. This was a further example 
of 'modernizing' in health policy (Qian Xin-Zhong, 1979). During 
the period 1979-1980, the CMS began to diminish and coverage was 
reduced to 67% villages (ZGWSTJ, 1987). 
Throughout 1980, the Ministry of Public Health 
maintained a consistent policy towards the CMS and continued to 
stress a steady improvement of the BFD standards of practice. But 
the Ministry of Public Health did not stress a standard nationwide 
proportion of recompense for patients in the CMS. Villages could 
make the standard of recompense to whatever suited their financial 
resources. Before 1980, the higher the standard of recompense was, 
the better the CMS was (Qian Xin-Zhong, 1980). The CMS coverage 
now was down to 65% or so of villages (ZGWETJ, 1987). 
In 1981, because of the effects of rural economic 
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reform, the Ministry of Public Health began to consider how to 
develop Chinese rural health care in the new economic climate. The 
Ministry of Public Health agreed that a village which had good 
economic conditions should retain the CMS, but if the village was 
poor, it could charge patients and need not implement the CMS- It 
was the first time that the Ministry of Public Health had given 
permission to charge patients, actually, it gave the 'green 
light' to the implementation of privatisation in rural health 
care. This marked a turning point in rural health policy. An 
important change accompanying it was that the BFD could obtain a 
rural doctor's license and bear the title 'rural doctor' if he or 
she passed an examination. Otherwise the BFD was now known as 
'rural health worker' (Qian Xin-Zhong, 1981). In the 1981, the 
CMS still covered about 60% of villages. There had been only a 
slight decrease (ZGWSTJ, 1987). 
In 1982-1983, the Ministry of Public Health began to bow 
to those political pressures which wanted to remove all forms of 
collective provision. The Ministry of Public Health thought that 
a high level of recompense to CMS users was good regardless of the 
actual economic conditions of the village and peasants. It was the 
first time the MOPH criticized the slogan 'the higher the standard 
of recompense was, the better the CMS was'. In 1982, the Ministry 
of Public Health made an informal confirmation of the pluralistic 
rural health system (Luo Yi-Qun, 1983). Then in 1983, the CCPCC 
issued the first document which encouraged the implementation of 
the responsibility and contract system in agriculture, industrial 
enterprises and business. Whilst the document recognised that 
cultural and health enterprises continued to retain government and 
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collective forms of management, they too were encouraged to give 
more responsibility to individual enterprise managers (CCPCC, 
1983). This document emanating from the CCPCC gave the Ministry of 
Public Health confidence to implement the responsibility and 
contract system in the management of health organization in rural 
areas. After that, the Ministry of Public Health confirmed 
officially a pluralistic rural health system. It said "A 
pluralistic rural health system was superior to the CMS which was 
a single rural health system. We should confirm and encourage the 
way" (Wang Wei, 1983). As a consequence the CMS went into a sharp 
decline with coverage reduced to 9% of villages in 1983 (ZGWSTJ, 
1987). 
In 1985, the State Council issued document 62, item 6 
of which reconfirmed the necessity of a pluralistic rural health 
system. Then the Ministry of Public Health decided officially to 
change the name of Barefoot Doctor into Rural Doctor. The BFD was 
created in the Cultural Revolution by Zhang Chun-Qiao , one of the 
discredited Gang of Four, who put forward the name at the 
begining of the Cultural Revolution. But it was to be regarded as 
an outdated title from now on (Chen Min-Zhang, 1985,1). The BFD's 
time had passed (Luo Yi-Qun, 1985). 
In 1986, the CMS decreased to 5.4%. As of 1988, the 
CMS covered 5.7% of villages, and had changed its form to allow 
pluralistic sources of payment. It recieved its money from per 
capita payments and also received a subsidy from the collective 
fund, the taxation of rural industrial enterprises and funds from 
the regional health budget (Luo Yi-Qun, 1987,10; ZGWSTJ, 1988; 
Hillier and Xiang Z 1990,2). 
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During 1978-1986, the numbers of BFD decreased. 0.37 
million barefoot doctors, midwives and rural medical workers left 
their jobs. During the same period when every component of the 
rural nonagricultural sector was gaining employees, the numbers 
working in health actually declined (Taylor, 1988). 
1.12.2 Consequences of the decline of the CMS 
First of all, the breakdown of the CMS produced a 
serious impact on all primary health care activities, such as, 
mass mobilization for the Public Health Campaigns, eradication of 
schistosomiasis by eliminating snails, providing basic maternal 
and child health care (Chen-PC, 1983). 
Second, the decline of the CMS also increased the 
financial burden of illness borne by the peasants. Stays in 
hospital were to become a heavy burden for patients. The high 
cost may have prevented some patients from seeking necessary 
treatment (Henderson, 1982). 
Third, these changes have had a major impact on the 
continuing education of barefoot doctors or rural doctors. In 
1978, the cost of barefoot doctors' education and their salary 
during training was generally financed by the CMS. After its 
decline, even though many barefoot doctors can now earn a living 
on a fee-for service basis, the means of upgrading their skills is 
impaired, and the quality of preventive and curative services may 
suffer (Liu YC, 1983). 
Fourth, preventive medicine is affected by the decline 
of the CMS. Without the CMS, emphasis on preventive programs has 
decreased, because they are not as profitable on a fee-for-service 
basis as medical treatment, even though they may be more cost- 
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benificial to the township (McClargey-M, 1989). For example, 
according to an investigation in 12 townships of Dezhou, Shandong 
province which reported cases of poliomyelitis, each township had 
only one preventive health worker, 75% of rural doctors had 
incomes which were less than those of peasants. So rural doctors 
did not want to do preventive work. As a result, some children 
were not innoculated and suffered from poliomyelitis. In January- 
July, 1988, there were 209 poliomyelitis cases in China, but 
during the same period in 1989, these cases increased to 525. One 
of the aims of preventive health work is to eliminate 
poliomyelitis in China by 1995. Without solving the innoculation 
problem in the rural areas, this aim will be very difficult to 
achieve Meng Ling-Qiao, 1989,9). 
1.12.3 The causes of the decline of the CMS 
A number of factors are responsible, and these are 
discussed below. 
1. The decline was clearly influenced by political 
factors. The CMS developed rapidly during the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976). The Gang of Four once labeled it as "newborn thing" 
produced by that political campaign. Now that period of history is 
commonly regarded as a disaster. The CMS was considered by some to 
have been a product of the Cultural Revolution, and therefore they 
thought that it should be dismantled. Subsequently the changes in 
health policy speeded up the decline (Nai-Su Zhu, 1989). 
2. The decline was caused by lack of availability of 
collective funds. The changes of rural economic structure induced 
major changes in the funding of the Cooperative Medical System. As 
a result of the responsibility system, peasants' income increased. 
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With the change from collective to individual production, the 
village welfare funds disappeared, because the villages no longer 
administered any collective revenue from the sale of their village 
produce. The village administrators were unable to pay the 
barefoot doctors' salaries. Therefore, many transferred the 
resposibility system of agriculture into health work. The village 
committee made a contract with the BFDs to run the clinic or the 
BFDs carried out their own business. This meant that the BFDs 
became in effect private doctors and the village health stations 
were run as private enterprise (Luo Yi-Qun, 1983). 
3. The decline was caused by increasing demands for a 
better quality of health services. The peasants' income increased 
and they demanded a better quality of health services. They were 
willing to pay for services at the township hospital or the county 
hospital (Hsiao, 1984). 
4. The decline of the CMS can also be attributed to the 
low quality of the BFDs. The usefulness of barefoot doctors was 
strictly limited to an early period in the development of health 
services in a poor rural community, when preventable disease 
caused a major part of morbidity. Prevention then was, from the 
technical point of view, a fairly simple task. The method of 
training BFDs was to give them a short-term initial training, then 
rotate them over a longer period. This took a lot of time, and 
was ineffective. It proved very difficult to improve the BFD's 
professional level to that of a middle level doctor. One health 
planning objective which has been suggested is to directly train 
middle and high school students for two to three years. These 
students could replace the low quality BFD (Luo Yi-Qun, 1985,3). 
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Training could be geared to producing a more $all-round' 
community health worker, who retains local contacts, and possesses 
organisational, as well as clinical skills. 
1.13 Summary of Part Two 
1.13.1 Health reform produced positive consequences in Chinese 
health care 
Chinese health care has been affected by health reform. 
By and large the main changes were a relaxation of previously 
rigid policies and an extension of various ways of developing 
health care, for example, the Ministry of Public Health permitted 
doctors who worked in the national hospitals to make extra money 
after-hours. A market competitive model which is the economic 
responsibility system has been implemented in the Chinese health 
care market, and this has brought economic vigour to hospitals. In 
the urban areas, decision making in government hospitals, became 
the directors responsibility. The Ministry of Public Health 
rectified the price standard and encouraged self-sufficiency in 
urban hospitals. Health work units devised various ways of 
collecting funds to overcome the shortage of national investment. 
1.13.2 The main problems in Chinese health care 
1. The main disadvantages of health reform were that the 
urban areas received more benefit from health reform. Unequal 
distribution of health resources brought rural health care into a 
position of difficulty (Shu-Min Huang, 1988). 
2. The CMS declined. Rural doctors and health workers 
replaced the barefoot doctors, with one important difference, that 
is, a majority of them were private doctors. Therefore only a 
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small minority of peasants can now rely on a collective health 
insurance plan to defray the cost of hospital care, and thus a 
majority are at risk of financial disaster if any member falls 
seriously ill. Privatisation of health care restricted rural 
residents' utilisation of health services (Davis, 1989). 
3. Health policies which were made during health reform 
were lacking in operational detail, and some were unfeasible. For 
example, having to implement a plurality of systems in rural areas 
confused the local health administrators, because the process of 
policy-making lacked any community participation and was affected 
by political factors. 
In China, 80% of the population live in the rural areas. 
Therefore rural health care should be the most important aspect of 
health work and the object of careful planning. How is it to be 
strengthened? How are the consequences of the reform in rural 
health care to be evaluated? What health system is the most 
suitable for rural health care? What problems in rural health care 
lie in the future? Specific research work is necessary to reply to 
these questions, and below, in the following chapters, an attempt 
will be made to reach answers. 
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Chapter 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS 
2.1 Research Contents 
1. Principles of selection: 
a. A consideration of the county, township, village and the 
three tiers. 
b. Research subjects include administrators, providers and 
the consumers, i. e. leaders at various levels, doctors and rural 
residents. 
c. The changes in the rural three tier health network 
following health reform. 
d. An examination of the changes from the point of view of 
individual, finance and property. 
e. Two approaches are used, i. e historical and current. 
2. The main research contents 
a. For all three levels 
To investigate the basic health conditions of rural 
residents; their health service need and utilization, the factors 
which have influenced health service need and utilization by rural 
residents after health reform; an evaluation by rural residents of 
the health service. 
b. County level 
i. To investigate the function and effect of county 
health organization. 
ii. To investigate the influence of health reform on the 
health service and financial conditions of the county hospital. 
iii. To study the status and functions of the Chinese 
traditional medicine hospital. 
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iv. To investigate the influence of health reform on the 
county health school. 
c. Township level 
To investigate the basic health service, financial 
status, and health personnel in the township hospital* to compare 
reformed and unreformed township hospitals. 
d. Village level 
i. To investigate and compare efficiency and equity 
issues among a variety of health delivery models including the 
CMS, private practitioners and group practices. 
ii. To investigate the attitudes of rural doctors, 
village leaders and rural residents towards the development of 
village health care. 
2.2 Research Site, Subjects and Chronology 
1. Places and subjects 
The investigation took place in the East-China Region, 
which includes three provinces: Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Shandong. 
Most of the research was carried out in Jiangxi province in 1989. 
But there was a supplementary investigation in four counties in 
1990 which concentrated on county level health organisation. one 
was in Zhejiang (it was also investigated in 1989), another in 
Shandong, the remaining two in Jiangxi (they are two of the seven 
counties which were investigated in 1989). In these four 
counties, there were four county hospitals and three county 
health schools. The purposes of supplementary investigation were: 
a. to understand further the financial conditions of county 
hospitals since these are the most important health organisations 
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at county level; b. to understand the influence of health reform 
on the county health school which is the base for training rural 
health personnel. Places and subjects are shown in Table 2.1 and 
Table 2.2. 
Table 2.1 Investigative places in 1989-1990 
Provinces County Township* Village* 
Jiangxi 7 9 21 
Zhengjiang 
Shandong 
1 
1 
3 
0 
9 
0 
Total 9 12 30 
*Townships and villages were selected in four counties 
from Jiangxi and Zhejiang in 1989. 
Table 2.2 Number of investigative subjects 
Subjects 1989 1990 
Households 725 0 
Rural residents 3493 0 
Inpatients 482 0 
County leaders 17 0 
County hospitals 7 4 
County Chinese 
traditional hospitals 7 0 
County health schools 0 3 
Township leaders 20 0 
Township hospital doctors 162 0 
Township hospitals 12 0 
Rural doctors in village 
health stations 44 0 
Village leaders 59 0 
Village health stations 21 0 
95 
2. Research data utilized in the thesis 
Chapter 3: the data concerning health services for rural 
residents were from three counties in Jiangxi, and one county in 
Zhejiang in 1989. 
Chapter 4: the data concerning health care at county level 
were from seven counties in Jiangxi in 1989 and four counties in 
Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Shandong in 1990. 
Chapter 5: the data concerning township hospitals were 
from nine townships in three counties of Jiangxi and three 
townships in one county of Zhejiang in 1989. 
Chapter 6: the data concerning health care at village 
level were from 21 villages in Jiangxi in 1989. 
2.3 Research Methods and Steps 
1. Basic research method 
This study was designed to analyze current health 
delivery models by a structure-process-outcome approach (Jay L. 
Lebow, 1974). This approach is multi-disciplinary and involves 
using ideas and concepts from health management, health economics, 
statistics epidemiology and health policy. 
a. Basic data were recorded by using the research form 
at the worksite (see apppedix). 
b. The questionnaire survey of attitudes and intentions. 
Rural residents were surveyed by visiting their 
families. The head of the household answered the questions, the 
investigator filled out the questionnaire. In the survey of rural 
leaders and doctors, they filled out the questionnaire themselves. 
The investigator explained the questionnaires, collected and 
checked them at the worksite. 
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There were no refusals and no survey forms were returned 
incomplete. 
Selection and sampling 
a. All counties in China have been classified by the 
State Bureau of Social Statistics into three categories, according 
to their average annual per capita income in 1984 (SBSSCr 1985). 
These counties were considered according to their economic level 
(high, middle and low income). 
b. After that, the townships and villages to be studied 
were selected using cluster sampling. Once a county, township and 
village had been chosen, the county hospital, the county Chinese 
traditional medicine hospital, the township hospital and the 
village health station were included as respondents. 
C. Households and Inpatients were selected using a simple 
random sampling technique. 
We chose the households in two stages. As mentioned 
above, firstly, we used cluster sampling to choose 30 villages 
from the townships and countries which have been selected. 
Secondly, we used a simple random sampling to choose households 
which are the basic unit for investigation. a. We obtained a list 
of the head of household ID number from each village committee. b. 
Each ID number was divided by 15. This number is determined 
according to an amount of households which we are able to do. Then 
we obtained the remainder of 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 
which cannot be divided. The same number of households would be 
put in one group. We chose one group from 15 groups for 
investigation. 
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Inpatients were selected from 7 county hospitals 
(average 70 inpatients per hospital). We chose inpatients by a 
systematic samping method. We went to patient's file office of the 
department of inpatient and chose inpatient from medical unit, 
surgical unit, gyneulogical unit and pediatric unit (each unit 
inpatient accounts for 25%). We followed the file order choosing 
one each 20th file until we obtained an appropriate number of 
patients. 
Because of the limitation of time and researchers, the 
townships, the villages and household were selected from three 
counties in Jiangxi and one county in Zhejiang in 1989. By means 
of these sampling procedures, 15% of the townships, 4% of the 
villages of the four counties were selected, 6% of the households 
were selected from the villages which were investigated. The 
research method and steps in 1990 were same as those in 1989. 
2.4 The Data Sources 
1. Basic data sources 
a. Health statistical yearbook of the Ministry of Public 
Health. 
b. Health statistical yearbook of the county health bureau. 
c. The bureau of county social statistics. 
d. The financial bureau of the county 
e. The yearly report of the county hospital and county 
Chinese traditional hospital. 
f. The yearly report of the county health school. 
g. The financial department of township government. 
h. The yearly report of the township hospital. 
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2. A note on bias in the collection of secondary data. 
a. The researcher went to the government department and 
collected the secondary data himself. The data has collected from 
available statistical materials and annual reports directly, not 
by verbal collection to prevent reporting bias. 
We would choose some secondary data to check with 
original data again. These secondary data have been collected, for 
example the distribution of health personnel in township hospitals 
(quantity, age, education etc. ), we have got the data from the 
County heatlh bureau, but we would go to some township hospitals 
to check again in case of an information bias. 
c. We made the investigative list and items before the 
researcher set about collecting the secondary data. The researcher 
had to follow the list in collecting the data to remove the risk 
of interviewer bias. This method was also used for collecting 
primary data. 
Generally speaking, the collection of secondary data has 
avoided sources of bias and procedures have been implemented to 
guarantee the validity and reliability of the data. 
3. There are 14 investigative forms and questionaires for special 
contents investigation (for more details see appendix). 
2.5 Statistical Mathods and Software 
1. The data were input by using IBM PC computer with DBASE 
III Plus. 
2. The statistics of the data uses ELONEX PC 386S-200 
computer with SPSS/PC+ VERSION 3.1. 
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3. The figures were drawn by using ELONEX PC 386S-200 
computer with Harvard Graphics (Version 2.10). 
4. Word processor uses the ATARI computer with IST WORD. 
2.6 Quality Control in the Research 
1. Before collecting data, make clear each index; after 
recording the index, check and gather in time; find out any 
missing data or wrong data, supply and correct them at once. 
2. The data were from original records of various 
governmental departments, in addition to those collected from the 
questionnaires. 
3. Design the questionnaire using simple questions putting 
the sensitive questions towards the end of the questionnaire. 
4. Before the leaders and doctors filled out the 
questionnaire themselves, the investigator explained each question 
for them. 
5. The questionnaire survey of village households was 
anonymous. The researcher explained each question to the 
respondants. 
6. Interviews were no longer than 30 minutes. 
7. All of the researchers who administered the survey were 
students of Shanghai Medical University under supervision. They 
had been carefully trained. 
8. Random sampling procedures have been used. 
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2.7 The Main Investigative Site--An Introduction to Jiangxi 
Province 
2.7.1 Geography 
Jiangxi is located at the middle to lower reaches and 
the south bank of th e Yangtze River in China. T he longest distance 
from south to north is 625 ki lometers; from e ast to west, 490 
kilometers. Total area is 166,000 square kilometers, which 
accounts for 1.7% of whole country area. It occupies the 
eighteenth position among prov inces as regards size. Mountain and 
hilly areas account for 78% of the land area in the province; low 
land, 12%; land, 10% (Ma Chen Xian, 1989). 
2.7.2 Population 
In 1988, Jiangxi had 77 counties, the population was 
35.58 million, 3.3% of China's total population (CHSD, 1988). 
According to the fourth census in 1990, the literacy rate was 
16.22%, and Jiangxi occupied the eighteenth position out of 30 
provinces. The literacy rate was 24.67% in the rural areas; 
12.17%, in the urban areas (People's Daily, 1990). The mortality 
rate was 6.07/1000 (the rural areas, 6.5/1000; the urban areas, 
5.0/1000) in 1982. The infant mortality rate was 47.72/1000 (the 
rural areas, 54.2/1000; the urban areas, 17.12/1000) in 1982 (Ma 
Chen Xian 1989). 
2.7.3 Economy 
The economic level of Jiangxi is that of the middle 
level in China. In 1985, the gross national product was 26.45 
billion Chinese yuan, 1.6% of China as a whole. The economic base 
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has changed from simple agricultural production to a combination 
of industrial and agricultural production (Table 2.3; Chinese 
Statistical Yearbook, 1986). 
Table 2.3 The national product and income 
province (Billion Chinese Yuan) 
in Jiangxi 
Items 1952 1965 1983 1985 
Industrial production 0.582 2.260 10.607 15.061 
Agricultural production 1.542 2.339 8.940 11.390 
National income 1.710 3.819 12.497 17.300 
2.7.4 Medical Care 
Since 1949, health care in Jiangxi province has 
developed well. The number of health organizations (including 
health bureaux, hospitals, epidemic stations) was 94 in 1949. This 
has increased to 5,373 in 1980 and 5,583 in 1988. Health 
personnel increased from 2,800 in 1949 to 79,000 in 1980, and 
138,238 in 1988. Hospital beds also increased from 1,900 in 1949 
to 76,900 in 1980,90,151 in 1988. The average female life- 
expectancy was 69.54, that of males 66.79 (ZGWSTJ, 1988). 
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2.7.5 Maps Relevant to the Study 
1. The map of China 
1. JiangXi Province 
2. ZheJiang Province 
3. ShanDong Province 
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The map of JiangXi 
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1. TongGu 
4. LinChuan 
7. LeAn 
2. ShangGao 
5. ChongRen 
3. FenYi 
6. YiHuang 
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CHAPTER 3 HEALTH SERVICES FOR RURAL RESIDENTS FOLLOWING HEALTH 
REFORM 
China is the biggest agricultural country in the world. 
These who live in rural areas account for 80% of the total 
population in China. Therefore the health service provided for 
rural residents holds a central position in Chinese health work. 
With the change in the rural economic system, the rural health 
system has implemented a parallel series of changes. Now a 
plurality of health systems have replaced the CMS, and the economic 
responsibility system has been applied to the staffs of county and 
township hospitals. These changes are bound to influence health 
service availability and the utilisation patterns of rural 
residents. To establish to what extent the reforms have had an 
effect, and to understand how matters might be improved, an 
investigation was carried out in parts of Jiangxi and Zhejiang's 
rural areas. The purpose of this chapter is to study the needs and 
the options of rural residents within the three tier health 
organisation after health reform and to analyse what factors 
related to the reforms have affected the health services. The 
chapter begins with background description of the county, township 
and village and their three tier rural health networks. 
The survey began in March, 1989, in 3 counties in 
Jiangxi province, Fenyi, Shanggao and Tonggu, and Shen county in 
Zhejiang province. There were in total 12 townships, 30 villages, 
725 households and 3,494 rural residents to be investigated (24 
households were chosen by random sample in each village, which 
accounted for 6% of the total number of households). First, the 
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questionnaire was designed and piloted, then households were 
visited and the head of the household (defined here as the person 
in the family who makes the important decisions, which in China is 
usually the oldest married male) was interviewed with a structured 
questionnaire schedule (see Appendix). The main topics of 
investigation were the age; the sex and the education level of 
head of household; the number in the family; the diseases from 
which each member had suffered and the number of times of seeking 
medical help in two weeks; the total annual medical expenditure 
and income for each family. 
3.1 General Remarks Concerning Rural Health Services and Rural 
Residents 
Estimating the need for health services is a useful 
method to evaluate the effects and the social benefits of a health 
service. This is done by studying the health conditions and health 
need of rural residents and by analysing both satisfactory 
standards, and factors influencing health services for rural 
residents. 
3.1.1 Basic condition of rural residents 
We questioned the heads of 725 households to obtain 
data on the whole family. The average population was 4.8 per 
household. The average gross income was 3089.7 yuan the 
household in 1988. An average age of 725 heads of household was 
42.6 years old. Among them, 632 were peasants, which accounted 
for 87.2%. The rest were individual businessmen, rural cadres and 
rural industrial workers (Figure 3.1). Individual businessmen were 
those rural residents who went in for commodity buying and 
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Figure 3.1. The Occupation of Head 
of 725 Households 
Peasants 87% 
Other 2% 
Workers 2% 
Cadres 2% 
Businessmen 6% 
selling. They did not work in the fields. Some rural cadres were 
government permanent employees with salaries from the government. 
These included township goverment staffs even if they lived in 
the rural areas. By contrast the cadres who worked in villages 
received only a subsidy from the village collective fund or the 
township government. They were not permanent government employees. 
The rural industrial workers means those rural residents working 
in a township or village factory. They did part time field work in 
the busy season. 
As for educational level: 175 heads of household were 
illiterate; 319, primary school; 167, middle school; the 
remainder, high school. This range was similar to that shown in 
the ten provinces rural health service study (MOPH, 1986, Figure 
3.2) . 
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Figure 3.2. Comparison of Education 
Level 
Percent 
50 F 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
4 Counties M 10 Provinces 
Type of medical practice used: 556 households used 
individual private doctors' services and paid fee-for-service. 88 
households used the group village health stations services, which 
was composed of three or four private doctors. Therefore these 
households were also using private doctors services (see 
Definition). This meant that 88.8% of all households were paying 
for their own medical care. On the other hand, 42 households 
(5.7%) were still covered by the CMS. The remaining 39 (5.4%) were 
covered by health insurance from their rural factories. The 
majority of peasants transferred from the CMS to the self- 
financing medical system during health reform, which shows a 
changing village picture, both as regards the health stations and 
the rural doctors. In other words , most village 
health stations 
became the private enterprises. The rural doctor was replaced by 
private doctor (see below). 
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Illiterate Primary School Middle School High School 
3.1.2 Health services need and utilisation 
There was total of 3493 people in 725 households. The 
two week morbidity rate was 97/1000. The prevalence of chronic 
disease was 75/1000. The rate of days spent sick in bed over two 
weeks was 100.2/1000. The average number of days in bed per person 
was 2.6 in 1988. These rates were lower than those shown in the 
"seven countries and 12 places study" (Table 3.1). This study was 
carried out by WHO from 1964-1974 in the USA, Canada, UK, 
Argentina, Finland, Poland and Yugoslavia. The total population 
sample was 0.56 million. The international data concerning health 
service need and utilisation are helpful as a comparison. 
Table 3.1 Comparison of the health service need and utilisation 
between the Chinese rural areas and 7 countries and 12 
places 
Items 725 households *10 provinces 7 countries 
in 4 counties in China and 12 places 
Chronic disease prevalence 
rate (per thousand) 75 86 93 
Days in bed 
(one person/year) 2.6 2.4 7.1 
Attendance at clinic 
(one person/year) 2.3 2.6 6.0 
Attendance at clinic 
per thousand population 
within a fortnight 87 97 155 
Annual hospital admission 
rate/1000 47 32 110 
*Data from The Ministry of Public Health PRC "National Rural 
Health Service Investigation Materials", December 1986, the 
Department of Administration, WeiShengBu, Beijing. 
**Data from K. L. White et al. "Health Services: Concepts and 
Information for National Planning and Management". WHO, Geneva, 
Public Health Papers 67,1976. 
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It should be pointed out that the comparitive data 
rendered by the '7 countries and 12 places' study and China were 
gathered on using the same design and method, ie, stratified 
random sampling. In other respects, the two studies are not 
comparable. The Chinese investigations were carried out later, and 
in a population with different characteristics. 60.5% of the WHO 
survey were in the urban areas, 39.5% in the rural areas; in 
China, the whole sample was of rural residents. This might have 
influenced the higher WHO figures: Urban populations may be more 
likely to recognise and name certain diseases, and seek treatment 
for them. There are also more doctors from whom they can seek 
treatment. As a result, the reported prevalence rate of urban 
inhabitants is likely to be higher than that of the rural 
inhabitants. However this does not completely invalidate the 
comparison. It is interesting to note that, although the number of 
days confined to bed was lower in the Chinese example, the chronic 
disease prevalence rate was approaching that of the WHO study. It 
is not unfair to suggest therefore, that this is likely to be, 
accurate, or even an underestimate. The Chinese data are likely to 
underreport more minor conditions for reasons described above. 
Health service utilisation, the number of physician 
visits per person per year and annual hospital admission per 
thousand in Chinese rural areas were lower than the WHO 
study (Table 3.1). This suggests that the health service 
utilisation in Chinese rural areas was not as high as in 7 
countries and 12 places studied by WHO, especially 
in patient 
admissions. 
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When making comparisons within China, between this study 
and the MOPH data, utilisation rates did not differ so much. In 
this study, outpatient rates were lower, and inpatient rates 
higher than in the MOPH study. 
3.2 Analysis of the Factors Which Influenced the Need for Health 
Services and Their Utilisation by Rural Residents 
Many factors can influence the need for health service 
and utilisation, such as social economy, culture, occupation, 
medical health system, age, sex, individual behaviour and life 
style, the distribution of health care, service time, distance to 
hospital, traffic condition and medical service quantity and 
quality. It is argued here, however, that the most important fact 
that may have influenced need and utilisation in this case is the 
collapse of the CMS in rural areas after health reform, since 
peasants now pay directly for health care. In order to consider 
the matter, below five factors are analysed in more detail. These 
are the health care system available, family type and source of 
income, family population, education of head of households and age 
of population. 
3.2.1 Health care system 
There were 3,493 people in 725 households. Among them, 
163 (4.7%) people were covered by the CMS, but the great majority 
(89.3%) were paying for their own health care. This proportion is 
typical of rural residents in China today. If we compare health 
need and utilisation for rural residents under the various medical 
systems, we can see that those covered by the CMS had higher rates 
of reported illness (4.9) in 1988 than those who were paying for 
ill 
themselves (2.4, solo; 
reform, joining the CMS 
older people, children 
services preferred the 
prevalence rate of the CM 
will be discussed further 
2.3, group, Table 3.2). 
was on a voluntary basis. 
and sick people who needed 
CMS. This would also exp 
S group was higher than the 
in chapter 6.4.2. 
After health 
Therefore the 
more health 
lain why the 
others. This 
Table 3.2 Comparison of the health service need and utilisation for rural residents under various medical systems 
Self-finance Self-finance CMS Other Total 
Items (solo) (group) 
I. The Population 
in investigation 2618 515 163 197 3493 
2. The times peasants 
suffered diseases 
in two weeks 243 45 31 19 338 
#3. The times one peasant 
suffered from disease 
one year 2.4 2.3 4.9 2.5 2.5 
4. The number of peasants 
visiting doctor in two 
weeks 222 38 24 19 303 
#5. The number of visiting 
to a doctor(one person 
/year) 2.2 1.9 3.8 2.5 2.3 
6. Medical expense 
in two weeks(Yuan) 2165 467 96 108 2836 
#7. Medical expense 
(one person/year, Yuan) 21.5 23.6 15.3 14.3 21.1 
#3=2/lx26, #5=4/lx26, P<0.05. #7=6/lx26 P<0.05. 
On the subject of health utilisation, the average number 
of visiting to the doctor in the CMS group in 1988 was 3.8, which 
was obviously much higher compared with the self-financing group. 
But the medical expenditure of the CMS group was lower than that 
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of the self-financing group. This shows that the health 
utilisation in the CMS group was higher than in the self- 
financing group, and also the CMS kept medical expenditure down. 
What produced these effects? From Table 3.3, we know that 87.5% 
peasants, that were covered by the CMS went to the village health 
station, whereas 66.2% peasants paying for themselves went there. 
It was an advantage for self-financing peasants that they could 
choose where they went to see the doctor. They had the 
opportunity, for example, to go to the county hospital in 
the hope of receiving better health services. But the CMS group 
had a limitation on their choice. The cost of one visit to the 
doctor at the village health station was 6.28 yuan; at the 
township hospital, 15.10 yuan; at the county hospital, 20.80 yuan. 
Therefore, the medical expenditure of the CMS group was inevitably 
lower than that of the self-financing group, and this clearly 
shows the effect the CMS has on controlling medical expenditure. 
Another way the method of payment can influence utilisation is 
demonstrated if we consider the patients who did not go to 
hospital. In the investigation, there were 23 patients in 1988 who 
Table 3.3 Comparison of percentage of various medical systems 
covering peasants to see doctor at various level hospitals 
Places 
Village 
Township 
County and 
over County 
Self-financing Self-financing 
(solo) (group) 
66.2 78.9 
25.7 13.2 
8.1 7.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
P<0.01 
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cms Other Total 
87.5 78.9 70.3 
8.3 5.3 21.5 
4.2 15.8 8.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
should have gone as inpatients but they did not go to hospital. 
All were self-financing patients. Therefore it seems reasonable 
to conclude that the change from the large scale use of the CMS 
influenced the health service need and utilisation by rural 
residents. In other words, the privatisation in Chinese rural 
health care restricted the health service utilisation of rural 
residents. We can get other evidences from Chapter 6. 
3.2.2 Family economy 
It is often suggested that family income is the most 
important factor affecting health utilisation and medical 
expenditure (Ding You He 1980; Luo Yi Qing 1987,10). Table 3.4 
shows the health utilisation by rural residents with different 
incomes. At first sight, there is no direct relationship between 
income and medical utilisation. Whilst it appears that the number 
of visits to the doctor was least in the lowest income group 
(1.9). The highest number, 2.6 was amongst those with a yearly 
income between 200 and 500 yuan i. e. those officially classed as 
Table 3.4 The different family incomes and health service 
utilisation 
Items 
Yearly income 
<200 200-500 
per person 
500-1000 
(yuan) 
>1000 
Total 
1. The population 215 953 1768 557 3493 
of investigation 
2. Number of visits 
to doctor 
(one person/year) 1.9 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.3 
3. Medical expenditure 
(one person/year) 22.61 27.53 19.66 13.96 21.10 
2. P>0.05 3. P<0.05 
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low income. The next two groups with higher incomes showed below- 
average utilisation. The point tells us that high income families 
do not necessarily have high medical consumption. Another is that 
those with the lowest income, were spending almost 10% of their 
annual income on medical care. 
Why was medical expenditure low in high income 
families? The number of visits to doctor was also not high in high 
income families. There might be five possible reasons. Firstly, 
the development of economy and culture has not been rapid in all 
rural areas. Therefore peasants' knowledge of modern medicine was 
fairly low. Most peasants thought medical expenditure was an 
extra economic burden. They did not want to increase health 
expenditure when the family income went up, but preferred to spend 
more money on building a house. So it appears that the medical 
expenditure in a high income family may not have been higher than 
that in a low income family. Secondly, in high income families, 
there existed the capability to consume in other respects for 
example drinking or gambling. Thirdly, sensitivity to matters of 
health was possibly greater in the high income family. So a high 
income family would see the doctor in time and the patient would 
not delay in treatment. Therefore finally, medical expenditure was 
less. Fourthly, perhaps the doctors did not always charge a rich 
family more, although this seems unlikely. Fifthly, low income 
families may try not to see a doctor at first but when a family 
member becomes very ill, buy expensive medicine, and do not care, 
at that moment, how much they pay. They might even prefer 
expensive medicine. The explanations above do not completely 
explain why family income and expenditure are not correlated, 
115 
but we may conclude from these analyses that family income is not 
the decisive factor influencing the health service utilisation of 
peasants. This is further evidence against the argument that the 
increase in peasants' income is one of reasons for collapse of the 
CMS. It has been suggested that when the income of peasants 
increased during health reform, the peasants became dissatisfied 
with the CMS's low level of health service and sought better 
services. This contributed to its decline (see Chapter 1, part 
two). 
3.2.3. Population 
If we divide the 725 households into various groups 
depending on the size of the family, we can see that the number 
of visits to the doctor and the medical expenditure both reduce, 
the bigger the family. Both factors were negatively correlated 
with family size. The correlation with number of visits was r=- 
0.87, p<0.05; that with medical expenditure, r=-0.83, p<0.05 
(Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5 Family size and health service utilisation 
Family Population of Number of visits doctor Medical expenditure 
size investigation ---------- ------------- --------- ------------ 
one person one family one person one family 
per year per year per year per year 
[Yuan (RMB)l 
1 12 6.5 6.5 34.67 34.67 
2 68 5.7 11.4 46.26 92.52 
3 306 2.5 7.6 30.84 92.52 
4 788 2.1 8.6 19.83 79.32 
5 905 2.4 11.9 23.24 116.20 
6 1414 2.0 13.0 17.03 102.18 
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Figure 3.3. The Population of Family 
with Number of Visits to Doctors 
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Linear Regression Equation, Y-6.8-0.937X 
If we rate family size as the independent variable, X; 
number of visits to the doctor as the dependent variable, Y, we 
can build a linear regression equation Y=6.8-0.937X. The 
relationship is clearly shown in Figure 3.3. 
Generally speaking, there are more children and elderly 
people in a large family. The number of visits to the doctor and 
the medical expenditure should be also high compared with a 
smaller family. Yet these results show the opposite. This might be 
for 2 reasons: as the family's size increased, so did its 
potential for medical expenditure, and in a self-financing system, 
larger families would have to carefully consider their medical 
expenditure, and limit consumption. Although the number of 
individual visits was negatively correlated with f amily size, the 
number of family visits (i. e the number of times someone 
in the 
family went to visit the doctor) went up. From Table 3.5, we know 
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that in a 6-person family there was an average of 13 visits per 
year. In the other words, there was at least one person going to 
see the doctor per month in their family. This could be a severe 
cause of anxiety for the person responsible for family finances, 
--_ 
zvnd might cause him (usually him) to seek to limit the health 
needs of individual members of the family. When the family member 
needed treatment at the county hospital, this cost both time and 
money, and probably led to an attempt to limit the waste of both. 
3.2.4 Education 
It is worth enquring whether educational level, i. e 
high school, middle school and primary school is related to health 
utilisation. It is generally agreed that educational level affects 
the people's understanding of health care. However the educational 
level of people is usually low in the rural areas. 
In this investigation, there were 175 illiterate heads 
of household in 725 households. The head of household is usually 
the family policy maker. Did the difference in educational level 
affect the health utilisation of the whole family? Table 3.6. 
shows that the lower the educational level of the head of 
household, the fewer, the visits to the doctor. For households 
where the head was illiterate, the average number of individual 
visits to the doctor was 1.8, compared with 2.7 in those household 
where the head had a high school education. Medical expenditure 
increased from the illiterate group to middle school group, but 
was lowest in the high school group. It is probable that people 
in 
this group would recognise the need for treatment earlier, thus 
avoiding more extensive and expensive treatment at a 
later date. 
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This suggests that the difference in educational level 
of the household's head affected the health utilisation of the 
family. The degree to which various factors affected health 
service utilisation for peasants is a complex question. We have 
seen that both family size and educational level are important, 
but these factors are related to each other. Generally speaking, 
in the Chinese rural areas, the lower the educational level of the 
family, the larger the family size. In contrast, the higher the 
educational level of the head of household, the smaller the family 
(Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 The education of household's head and health service 
utilisation 
Items Illiterate Primary 
school 
Middle 
school 
High 
school 
Total 
1. The population in 924 1591 710 268 3493 
difference educational 
level of household's 
head 
2. Number of visits 1.8 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.3 
to doctor 
(one person/year) 
3. Medical expense 19.22 20.18 28.69 12.51 21.10 
(one person/year) 
4. Average population 5.3 5.0 4.3 4.2 4.8 
each family 
2. P<0.05.3. P<0.05 
3.2.5 Age 
The age of people has an obvious effect on health 
service need and utilisation. The people who most need health 
services are the elderly and children. This investigation 
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indicated again that the highest number of visits to the doctor 
was in the 0-1 year group (8.7 times per year). As age increased, 
the number of visits fell. In the 15-24 year group, the number of 
visits was the lowest (0.6 times per person per year). After that, 
visits gradually increased with age. Figure 3.4 and Table 3.7 
shows this in the 'bathtub curve'. The trend for medical 
expenditure paralleled that of visits. Health problems are most 
likely amongst the very young and the very old, yet during health 
reform, there were no useful policies directed specifically at 
these groups. Young fit adults seems to be less at risk. They need 
perhaps greater persuasion to be involved in a health insurance 
system, since they spend little on health at present, and use the 
medical services less. If the CMS, or a version of it was to be 
revived , their particular utilisation patterns would have to be 
taken into account before establishing a fixed rate insurance. 
Table 3.7 The age and health service utilisation 
Age Population of Number of visits Medical expense 
investigation to doctor (one person/year) 
(one person/year) 
0- 99 8.7 55.68 
1- 165 7.7 57.52 
5- 276 2.7 16.96 
lo- 397 0.9 3.21 
15- 897 0.6 8.96 
25- 552 1.4 18.09 
35- 401 2.0 35.92 
45- 291 3.0 20.73 
55- 237 2.3 41.69 
65- 178 4.4 23.66 
Total 3493 Average 2.3 Average 21.10 
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Figure 3.4. The'wBathtub Curve'von Various 
Age and Health Service Utilization 
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3.2.6 General evaluation 
In the analysis of the factors above, their relative 
importance varies. If we compare maximum and minimum values for 
each factor (Table 3.8), the difference is greatest in the case of 
age (8.1), and lowest in the case of income (0-7). 
Table 3.8 Internal changes of various factors, grouped 
Various Number of visits to the doctor 
factors (one person/year) 
*Max. *Min. Difference 
Medical expenditure 
(one person/year) 
Max. Min. Difference 
Medical system 3.8 
Family income 2.6 
Family population 6.5 
Education 2.7 
Age 
*Max.: Maximum 
1.9 
1.9 
2.0 
1.8 
8.7 0.6 
*Min.: Minimum 
1.9 25.90 14.30 
0.7 27.53 13.96 
4.5 46.26 17.03 
0.9 28.69 12.51 
8.1 57.52 3.21 
11.60 
13.57 
29.23 
16.18 
54.31 
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A further comment must be made about the influence of 
the medical system on health service utilisation. As already 
discussed, the health service utilisation of the peasants covered 
by the CMS was higher than that covered by the other medical 
systems. By contrast, the medical expenditure in this group was 
lower than others. This relationship holds irrespective of other 
factors, and is especially significant where the CMS is in working 
order. However, in our sample, the majority of peasants were 
covered by the self-financing medical system. At that point, the 
other factors become significant. Age was the most influential 
factor. Family size and educational level were the factors which 
jointly affected the peasant's health service need and 
utilisation. The economic factor had been considered the most 
important previously. But this analysis suggests it was not as 
influential a factor on peasant's health service utilisation as 
thought before. The explanation is that the Chinese rural economic 
level has been improved by the rural economic reform since 1980. 
The reforms have not yet extended to improve health care for 
peasants. The peasants first had to solve food and clothing 
problems. That done, they would look for better health service. 
3.3 Investigation of Attitudes towards Health Services for Rural 
Residents after Health Reform. 
3.3.1 The quality of health service 
725 heads of household evaluated the quality of health 
services in county, township and village three tier medical 
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organisations. Highest satisfaction was with the village health 
station (50.1%). Lowest satisfaction was with county 
hospitals (10%). Only 5.4% of respondant were dissatisfied with 
village health stations, which had the lowest dissatisfaction 
score of the three levels examined (Figure 3.5). 
The main reason for dissatisfaction was the high price 
of medicine and treatment. Respondants thought that the county 
hospital possessed superior equipment, and buildings and more 
skilled doctors compared to township hospitals and village health 
stations. The worst in this respect was the village health 
station. With regard to service attitudes, 36.5% thought these 
were unsatisfactory in the township hospital, 39.6% in the county 
hospital, but only 4.4% at the village health station. For county 
and township, service attitude was the second most important cause 
of dissatisfaction after cost (Table 3.9). 
Tabel 3.9 Regard reasons for dissatisfaction with various 
health facilitiesM 
Item Village Township County 
Medical expense 60.0 38.5 47.2 
Poor facilities 24.5 10.7 1.9 
Poor service of 
staff attitude 4.4 36.5 39.6 
Low technical 
level of staff 11.1 5.4 9.4 
Other 0.0 8.9 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Figure 3.5. Comparison of Health Service 
Quality on Three Level Health Network 
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One reason why the service attitude was poorer in the 
county hospital could have been because the doctors received 
their salary from the government. The quantity of patients did not 
basically affect their income. They did not have as great a sense 
of personal accountability as the village doctors. This is 
straightforwardly a managerial problem. Everyone paid by the 
government is a permanent staff member, and there is no one who 
controls the quality of health services. The health reforms 
ignored this problem. In fact it was necessary to improve the 
county and township staff's responsibility and working practices 
in order to supply proper health service for peasants. A series of 
health policies for health reform such as the hospital economic 
responsibility system (see Definition) emphasised how to increase 
the efficiency and profits but not quality. Although the hospitals 
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satisfactory unsatisfactory general 
were able to enlarge wards and buy new medical equipment, the 
patients were still dissatisfied with hospital services because of 
the service attitudes of staff. Furthermore, with so much 
concentration in the reforms on economic gains, various methods 
were used to increase the charges for patients. These resulted in 
high medical expenses, which were such a cause of dissatisfaction 
to peasants. The poor medical conditions in village health 
stations should be a cause for concern. The quality of a village 
health station affects the health service for peasants, because it 
is the first point of contact and the primary supplier of health 
care. However the health reforms had a negative impact on it (see 
Chapter 6). 
3.3.2 Medical system 
According to the investigation, 88.8% of 725 households 
were paying for medicine themselves, which covered 89.7% of 
population. Just under half (43.9%) of household heads questioned 
were satisfied with this system, whilst 26% were not. Reasons for 
dissatisfaction, were, first that the disease caused the rural 
residents to became poor. When a family member became ill, the 
family could not afford medical expenses because it had lost the 
CMS protection. 70% peasants were of this opinion, it was by far 
the most frequently mentioned reason (Figure 3.6). In 3.2.1, we 
note there were 23 patients who needed hospital admission but were 
unable to go to hospital in 1988. These 23 patients were totally 
self-financing, and 16 of them did not go to hospital because the 
cost was too high, and they could not afford it. 
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Figure 3.6. The Unsatisfactory Reasons 
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3.3.3 Medical expenses 
When the heads of household answered the question "Do 
you want to join the health insurance system for outpatients' 
service? " it meant the outpatient service was free if peasants 
subscribed to this kind of health insurance. 543 persons said 
"Yes", which accounted for 75% of heads of household. They were 
asked "Do you want to join the health insurance for inpatients' 
services"? 61.4% said "Yes". 
When asked about the amount of medical insurance they 
wished to pay, heads of households said they would like to spend 
an average of 58.72 yuan premium for insuring the whole family's 
health including outpatient and inpatient services. This premium 
accounted for only 1.9% of 3089.7 yuan, the average family yearly 
income. In 1988, the actual medical expenditure of each family in 
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the study was 101.70 yuan, which accounted for 3.3% of family 
income. This indicated two points, first, the actual medical 
expenditure was not excessive, and was within the capacity of most 
families. Therefore insurance subscriptions may be a practical 
possibility. Second, the educational and economic level of 
peasants are not high enough at present, they do not think an 
investment for health is necessary. This explains why, although 
they could afford more, they are only prepared to spend 1.9% of 
annual income on a premiums and regarded the 3.3% average 
expenditure as far too high. During health reform, there was 
little specific health education for peasants, and it is probably 
necessary to convince them of the value of personal health 
investment. Their experiences with the CMS, which many had been 
forced to join in the past, had been unsatisfactory, because the 
CMS had many mangerial and quality problems (Hillier and 
Xiang, 1994). Therefore extra encouragement towards an insurance 
based system may be required. 
3.4 Summary of Chapter 3 
Utilisation of health services among Chinese rural 
people is low relative to need. In some part, this is because 
Chinese rural areas are not very prosperous or developed at 
present. The survey results showed that privatisation of Chinese 
rural health care gave rural people more choices. The private 
doctors in the village health station had a better service 
attitude than the doctors in the county hospital. However, overall 
costs to be patients in the private system were higher than in 
the CMS group. 23 patients who were totally self-financing were 
unable to go to hospital because they could not afford the cost 
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of medical service. On the other hand, the health utilisation in 
the CMS group was higher than in the self-financing group. The CMS 
gave the rural residents a greater sense of security. So the high 
risk people who require more health services preferred the CMS 
(see Chapter 6). 
In view of various factors influencing the need for 
health service, the type of health care system is a decisive 
factor in influencing utilisation. As stated in the previous 
paragraph, though in some cases private health enterprises could 
give rural people more choices and work more efficiently than 
public health enterprises, the privatisation in Chinese rural 
health care limited the health service utilisation of rural 
residents after health reform. 
The age, number in the family and the educational level 
of household head had a broad influence on utilisation. Smaller 
families had a higher number of visits to be doctor per person per 
year, but of course, family size is also correlated with the 
educational level of the head of household. According to Chinese 
rural conditions, education is the only important influential 
factor in health service utilisation by peasants. Because the 
peasants in China still have quite strong traditional views, no 
matter what their educational level is, they wish to have more 
children. They think that more children in the family indicates 
more prosperity. Probably, with the educational level of peasants 
increasing beyond the present primary school level that most 
peasants have today, the educational level of peasants will be a 
decisive factor. 
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Money was not a decisive factor in health service 
utilisation for the rural residents because health consumption 
is usually controlled by hospitals and doctor. Moreover, an 
average approximate 600 yuan yearly income per person did not 
allow peasants to have the chance to choose good health services 
freely. The main consumption for peasants was still on food, 
clothes and enlarging agricultural production. Therefore the 
medical expenditure in the high income family was not bound to be 
higher than that in lower income family. 
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CHAPTER 4 HEALTH CARE AT COUNTY LEVEL 
There has been a county, township and village three tier 
health network in Chinese rural areas for 40 years. The county 
health organization is a technical guidance centre for medical 
work, preventive medicine , MCH and family planning as well as a 
base for training health personnel. Generally speaking, the 
county hospital, epidemic station, maternal and children health 
station, and middle health school are standard health 
organizations in the county. In 1982, the Ministry of Public 
Health convened two meetings in Heng Yang and Shi Jia Zhuang city 
and announced the policy of building a Chinese traditional 
hospital in all counties. Following that announcement, most 
counties have built a Chinese traditional hospital as well (Hu 
Zhao Ming, 1987). 
In addition to the organizations mentioned above, some 
counties have special preventive organizations such as the 
tuberculosis institutes, and those concerned with mental disease, 
schistosomiasis, leprosy, infectious disease, occupational disease 
and tumours. Some institutes are independent, some attached to a 
county hospital or epidemic station. These institutes are set up 
on the basis of an overall consideration of the local historical, 
economic, epidemic situation and health resources. Also, an 
organisation which repairs medical equipment, and services the 
whole county is usually present. It can be attached to the county 
hospital or independent. 
4.1 Development of Health Enterprises County Level 
From February to April 1989, seven counties were chosen in 
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Jiangxi province for investigation. These were FenYi, ShangGao, 
TongGu, Lean, YiHuang, LinChuan and ChongRen. The content of the 
investigation included: 
1. The basic condition of the 7 counties in 1988, 
including geography, population, economy, education, culture, 
health organization, health personnel and health service. 
2. The finances and health services both in the county 
hospital and the Chinese traditional medicine hospital in 7 
counties. 
3. The medical expenses of 482 in-patients in the county 
hospitals. 
4. The expenditure of National Health Insurance in 7 
county hospitals. 
5. In depth investigation of 17 county leaders. 
6. Supplementary investigation in 4 county hospitals and 
three county health schools in Jiangxi, ShanDong and ZheJiang 
provinces in 1990. 
The scope of county health care is wide, and this 
discussion concentrates on the principal aspects of county health 
care which have been affected by health reform. The county 
hospital is the biggest health service provider amongst county 
health organisations. By studying the health service and finances 
of the county hospital, it is possible to identify the general 
influences of health reform upon health care at county level. 
Looking at the expenditure on national health insurance and the 
hospitalization expenses of patients helps to understand further 
the influences of health reform on the county's financial 
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condition. A comparison of the county hospital with the county 
Chinese traditional hospital is also made, because the county 
Chinese traditional hospital is the second biggest health provider 
amongst the county health organisations. In addition, there was a 
new policy concerning the development of county Chinese 
traditional hospitals during health reform. By comparing the two 
types of hospital, it is possible to evaluate the policy. The 
study also concentrates on the county health school rather than 
the MCH and county epidemic stations which are at the same level. 
The reason is because during health reform, Chinese rural health 
personnel underwent a large change. The barefoot doctor was 
replaced by the rural doctor and health worker (see Chapter 6). 
The county health school was a base for training rural health 
personnel before health reform, therefore it is important to 
investigate what changes took place there. 
4.1.1 Geography, economy and population condition in 7 counties 
42.9% counties were located in mountain areas, others 
were located in hilly land. It was rather inconvenient for 
peasants to visit the doctor because of these geographical 
conditions, especially in mountain areas. Few villages had a 
direct bus service. It was very difficult to send patients to 
county hospitals in the case of serious illness. However, the 
emergency services in township hospitals and village health 
stations were not very good, lacking the necessary equipment. 
There were 136 townships, and 1,403 villages in 7 
counties. The total population was 2.11 million, the agricultural 
population were 1.767 million (83.7%). 
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Economic Condition: The average gross value of 
industrial output was 92 million yuan in each county in 1988, 
however the gross value of industry in township and village was 
only 10 million yuan. This indicates that the counties were 
rather well developed economically. Therefore health units at 
county level found it relatively easy to get financial support 
compared with the township hospitals and village health stations. 
The average gross value of agricultural output was 63 million 
yuan. An average annual personal income of workers, 1107.5 yuan, 
which was less than the average 1261 yuan of the country. The 
yearly income of peasants was 550 yuan, which was less than an 
average 605 yuan for the whole country's peasants (People's Daily 
Ist, December, 1990). But the income of urban residents was 
double that of the rural residents. As regards health care, most 
residents in the urban areas were covered by national health 
insurance and labour health insurance. National health insurance 
is a scheme under which the government supplies free medical 
services for teachers, high school students and staff who work for 
the government. Under labour health insurance, the factory 
supplies free medical service for its workers. Normally, their 
families can get 50% of costs from both health insurance schemes. 
But most residents in rural areas were paying for their own health 
care, using private doctors. A few were still covered by the CMS. 
So there was different social benefit between the urban residents 
and the rural residents. 
Education and Health: The illiteracy rate of children 
12+ was 24.855% in 7 counties in 1982, which was higher than 
21.38% for the whole of Jiangxi and 22.81% of the whole country 
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in the same year. The infant mortality rate was 19.26/1000 in 
1988, which was less than 23.55/1000 for all rural areas in the 
same year (ZGWSTJ, 1988). 
4.1.2 Health personnel and organizations 
There were 46 health organizations (including hospital, 
MCH centres and epidemic stations); 2087 beds; 2812 health workers 
in 7 counties, and 2157 persons were health professional 
personnel, which accounted for 76.7% of health workers, slightly 
less than the 79.6% of the country as whole. 'Health professional' 
personnel means these persons have studied medicine (including 
advanced study and part time study) in a health school or medical 
university, and have direct clinical contact with patients. They 
include doctors, clinic technicians, nurses and pharmacists. A low 
proportion of health professionals would indicate that the 
administrative and back up service personnel were too numerous. 
Including township hospital beds and health professional 
personnel, average bed numbers per thousand population were 1.35, 
average number of professional personnel per thousand population 
was 1.59; both figures are less than 1.59 beds and 2.16 health 
professional personnel in rural areas (ZGWSTJ, 1988). As to the 
number of medical doctors, (the title 'medical doctor' means the 
person has been in health school or medical university for three 
or five years full time study and got one degree and the requisite 
qualifications for treating patients), the 7 counties average at 
0.44/1000 compared with national and international data --- see 
Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Comparison of the number beds and doctors between 
7 counties and other countries 
Region Year Doctor per thousand 
population 
Year Bed per thousand 
population 
7 counties 1988 0.44 1988 1.35 
Chinese rural 1988 0.54 1988 1.59 
areas 
China 1988 1.01 1988 2.30 
WHO 7 countries 1974 1.51 1974 10.00 
and 12 places 
Japan 1986 2.10 1983 11.80 
India 1982 0.41 1978 0.80 
USSR 1985 4.20 1985 13.00 
The data is from Chinese Health Statistical Digest 1988, the 
Minsitry of Public Health P. R. C.. 
Preventive health personnel in 7 counties were 222, 
which accounted for 7.9% of total health personnel. This 
proportion reached the Ministry of Public Health standard 
which was that 7% of total health workers should be preventive 
health workers in 1984 (Dai Zhi-Cheng, 1988). 
There were 128 MCH health staff in 7 counties with an 
average 18 health staff in each county. According to the Ministry 
of Public Health's standard, which is 1 MCH health staff to 10,000 
population at county level, these seven counties should have 211 
MCH health staffs. So there was a shortage of 83 MCH workers (Liu 
Xiao, Xian 1988). 
From the quantity and distribution of health personnel, 
the senior doctors were more numerous than junior doctors in 
seven counties. 73% of senior doctors were distributed in county 
health work units (Table 4.2), (Normally the term 'senior doctor' 
135 
means that the person has been in medical university for three or 
five years full time study, followed by 3-5 years clinical work. 
Junior doctors usually graduate from middle health school. They 
have to work more than five years, then pass a qualifying 
examination, after which they may obtain a senior doctor 
position. ). 
Table 4.2. The structure of health personnel in seven counties 
in 1988 
Item Senior doctor Junior doctor Nurse Total 
County level 683 203 485 1371 
preventive 
doctor 62 37 75 174 
MCH Doctor 37 18 12 67 
Township Hospital 257 239 176 692 
As well as the proportions of health professionals per 
thousand population at various levels being lower than the 
national average, the low proportion of Junior doctors was very 
unusual, --only 22.5% of the national average (whole counties, 
0.91; seven counties, 0.21). This suggests that it might be 
important to replenish middle level health personnel in these 
areas, because it is impossible to train many high level health 
personnel in a short time. 
Most health personnel in this study had graduated from a 
health school, but they also included 121 (5.6%) people at the 
county level who had graduated from a medical university. At 
township level, there were only 8 medical university graduates 
which accounted to 0.66% of the whole township level health 
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personnel (Table 4.3). The rural health personnel are few in 
number and poorly qualified. This is a long standing problem 
which hinders the development of rural health personnel services 
where development depends upon having more graduates. There is no 
adequate training for basic level health personnel either, but 
attracting medical graduates is very difficult. There are long 
standing differences between the urban areas and the rural areas 
such as a poor working conditions, and out of date medical 
equipment. 
Table 4.3. The educational level of health personnel in seven 
counties in 1988 
Item Graduate Graduate Middle health 
(5 years) (3 years) school 
County level 121 190 1324 
Township hospital 8 71 379 
4.1.3 Health services 
Total patients numbered 1,237,212 in the seven counties 
in 1988. The total number of patients treated in township 
hospitals was 2,452,633. Total patients discharged from county 
level health units numbered 47,190 in 1988, those from the 
township hospital, 102,909. 
Bed utilisation and turnover in county and township 
levels are compared and the results presented in Table 4.4. 
1. Not only in seven counties but in Jiangxi and 
nationally, the bed turnover was higher in township hospitals than 
in county hospitals. But high turnover does not imply efficient 
utilisation. Most patients were admitted to the township hospital 
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Table 4.4. The utilization of beds in hospital in 1988 
Item The utilization rate Bed turnover rate 
of beds M 
County Level 
7 counties 75.6 23.2 
*all counties in 
Jiangxi province 82.9 28.6 
*all counties 85.3 26.1 
in China 
Township Level 
7 counties 47.1 45.6 
*all townships 
in Jiangxi province 41.6 31.6 
*all townships 47.3 29.2 
in China 
*(ZGWSTJ, 1988) 
only for observation and they stayed in hospital for a few days, 
before discharge. If patients were seriously ill, they would be 
transferred to a county hospital or a city hospital. Most 
township hospitals do not have adequate facilities to operate on 
patients. So use of township hospital beds is limited. This point 
can be also proved by the bed utilization rate. The rate in the 
township hospital is half that of the county hospital. A 
consequence of the low rate of bed utilization is an increase in 
medical costs and a decrease in profits in township hospitals (see 
Chapter 5). 
2. Bed utilisation and bed turnover in the seven 
counties were both lower than those at county level in Jiangxi and 
nationally. This was not because people were healthier, but 
because the poor transport and lack of money made it difficult for 
peasants to go to their county hospital. The shortage of good 
doctors in some county hospitals also influenced the bed 
utilisation. 
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4.1.4. The development of health economy 
Average health expenditure in seven counties was 738rOOO 
Chinese Yuan in 1988, which only accounted for 3.2% of total 
county government financial expenditure. It was less than the 8.2% 
of the rich Shanghai suburban counties (ZGWSTJ, 1988). It is 
doubtful whether this proportion is sufficient for the development 
of rural health services. According to the Chinese current 
situation, health investment is planned to account for 5% of the 
governmental budget by the year 2000, which could be enough to 
meet the basic needs for developing rural health care. It needs 
the government to make up its mind to raise health investment in 
a short time, otherwise it is very difficult to put an end once 
and for all to the lack of doctors and medicine in the rural areas 
(Xiang Zheng, 1988). 
The main health expenditure (37%) is for the support of 
the county hospital. 20% goes on preventive work, 25% for the 
township hospital. This distribution is the same as for other 
counties in China (Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 The condition of health expenditure (%) 
Item Average level 
in 7 counties 
Expenditure for hospital 36.9 
Expenditure for prevention 19.5 
Expenditure for township 25.2 
hospital 
*CHSD, 1988. 
*JiangXi *Whole country 
province 
36.5 41.8 
17.2 14.0 
19.4 18.1 
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These three kinds of expenditure amounted to over 80% 
of total expenditure. Health expenditure for MCH, training health 
personnel and the CMS was very small proportion of the total. As 
well as the regular health investment from the county government 
budget, there were some extra health investments for special 
health work from central and local government, such as an average 
250,000 yuan for family planning in 1988,144,000 yuan for other 
health work, including schistosomiasis elimination and new 
medical equipment. Part of the extra investment came directly from 
the central government and the provincial government, the rest was 
from the special budget of the county government. This health 
investment excluded a capital construction investment for health, 
which was included in the total county budget for capital 
construction. It was usually obtained from the provincial 
government and some factories. An average capital construction 
investment for health was 258,000 yuan in seven counties in 1988. 
At county level, in general, health investment was 
inadequate to meet the needs of health service development. 
Because of inflation more and more health expenditure went in 
salary payments for staff. Only a small part of health investment 
was used for enlarging the service. Some rural areas were only 
able to maintain the existing situation. 
4.1.5. The expenditure of national health insurance (NHI) 
The NHI is an important part of county health 
enterprise, which means the government supply of free medical 
services for state employees. This expenditure is not included in 
health investment, but comes from the administrative expenditure 
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of the department in which these people work. The government is 
responsible for all medical expenditure, and agrees to reimburse 
what has been spent. Since health reform, the expenditure of the 
NHI has gone up year by year because of the raising of medical 
prices and increased personal demand for health services. The 
NHI has become a heavy financial burden to governments at various 
levels. So one recent aspect of cost control has been an attempt 
to reform the management of the NHI. 
According to government statistics, the expenditure on 
NHI in China in 1986 was 1.8 times of that in 1980, an average 
increasing by 18.9% each year. The rate of increase was greater 
than that of national income (Tian Yi Nong, 1987,10). In the seven 
counties of the study, average NHI expenditure of 1988 was double 
that of 1986. Total money was 614,290 yuan, which accounted for 
2.7% of the total county expenditure. Expenditure on other health 
matters was 3.2% the total county expenditure. There was only 
0.5% difference between the two. There is no doubt that the 
increasing rate of NHI surpassed that of industrial and 
agricultural output and price. What were the reasons? We can get 
answers from the table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. Average county expenditure of national health insurance 
Year Expenditure Increase Population Increase 
(Yuan) (96) are covered M 
1986 302,161 100.0 3,580 100.0 
1987 432,956 143.3 4,681 130.8 
1988 614,290 203.3 4,880 136.3 
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1. The people covered by the NHI increased from 3580 an 
average of in each county in 1986 to 4880 in 1988, because many 
people had retired since 1982. In 1982, the cadre policy changed, 
the government wanted the veteran cadres retired, so that young 
people could take their places. Most cadres who were at retirement 
age had to leave their jobs. These cadres were old and infirm and 
many suffered from chronic diseases. Their medical expenses were 
several times greater than the average per capita medical expense. 
2. Medical cost increased due to the change in the 
prices of medicines and medical materials. Medical equipment 
replacements, additional test items and more charges increased the 
medical costs of people covered by the NHI. 
Waste was another important factor which caused the 
increase in NHI's expenditure. As we know, the NHI supplied a free 
medical service, so if a family had one person covered by the NHI, 
this person could see the doctor more frequently and obtain more 
medicines for others in the family, which produced an example of 
'moral hazard'. This mean that users will always demand more than 
is supplied, leading to abuse of health services. The hospital did 
not prevent this from happening, because the more patients went to 
hospital, the more medicines the hospital sold, and the bigger 
profit the hospital received. As a result, where 'one person was 
covered by the NHI, the whole family enjoyed the NHI'. Usually, 
this sort of family kept many medicines, which were sometimes 
resold at a profit to a private doctor. This was, of course, both 
wasteful and illegal (Xiang Zheng 1988,7). 
To avoid waste and control the increase in NHI's 
expenditure, many places attempted managerial reform. In seven 
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counties, medical expenses were linked to the benefit of the 
individual, hospital and work unit. Each paid a part of the 
total. All of them were obliged to control medical expenses. 
The 'seven counties' used this method to reduce medical 
expenditure on NHI. 
The difference between urban and rural areas was very 
striking. In this study, average percapita NHI medical 
expenditure for urban residents (workers) was 125.8 yuan in 
1988,11.4% of their 1107.5 yuan yearly income. The urban 
resident did not pay this 125.8 yuan. In contrast, the average 
medical expenditure per peasant was about 20 yuan in 1988, only 
3.6% of their 550 yuan yearly income (Chapter 6). This amount of 
the money was paid by the peasant himself. The medical expenditure 
of peasants was far less than that of urban residents. The volume 
of medical services 'received by peasants was not as great as 
those available to urban residents and the health status of 
peasants was inferior to that of urban residents. The mortality 
of urban residents was 5.56 per thousand in China in 1988, that of 
peasants was 6.52 per thousand in same year (ZGWSTJ, 1988). 
4.2 The State of County Level Health Units (including the county 
hospital, the MCH, the county traditional Chinese medicine 
hospital and the epidemic station) 
Two investigati ons of the state of the County Health 
Unit were carried out. On the first occasion, in 1989, we 
collected data from seven county hospitals, the county Chinese 
traditional hospital, and the MCH and epidemic station i n Jiangxi 
province. We analysed the hospita lization expenses, and compared 
the economic and health service conditions in both kinds of 
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hospital, the county hospital and county Chinese traditional 
hospital (See 4.3 below). The second time in 1990, we collected 
supplementary materials from four county hospitals in Jiangxi, 
Shandong and Zhenjiang provinces. The purpose was to understand 
further how these county hospitals are able to make up their 
financial deficits. 
4.2.1 Tncome and expenditure 
The total income was 18.77 million yuan in 1988 in seven 
county level hospitals. The expenditure was 17.59 million yuan. 
The profit was 1.18 million yuan. On checking income and 
expenditure, it appears that the biggest proportion of expenditure 
and income was derived from selling and buying medicine. The 
income from selling medicine was 10.52 million yuan, which made 
up 56% of total income, the expenditure on buying medicine was 
8.80 million yuan, which accounted for 50% of total expenditure. 
The profit from selling medicine was the main support for running 
the hospital. The income from medical treatment was only 0.49 
million yuan, of which fees for operations and registration were 
the main proportion. These low operation and registration fees 
did not reflect the real working value of medical staff. For 
example, my research in Xinyu, Jiangxi province in 1987, 
investigated the cost of an operation on a patient for gastric 
ulcer in the Xinyu city hospital. From 1981 to 1987, the average 
yearly increasing rate of cost was 4.4%, which was lower than the 
7.7% of rate inflation and the 14.33% from selling medicine. One 
case paid only 28.35 yuan for an operation on gastric ulcer in 
1987 (Xiang Zhengj, 1988,7). Therefore, doctors work yielded 
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comparitively little profit. As a result, the economic position of 
medical staff was not very high in many areas of China. Some 
people said that the income of a brain surgeon was not as much as 
a hairdresser's. We can understand why the rural doctors often 
complained about their salaries. The doctors who were in county 
hospitals preferred to go to township hospitals to perform 
operations because the patient charges were not controlled by the 
county hospital, and they could earn extra income but there are 
not many chances for them. 
4.2.2 Analysis of hospitalization expenses 
We chose a random sample of 482 in-patients in seven 
county hospitals for investigation. The purpose was to discover, 
through analysis of the hospitalization expenses, what health 
services the patients got after health reform. The development of 
county hospitals themselves, will be discussed below. 
1. General conditions 
Among 482 in-patients, 209 were female, 273, male. 166 
(34.4%) in-patients were covered by the NHI or the Labour Health 
Insurance (the latter health insurance means that the factory 
supplies free health services for workers. The cost is borne by 
the factory budget, not by the government). 316 (66%) in-patients 
were self-financing patients. Most of them were peasants. Others 
were children and students in middle school. 
The distribution of diseases is shown in Table 4.7. The 
major group were diseases of the respiratory system, which 
accounted for 31%. Most patients suffered from pneumonia and 
bronchitis, the second major group were diseases of the digestive 
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system (21%). Table 4.7 indicates that the majority of patients 
suffered from common and frequently occurring diseases. Only 6 
patients suffering from tumour went to the hospital because the 
patients who suffered from more complicated diseases were 
transferred to civic and provincial hospitals. 
Table 4.7. Distribution of diseases 
Type of disease No. of patients 
Respiratory 147 
Gastroenteritis 101 
Urological 12 
Circulatory 30 
Parturition 37 
Nervous 17 
Bone 56 
Surgical trauma 41 
Tumour 6 
Missing Data 35 
Total 482 
After health reform, the number of self-financing 
patients increased in the county hospital. Most of them were 
peasants. These self-financing patients had more opportunities to 
purchase health services. On the one hand, this was an advantage. 
It was not necessary to get permission if they wanted to choose a 
hospital to see a particular doctor. The self-financing patient 
could receive county level health services if they paid the same 
or slighly higher than the patient who was covered by the NHI or 
labour health insurance. On the other hand, the self-financing 
patient had to bear the full cost. If they stayed in hospital 
longer due to severe disease, they might encounter financial 
difficulty. The study shows that such cases often occurred in the 
rural areas, as we shall see below. 
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2. The relationship between occupationt length of 
patient stay and in-patient medical expenditure. 
If patients are classified by occupation, we can see 
that 45% workers and 44% cadres stayed in the hospital more than 
ten days, 33% peasants stayed in the hospital more than ten days. 
The health services they got were very different (Table 4-8). 
Table 4.8. The relation between occupation and length of patient 
stay 
Days in 
hospital 
Workers Peasants Students Cadres Children Others 
<5 24 60 8 2 52 15 
5- 26 50 4 7 51 14 
10- 26 46 6 3 8 9 
20- 10 6 0 4 0 2 
30- 5 1 1 0 1 0 
Total 91 163 19 16 112 40 
Missing data 41 
The reason for the difference was not that the peasants 
were less severely ill. As we can see from the Table 4.7, most 
patients who had been in the county hospital suffered from common 
or frequently-occurring disease. Yet peasant stays were shorter, 
because they paid themselves. The workers and the cadres did not 
have this constraint. The county hospitals preferred patients who 
were insured because their longer stays resulted in more profit. 
Evidence to support this view comes from an analysis of 
the hospitalization expenses. Except for blood transtusion, which 
all patients pay for themslves, other expenses would depend on the 
kind of health insurance cover available to the patient. Some 
peasants could get a little financial support 
from the CMS, most 
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pay themselves. The medical expenses of workers and cadres are 
paid by the factory and the government. The students in middle 
school, and children would depend on their parents. If their 
parents were covered by the NHI or the labour health insurancer 
according to the rules, the parents paid half. The peasant's 
children have to be fully supported by their parents, unless their 
parents have some CMS cover. The students in university were the 
same as the cadres, and were covered by the NHI. We can see from 
Table 4.9 that 73.6% workers and 94% cadres did not need to pay 
any thing, but this applied to only 28% of peasants who were 
covered by the CMS or by labour health insurance from rural 
industry. Although some workers and cadres paid for themselves, 
this was only for blood transfusion and some minor items. Peasants 
were charged more, relatively, than workers or cadres. Most 
workers, even if they contributed to their own costs, had bills of 
less than 100 yuan. Nearly half the peasants paid more than this, 
and in 12% of cases, 3 times as much. The highest charge to a 
peasant was 777.3 yuan. This is a large financial burden when set 
against the average peasant income of 550 yuan per annum. If the 
peasant suffered from a disease such as cancer, which could not be 
treated at county level, the peasant had to be transferred to a 
provincial hospital. The total costs which also included travel 
and accommodation for accompanying relatives could use up the 
whole years income of the family. There is no doubt that this 
heavy expenditure is a consequence of the collapse of the CMS 
after health reform. The privatisation of Chinese rural health 
system worsened the inequity in health care that has already 
existed between the urban areas and the rural areas 
(see Chapter 
6). 
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Table 4.9. A relation between occupation of inpatients and their 
medical expenses* 
Expense Workers Peasants Cadres Students Children others 
(Yuan) 
0 67 46 15 5 37 16 
< 50 6 32 1 5 11 5 
50- 10 32 0 3 47 8 
100- 4 14 0 3 13 8 
150- 0 12 0 1 2 1 
200- 3 7 0 0 1 1 
250- 1 6 0 1 0 0 
300- 0 14 0 7 1 1 
Total 91 163 16 19 112 40 
*Missing data 41 
3. The nature of hospitalization expenses 
An average hospitalization expense was 145.7 yuan. From 
Table 4.10,54.6% of that cost was for medicine. Operation fees 
accounted for only 3.7%. With the inclusion of a treatment fee, 
this was raised to 24%, still a comparatively small proportion. 
Compared with the proportional distrubution of costs in the 
U. S. A., there is a large difference. In 1981, in the U. S. A., 
7.6% of costs were for medicine, 39.2% for the labour charges of 
doctors and nurses (Stein, 1983). Bed charges in China are also 
very low. At around 1.8 yuan per day, a hospital stay is cheaper 
than a hotel. Although medicine costs were high, most profit from 
selling medicine would be taken by the pharmacy and factory. The 
hospital recieved only a small percentage. But, of course, the 
costs to the patient were still very high. 
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Table 4.10 The form of hospitalization expense 
Items Money(Yuan) % 
Western Medicine 62.1 42.6 
Chinese Medicine 17.5 12.0 
Treatment Fee 30.1 20.7 
Bed Fee 14.5 9.9 
Examination 6.5 4.5 
operation 5.4 3.7 
Materials 3.9 2.6 
X-Ray 1.2 0.9 
Ultrasound Scanner 0.9 0.6 
ECG 0.1 0.1 
Oxygen 2.3 1.5 
Other 1.2 0.9 
Average Total 145.7 100.0 
4.2.3. Methods adopted by the county hospital for making up their 
deficits 
A supplementary investigation of the financial 
organisation of four county hospitals in Jiangxi, Shandong and 
Zhejiang was made in 1990. These four county hospitals began to 
implement health reform in 1982. A main reform measure was to 
introduce the system of market competition which is the economic 
responsibility system. The quantity of hospital services are 
linked with profits. The detail was that doctors were given a 
quota of patients. If doctors saw more patients than their quota, 
they would receive extra money. This was an attempt to generalise 
the 'responsibility system', which had been successful in 
increasing peasant agricultural output, into the hospitals. 
In 1988, the four county hospitals extended the 
implemention of the responsibility system throughout their 
organisations. Not only the medical staff, but each 
department and 
all other employees had economic targets set. The 
individual was 
responsible to the department, the 
department was responsible to 
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the hospital, the hospital was responsible to the county health 
bureau. The rules were the same throughout: if they exceeded the 
target, they would recieve a bonus; if they failed, fines were 
imosed. It is worth noticing that the implementation of the 
'responsibility system' in the Chinese health market was simply a 
copy of the model of economic reform and did not consider the 
health care market that also contains elements of social benefit. 
This reflects the fact that health policy-making in China is 
completely determined by the central government with virtually no 
consultation from society, community organizations and 
individuals. A further discussion is in the 4.3. Below, the impact 
of the responsibility system is considered. 
1. Basic finances 
In the four county hospitals studied, the income from 
selling medicine accounted for 44%-54% of total income, which was 
the highest proportion of all types of income, and was tending to 
Table 4.11. The form of income in 4 county hospitals 
Items 1980 1985 1989 
Total income 
(Ten thousand yuan) 389.69 668.80 1846.65 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Proportion %%% 
medicine 45.04 47.35 54.16 
Test and 6.39 13.00 19.45 
treatment 
Registration fee 3.60 4.25 5.02 
Health investment 13.57 15.84 4.42 
from the government 
Preparation 3.96 2.69 3.84 
Other 27.44 16.87 13.11 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Figure 4.1. Income from Medical Service 
Ten Thousands Yuan 
500 r- 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 ý- 
80 
4 county hospitals in China 
increase yearly. But it did not increase as quickly as the income 
from treatment, which went up from 6.39% in 1980 to 19.45% in 1989. 
The proportion of health investment from government reduced from 
13.57% in 1980 to 4.42% in 1989 (Table 4.11). 
To analyse the financial balance of each year in four 
county hospitals (Table 4.12, Figure 4.1): Figure 4.1 shows that 
the income from medical services increased yearly, from 36.3 ten 
thousand yuan in 1980 to 492.76 ten thousand yuan in 1989. The 
biggest increase was in 1988, when income from medical services 
increased by 86% over 1987. The income from selling medicines 
alone in 1988 was also the biggest jump in ten years, it went up 
by 40% over to 1987 figure. 1988 was the year when there was 
widespread implementation of the responsibility system. Tn that 
same year 1987-1988, governmental health investment reduced by 
10.2 percent. This increase in income generated a four fold 
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Table 4.12 Economic condition in 4 county hospitals 
(Ten thousands yuan)* 
Income 
Year Expenditure Balance 
Medical Governmental 
service investment 
Net Balance 
profit again 
selling 
medicine 
1980 36.30 52.89 136.94 -47.75 44.89 - 2.88 
1981 38.34 55.28 166.98 -73.36 53.70 -19.66 
1982 43.47 67.74 176.64 -68.16 56.24 -11.92 
1983 52.63 89.10 237.91 -96.18 67.41 -28.77 
1984 68.48 117.06 269.48 -83.94 70.97 -12.97 
1985 103.79 105.95 254.07 -44.33 81.31 36.98 
1986 123.34 152.89 344.92 -68.69 99.38 30.69 
1987 204.23 152.84 453.89 -96.82 125.69 28.87 
1988 381.18 137.21 578.23 -59.84 176.37 116.53 
1989 492.76 81.75 617.75 -43.24 180.58 137.34 
*The income and expenditure of medicine have been deducted from 
total income and expenditure. 
increase in profits for 1988 over 1987. Therefore it seems 
reasonable to conclude that health reforms brought a vigour to the 
hospital's running and aroused the enthusiasm of the staff. The 
reforms increased staff productivity and income and there is no 
doubt that, on the simple outcome measure of def icit reduction, 
the ten years of health reform helped the hospita ls to extricate 
themslves from a deficit position. Other factors which lessened 
the deficit cannot be ignored, however. These include price 
increases, and significantly, the lossening of con trols on patient 
choice because of the collapse of the CMS. Peas ants could now 
choose their own services, for which they had to pay themselves. 
The county hospital, because of its range of services scored an 
easy victory over the township hospitals in the competition 
for 
patients. 
2. Examination of deficit strategies 
As Table 4.12, shows, without the large profits made 
from selling medicine, the hospitals would have remained 
in a 
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deficit position. They could not survive financially solely on 
the income from medical services and their government subsidy. 
This suggests that the medical services were not charging patients 
at cost. 
a. Selling and buying medicines proved the most useful 
way to make up the deficit. Average charges for medicines to 
outpatients increased by about 400%, between 1980-1989 those for 
inpatients by nearly 600% (Table 4.13). 
Table 4.13. Average cost per visit or treatment episode 
of outpatient and inpatient service (yuan) 
Out-patient In-patient 
Year 
Total 
expenditure 
Medicine Total 
expenditure 
Medicine 
1980 1.74 1.40 32.69 28.24 
1981 1.83 1.48 35.60 30.95 
1982 1.98 1.58 42.99 36.75 
1983 2.26 1.78 50.08 43.12 
1984 2.70 2.14 63.39 51.88 
1985 3.23 2.41 85.02 64.72 
1986 3.52 2.67 99.58 77.23 
1987 4.50 3.28 131.76 96.23 
1988 6.31 4.80 228.28 145.62 
1989 7.86 5.96 274.52 167.13 
Net profits from sales of medicine increased more 
rapidly after 1986 (Table 4.12) because the reform was carried out 
further. The rate of profit from selling medicine was 15%. The 
average ratio of gross profit to net profit from selling medicine 
was 7 to 1 after 1986. It meant the hospitals increased their 
gross income seven fold from selling medicine, resulting in a one- 
fold net income increase. 
b. Another method was to charge more for medical 
services. Table 4.13 shows that charges for outpatient service 
increased yearly, from 0.34 yuan in 1980 to 1.9 yuan in 1989, by 
5.6 times. Increases in inpatient charges were massive, from 4.45 
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yuan in 1980 to 107.39 yuan in 1989, jumping 24.1 times(total 
expenditure - medicine). The main measures were to increase the 
number of medical service items, for example, the registration fee 
was divided into day time, out-of-hours, emergency service and 
senior doctor service, to increase the numbers of laboratory tests 
and to increase the price of each item of medical service. 
C. Changes in government health investment: the 
government health investment was used mainly to pay staff 
salaries. It increased yearly before 1988, but reduced in 1988- 
1989 (Table 4.12). The government hoped that the hospitals would 
solve their own financial problems by implementing the economic 
responsibility system. The government found it was also in 
financial difficulty. According to this study, an average health 
investment covered only half of the staff's salary, whereas in 
1983 government paid nearly 60% of staff salaries. The proportion 
declined yearly and by 1986 was down to 26%. Government investment 
contributed relatively little to management of the deficit. Health 
reforms reduced the financial burdens of the government, but added 
to those of the hospital. The hospitals had to look for methods 
to transfer their costs to patients in order to stay open. if 
the patients were covered by the NHI and the labour health 
insurance, there was no problem, for hospitals shifted the costs 
to the factories, or back to the government. But for patients 
those paying for themselves, mainly peasants, there were clear 
difficulties. 
d. After health reform, the hospitals increased their 
working efficiency and attempted to reduce waste and 
administrative expense. Table 4.12 shows how an incremental rate 
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of expenditure was decreasing yearly since 1986, from 35.8% in 
1986 to 31.6% in 1987,27.4% in 1988 and 6.8% in 1989. 
Health reforms in the county hospital had undoubtedly 
some positive effects. Income was increased, some expenditures 
were controlled, managerial efficiency was improved and the 
governments contribution also decreased. On the other hand the 
economic responsibility system and some reform methods which 
emphasised incentives, strengthened the monopoly position of 
doctors towards patients. The doctors tried to see more patients 
and make large prescriptions in order to complete their working 
quota early and earn extra money. Government health investment 
was insufficent, and the welfare functions of the hospital i. e. 
providing care, were seriously impaired. The situation stimulated 
excessive use of medical services and profits were achieved by 
selling increased amounts of medicine. Last of all, the costs to 
peasants were considerably increased. 
How might these problems be solved? One answer might be 
to increase the charge for technical services and to reduce the 
expenditure on medicines. The profit from selling medicine would 
then be transferred to profit from technical services. This 
reduces the burden to consumers and increases the direct income of 
the hospital. For example, with 15% profit from selling medicine, 
if the outpatient service reduces 1 yuan of medicine costs, the 
hospital reduces 0.15 yuan income, but at the same time, increases 
registration fee to 0.5 yuan, the charge for patients will be 
reduced 0.5 yuan, and the hospital could increase 0.35 yuan 
income. This seems a feasible method of benefiting both consumer 
and hospital, and cuts the profits to pharmaceutical companies 
(Table 4.14). 
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Table 4.14. Price adjustment (yuan) 
Item Income of Expenditure 
hospital of patient 
Reduction of 1.00 yuan *-0.15 -1.00 
in selling medicine 
Increase of 0.5 yuan 
registration fee +0.50 +0.50 
Balance +0.35 -0.50 
* The rate of profit from medicine sales is 15%. 
4.3. A Comparison of the County Hospital (CH) with the County 
Chinese Traditional Hospital (CCTH) 
Traditional medicine, as is well known, plays an 
important role in China. Several important forms of traditional 
medicine are practiced, including Chinese, Mongol, Tibetan, Ugyur 
and others. Because over 93 percent of China's population is of 
the Han ethnic group, Chinese traditional medicine (CTM) 
predominates, although official policy does not discriminate in 
favor of any particular system of traditional medicine (Jamison 
1985) . 
Before health reform, the development of Chinese 
traditional medicine was not as rapid as western medicine in 
China. At present, there are 1.05 million doctors of western 
medicine, a nine fold increase over 1949. By contrast there were 
only 0.32 million traditional doctors in 1986, less than in 1950. 
There were only 171 Chinese traditional hospitals in 1976 (Yu 
Xiang-Dan 1988,3). 
In view of this situation, the Ministry of Public Health 
convened a conference on CTM in Heng Yang, Hunan province in 1982, 
to discuss the developing problems of Chinese traditional 
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medicine. In the same year, the development of CTM was placed on 
the general programme of the new constitution which was issued in 
1982. The CCPCC and the State Council held five meetings on the 
matter. The CCPCC decided "Chinese traditional medicine should 
have the same position of importance as Western medicine" in 
June, 1985. The State Council set up the State Bureau of Chinese 
Traditional Medicine (SBCTM) on January 4,1986. it was 
established formally on December 6 1986 (Hu Zhao Ming, 1986). The 
objective of the Ministry of Public Health was that there should 
be one Chinese traditional medical hospital in each county by 
1995. This policy originated from the CCPCC. The CCPCC decided 
the direction of the CTM then the State Council built an 
organization to express the importance of the CTM. In following 
the CCPCC, the Ministry of Public Health made the policy of 
building a County Chinese Traditional Hospital in all counties. 
The counties just implemented the policy without thinking about 
its financial viability. The whole process of policy-making 
follows a typical 'top-down' model as mentioned in the literature, 
where community participation as absent. This policy had positive 
effects for improving Chinese traditional medicine and provided 
convenient access to a hospital for rural residents. The number of 
Chinese traditional medicine hospitals increased from 678 in 1980 
to 1445 in 1985, and 1932 in 1988. During health reform, Chinese 
traditional health workers increased by 46.2%. CTM developed very 
rapidly during health reform (ZGWSTJ, 1988). 
However, was such a rapid development necessary? How 
much in demand is it? The policy lacked systematic 
investigation and study. Data from seven counties were analysed to 
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compare the county hospital with the county Chinese traditional 
hospital. The purpose was to consider the feasibility of building 
a CCTH in all counties. Because of the lack of data about finance 
from one CCTH, six county hospitals were compared with six county 
Chinese traditional hospitals. 
4.3.1 Analysis of basic health resource 
Table 4.15 shows that the number of staffs, beds and 
fixed assets in the CH were 2.7 times, 4.5 times and 3.1 times of 
those in CCTH respectively. Governmental investment was only 2.6 
times greater. Looking at health investment average per staff and 
average per bed, both were lower in the CH than in the CCTH. This 
indicated a scale of the CCTH was small, but the governmental 
investment was big. It was due to the effect of health reform. 
Table 4.15. Comparison of basic health resourse in the CH with 
that in the CCTH 
Item CH CCTH CH: CCTH 
Average staffs 226 83 2.7: 1 
in each hospital 
Average bed 218 49 4.5: 1 
in each hospital 
Average fixed 161.2 52.2 3.1: 1 
assets of each 
hospital 
(Ten thousand yuan) 
Average governmental 16.4 6.2 2.6: 1 
investment to each hospital 
(Ten thousand yuan) 
Average governmental 726 747 0.97: 1 
investment to each 
person (yuan) 
Average governmental 752 1265 0.59: 1 
investment to each bed (yuan) 
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A comparison of health personnel (Figure 4.2) shows that 
the educational level of doctors in the CCTH was lower than that 
in the CH. 22.6% of doctors had no record of formal schooling. A 
majority of doctors in the CCTH were in a low professional 
position compared with those in the CH. The difference is 
important and relates to the background of Chinese traditional 
doctors. Chinese traditional Medicine has a long history. Many 
Chinese traditional doctors followed their masters to study in the 
rural areas. They had few opportunities to study in medical 
school. But in CCTH, some Chinese traditional doctors took courses 
in medical school, so they had the ability to treat patients using 
western medical knowledge. The higher level professional position 
is called "Zhu Ren" Doctor. The middle level professional position 
is called "Zhu Zhi" doctor. Normally, both of them studied in 
medical college. If Chinese traditional doctors had many years of 
clinical experience and passed the examination, they could also 
achieve these titles. The lowest level professional position is 
called "Yi Shi", which described those doctors who have studied 
in health school for only two or three years. 
4.3.2. Analysis of income and expenditure 
The expenditure of the CCTH was three fold lower than 
that of the CH; the income, 3.3 times lower. The expenditure and 
income was unbalanced, an average deficit per CCTH was 29,000 
yuan in 1988. Even including government health investment, each 
CCTH had only 33,000 yuan profit. If the per capita profit is 
calculated, there was an average of 398 yuan in the CCTH; 1062 
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yuan, in the CH. This shows that the CCTH could only survive on 
basis of the government subsidy. They did not have the capacity to 
enlarge their services (Table 4.16). 
Table 4.16. Comparison of two kinds of hospital medical income 
and medical expenditure (ten thousand yuan) 
Item CH CCTH CH: CCTH 
An average total 180.0 55.1 3.3: 1 
medical income 
in each hospital 
An average total 
medical expenditure 
in each hospital 
172.4 58.0 3.0: 1 
An average profit 
of each hospital 
After adding governmental 
investment, the profit 
of each hospital 
An average profit 
of staff making 
(yuan) 
7.6 
24.0 
1062.0 
-2.9 
3.3 7.3: 1 
398.0 2.7: 1 
The sources of income of the CH and the CCTH differed 
[Table 4.17(a)]. The main income of the CCTH was from outpatient 
services (62.4% of the total). At the CH, inpatient services 
accounted for 62.3% of total income. The reasons were that the 
technical level of health staffs was lower in the CCTH, the scale 
of work undertaken was small, and there were fewer beds. The 
capacity to carry out surgery was less. Table 4.17(b) shows that 
78.6% of CCTH income was from medicine sales compared with 62.1% 
in the CH. The income from tests and treatment was lower in the 
CCTH. 
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Table 
Item CH CCTH 
Outpatient income 
Inpatient income 
Pharmaceutical manufacture 
Other 
Total 
30.8 
193.1 
62.3 
3.8 
3.1 
100.0 
62.4 
195.3 
32.9 
0.0 
4.7 
100.0 
Table 4.17(b). Sources of income in outpatient departments 
and inpatient admissions (%) 
Item CH CCTH 
Selling medicine 62.1 78.6 
Tests and treatment 25.7 12.9 
Bed charges 4.2 2.2 
Registration fees 1.1 1.6 
Subtotal 93.1 95.3 
73% of the medicines sold to outpatients at CCTH were 
traditional remedies, the remainder were western medicines. At the 
CH, 44% of medicine was traditional Chinese medicine, which is 
quite a large proportion. Clearly, Chinese traditional medicine is 
also well developed as a treatment option in the CH. When it comes 
to inpatient treatments, the CCTH uses less traditional medicine, 
with 40% of its prescriptions being for western drugs. Combining 
western and traditional treatments for inpatients was an important 
characteristic of the service at the CCTH. 
4.17(a). Comparion of the sources of medical income 
between the CH and the CCTH M 
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4.3.3 Level of working efficiency in the two kinds of hospitals 
According to 'the working regulations for Chinese 
traditional hospitals in China', a standard ratio of bed to staff 
was 1 to 1.3-1.4 in a hospital of fewer than 150 beds, 1: 1.3-1.4 
fewer than 300 beds in the county hospitals (Peng Yui Chong, 1988, 
3). Yet the investigation showed substantial overstaffing in CCTH 
(Table 4.15). 66 staff members should be enough for each CCTH, but 
there was an average of 83 staff members in each CCTH, a surplus 
of 17. Average numbers of staff at the CH should be 294, but the 
actual average was 226 staff members, a shortfall of 68. Was staff 
surplus at the CCTH related to greater bed utilization and harder 
work? Figure 4.3 suggests that both *the rate of bed utilisation, 
and *the average time of bed turnover were lower in the CCTH than 
in the CH. For the whole of Jiangxi province, the rate of bed 
utilization was 75% in the CCTH, 83% in the CH (ZGWSTJ, 1988). So 
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Time of Bed Turnover Rate of Bed Utilized 
the staff surpluses can not be justified on the basis of greater 
utilization. 
If patients numbers are calculated at CCTH, each doctor 
saw an average of 686 outpatients in 1988 compared with 514 
patients in the CH. Nevertheless as to the patients discharged 
from hospital and *average bed utilisation days, the CH averaged 
7.3 times and 1.3 times compared with the CCTH. This shows that 
outpatient services are what the CCTH is mainly engaged in. The 
quantity of inpatient services supplied by the CCTH seems 
insufficient. From an average output of each staff, average bed 
utilisation days in the CCTH were 134 in 1988; in CH, were 289. If 
one bed utilisation day is to equal to three outpatients service, 
the general output of each staff member in the CH was 1,381, that 
in the CCTH was 1,086. Average working output per staff in the CH 
was 1.3 times greater compared with the CCTH (This index combines 
the service quantity of outpatient with the service quantity of 
inpatient, and is only for evaluating the two kinds of 
hospitals)(Table4.18). 
Total days of bed occupancy 
*The rate of bed= -------------------------------- x 100% 
utilisation Total days of bed utilisation 
Total patients are discharged from hospital 
*The average time= ------------------------------------------- 
of bed turnover Total beds utilisation 
Total days of bed are occupied 
*Average bed ------------------------------- 
utilisation days Total beds that can be used 
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Table 4.18. 
Item 
Comparison of output of the CH with that of the CCTH 
in 1988 
CH CCTH CH: CCTH 
An average output of 
each hospital 
Outpatients service times 116,011 56,972 2.0: 1 
The patients discharged 5,864 806 7.3: 1 
from hospital 
Bed utilisation days 65,162 11,160 5.8: 1 
---------------------------------- 
An average output of 
------------- ------------ -------- 
each staff 
Outpatient service times 514 686 0.8: 1 
The patients discharged 25.9 9.7 2.7: 1 
from hospital 
Average bed utilisation days 289 134 2.2: 1 
*General output 1381 1088 1.3: 1 
*General output = number of outpatient service + (bed utilisation 
days x 3) 1381 = 514 + (289x3) 
[one bed utilisation day equals three outpatients service. ) 
Overall it seems that the volume of health services 
provided by the CH was greater than that of the CCTH. Staff 
members in the CH were busier than that in the CCTH, but their 
salaries were the same. Costs of the CCTH were higher, but their 
profitability was lower, which seems a wasteful use of resource. 
4.3.4. The prospects for development of CCTH 
The CCTH is small scale, with staff who are relatively 
less well trained in a formal sense. Per unit of input, output 
is 
relatively low, and these hospitals have a deficit. 
1. one problem is that CCTH is excessively dependent on 
governmental subsidy and income from medicine sales. The support 
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from government is difficult to expand, and is vulnerable to 
policy change. Selling medicine is also a strategy pursued by 
county and township hospitals. If these sales are regulated, the 
impact on the income of CCTH is likely to be even greater because 
of their greater dependence on such sales (Yan Hui Zhong, 1988,8). 
2. The research suggests that the CCTH encouraged the 
wastage of health resources. The CCTH have been unable to alter 
their deficit position, yet government policy is that a CCTH 
should be built in all counties by 1995, and that its scale and 
standard should be the same as the CH (Hu Zhao Ming, 1987). The 
deficit will be very huge in whole counties and this can not be 
rescued by improved efficiency. As shown above, the rate of bed 
utlization was low. Most patients are self-financing, and in the 
market for patients, the CH, with its superior doctors and greater 
access to medical techniques is bound to win. The government can 
not afford the huge investment needed to improve these hospitals 
and train their staff. The greater dependence on medicine sales 
of the CCTH currently would have to be increased. These medicines 
are bought from pharmaceutical factories using the CCTH's main 
source of finance-government money. And prices to patients would 
still have to be increased. 
4.3.5 The way forward for the CCTH 
1. Enlarging the traditional medicine department of the 
county hospitals. 
The CCTH do not exist yet in all counties. Measures 
should be suited to local conditions. After the feasibility of 
building the CCTH has been proved then building could go ahead. If 
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this is impossible consideration should be given to enlarging the 
department of Chinese traditional medicine in the county hospital, 
because all county hospitals already have such departments. This 
approach would take advantage of the strong 'outpatient' nature of 
Chinese health services and expand on this valuable 
characteristic. The support services and superiority of medical 
equipment are also likely to be greater in the CH. Such an option 
would also reduce the scale and dependence upon government 
investment, improve the utilization of health resource and expand 
the departments of Chinese traditional medicine in county 
hospitals, suiting measures to local conditions. After proving 
the feasibility of building the CCTH, then it could go ahead. If 
not, an enlargement of the department of Chinese traditional 
medicine in county hospital should be considered, because all 
county hospitals possess one. In this way, western medicine and 
Chinese traditional medicine learn from and help each other, to 
make up each other's deficiencies. This method brings the 
outpatient service characteristics of Chinese medicine into full 
play as well as drawing support from inpatient services and the 
superior medical equipment in the county hospital. It reduces the 
scale of governmental subsidy, improves the utilization of health 
resource and extends the department of Chinese traditional 
medicine in the county hospital. 
2. Readjustment of the internal structure of the CCTH- 
Some counties already have a CCTH. Since the outpatient 
service is the main service provided, distribution of health 
personnel and other health resources should take account of this 
fact. 
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3. Closer co-operation and exchange between the two 
types of hospital. 
A further option suggests a sharing and exchange of 
facilities and resources between the CH and CCTH. The CH could 
transfer its inpatients to the CCTH in order to raise bed 
utilization. The CCTH could send doctors to the CH to study 
western medicine in order to improve their medical skills. 
Following such training doctors would be able to treat patients by 
western medicine and Chinese traditional medicine together. The 
two kinds of hospital could bring their advantage into full play, 
in-coperation rather than competition. 
4.4 County Health School (CHS) 
The CHS is the main base for training rural health 
personnel. Before health reform, the CHS had two kinds of student, 
the first was a regular student who studied in the CHS for two or 
three years, the second was a barefoot doctor who usually received 
six or twelve months advanced study there. The CHS contributed 
greatly to solving the educational needs of rural health personnel 
at that time. However the development of the CHS was neglected 
during health reformand and no adequate plans were laid to solve 
personnel shortages for the rural areas. A supplementary 
investigation was carried out about the CHS in 1990.4 counties 
in Jiangxi, Shandong and Zhejiang provinces were chosen. One of 
them did not have a county health school, so finally, three county 
health schools were investigated. 
4.4.1 General condition 
There were 962 students and 51 teachers in three county 
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health middle schools in 1989. The teacher/student ratio was 
1: 19, which was far lower than the recommended ratio of 1: 8 
(State Education Commission, 1987). 21.1% of the teachers had a 
five years university course; 33.3%, three years university 
training; 22.8%, professional middle school training; 22.8%, below 
middle school. 77.8% of teachers had joined the CHS in the last 
five years. Low health investment by the government, meant 
resources of only 148.36 yuan for each student in 1989, far lower 
than the 835.8 yuan per student in provincial and municipal middle 
level health schools with whom they might be compared (Chen Min 
Zhang, 1989,2). Over half the teachers (54%) wanted to leave and 
work elsewhere. Below, some of the reasons for these problems and 
the impact of the health reforms are analysed. 
4.4.2 Changes in the CHS during health reform 
1. Changes in income sources. 
The ratio of national budget accounting for total income 
in the County Health Schools reduced year by year, and that of 
tuition fees increased gradually. Though health investment from 
the government increased yearly after 1983, it only took into 
account inflation and the increased salaries of staff. It could 
not be used for the development of the CHS. In 1989, the 
government's national share of the budget in the three county 
health schools would not cover the staff's salary (Table 4.19 and 
Figure 4.4). Government investment was down from 5% of the 
beginning of 1980's to 1.5% at the end of 1980's (the proportion 
means the national budget of the CHS accounted for total budget of 
county health bureau). This reflected the reduction in the total 
budget to the county, where most of the health budget was spent on 
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Table 4.19. The main income of three county health schools 
Year Total income National % Tuition fee 
(Yuan) Budget (yuan) (Yuan) 
1983 87,231 41,500 47.6 N/A N/A 
1984 138,470 65,000 46.9 N/A N/A 
1985 151,708 54,170 35.7 N/A N/A 
1986* 224,120 83,830 35.4 136,124 60.7 
1987 304,210 106,620 35.0 193,590 63.6 
1988 494,581 139,900 28.3 344,944 69.7 
1989 613,679 147,468 24.0 448,688 73.1 
*One county has accepted self-financing students since 1981, another 
in 1985, other in 1986. 
developing the county hospital. The CHS had to take in self- 
financing students in order to survive. Before health reform, 
tuition was free for students, and a part of their living 
expenses would be supplied by the CHS, according to individual 
means. In the eighties however, the student had to pay tuition 
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fees and all their living expenses. Because the CMS also declined, 
there were few rural doctors going to the CHS for advanced study. 
The tuition fee that the CMS paid previously had dried up. The 
county health school was no longer available as a resource for 
improved subsidized training for rural doctors, but became a 
college for fee-paying students. 
2. The result of health reform ------ the entrance and the 
exit of self-financing students. 
The majority of students the CHS enrolled were not 
targetted in terms of expected numbers. Nevertheless, unplanned 
enrollments to the CHS was encouraged by the government. It was a 
way of solving the CHS's financial difficulties as well as quickly 
addressing the problem of shortage of health personnel in rural 
areas (Chen Min Zhang, 1987,2). However, the research showed that 
each province and city already had a health school and 66.7% of 
counties had a health middle school. So province, city and county 
school, all wanted to enrol students in similar courses. This 
caused competition. It was obvious that the county health school 
could not win. Therefore, such schools could predict neither their 
intake of students nor their income. 
There was also a limit to the economic capacity of 
students. At each of the 3 schools, the annual expenditure of 
students in 1989 was 1.28 times, 2.70 times and 1.50 times more 
respectively than the yearly average income of local 
peasants (Table 4.20). Even if some students wished to study in 
the CHS, they had to give up for financial reasons. Financial 
factors determined the likely source of students and also 
indicated that this reform measure was not suitable to poor rural 
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areas or was merely a interim measure. It could not become the 
basic means by which the lack of health personnel in the rural 
areas could be addressed. 
Table 4.20. The economic situation of self-financing students 
in three county schools in 1989 (Yuan) 
County Peasant's average Student expenditure *Index 
income 
Tuition Living Total 
fee expense 
A 953.4 502.6 720 1222.6 1.28 
B 455.8 571.7 660 1231.7 2.70 
c 822.0 510.8 720 1230.8 1.50 
*The index means the time that student's total expenditure 
accounted for peasant's average income. 
It was not easy to assign these students to jobs. On 
investigating their future intentions, 30% of the self-financing 
students would like to conduct their own business after 
graduation, which means that they would become private doctors. 
45% students preferred to go to township hospitals, but only 25% 
students intended to go to village health stations. Why would 
nearly half of the students want to go to township hospitals? The 
reason is that the staff who work in the township hospital have a 
regular salary from the government each month, and they are 
permanent. However the township hospitals themselves were in a 
financially difficult position. They did not have the funds to pay 
these students although they needed them. The village health 
station, on the other hand, was able to pay them, but they did not 
want to go there. Therefore, 70% of students were difficult to 
assign. 
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4.4.3. Countermeasures 
The CHS is a part of the national education system. It 
has trained many primary health workers since 1949. At present, it 
is experiencing financial difficulty, with a lack of resources. 
There are also problems in student enrollment and assignment. 
Below, some options for solving the predicament are considered. 
1. Aim to try get more health investment from the County 
Health Bureau and county government. 
2. Alter the way courses are organised by taking rural 
doctors in rotation for refresher courses. 
There were a few barefoot doctors who had attained the 
status of rural doctors in these three counties, but the quality 
of rural doctors was not high. In the three counties 15% of rural 
doctors had primary level education; 64%, middle school; 15. %, 
high school; 6% had further training in the CHS. The rural 
doctors could be encouraged to go to the CHS, by setting up an 
examination for them. Failure to pass the examination, would mean 
that they could not be certified as a rural doctor. A retirement 
system for elderly rural doctors could also be implemented. There 
are three merits in this course of action. First the quality of 
rural doctors is ensured. Second the CHS will have opportunities 
to train rural doctors. At present a majority of rural doctors are 
private doctors and they do not like to pay out of their own 
pockets to go to the CHS. The rural doctors who work in a 
collective village health station are not private doctors, but the 
village finds it difficult to support them to go to the CHS due to 
the collapse of the CMS. However, if an examination is enforced, 
the rural doctors are obliged to engage in advanced studies at the 
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CHS. The CHS can get income from training rural doctors. Third any 
vacancies produced by rural doctors failing the examination would 
be filled by the CHS students. This would solve students 
assignment problems. 
3. Controlling the scale of the school in order to 
take into account actual local conditions, to readjust the 
curriculum and control the quantity of enrollment into school, the 
CHS should receive professional guidance from the provicial and 
civic health schools. This would have two useful outcomes- 
improving the CHS, and avoiding a conflict with provincial and 
civic health schools. 
4.5 Investigation of the Objectives of County Health Enterprise 
Development 
To investigate how people thought about the future of 
the county health enterprise, we interviewed 17 leaders, who 
included the president of the county, the director of the county 
health bureau and the director of the county hospital. 16 leaders 
were male, 1 female; their average age was 42 years old; 2 leaders 
graduated from middle school, the rest graduated from middle 
professional school or university. 
4.5.1 Development of capital construction 
The majority (82.4%) of leaders thought the most urgent 
need was to increase medical equipment for various county medical 
units. However, the 77% saw no urgent need to develop the number 
of hospital beds. 65% also agreed that an expansion of health 
personnel was unnecessary (Figure 4.5). On the other hand, 53% 
thought that the professional level of health staff should be 
improved. 
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4.5.2 County health system 
In the development of the county health system, the 
first organization which needed to be strengthened was the county 
epidemic station. 47% of leaders held this opinion. The second 
organization which needed to be improved was the county hospital 
especially with regard to the quality of service, 30% of leaders 
held this opinion. A further 59% of leaders agreed that it was 
important to implement the economic responsibility system. The 
rest of the leaders did not agree or thought it was a makeshift 
measure. On constructing the CCTH, 82% of leaders approved of 
this, but they thought the scale of the CCTH should be 40 beds, 60 
staff members and the CCTH should mainly concentrate upon 
Chinese traditional medicine. It is easy to understand why a 
176 
Beds Health Personnel 
majority of leaders agreed with constructing the CCTH. From their 
point of view, it could make the county health system better to 
build the CCTH. Unfortunately they did not do the cost accounting 
and the analysis of cost-benefit, or know whether it was necessary 
to build the CCTH in their county. 
The major focus in the development of county health care 
is preventive work, and it was this which was ignored during 
health reform. The development of rural preventive work was not 
promising. Many infectious diseases appeared after having been 
controlled or eradicated for example the schistosomiasis in 
Jiangxi province (see chapter 1). 
The reform measure, the overall economic responsibility 
system could improve the county hospital and reduce the 
government subsidy in a short period. But approximately half of 
the leaders know this reform has some shortcomings. It encourages 
the county hospital to seek economic benefit blindly, for example 
by selling more medicines, and ignores social benefit such as the 
supply of satisfactory services for patients. An important measure 
to develop county health care should be to increase governmental 
subsidy. 
4.5.3 Main problems in developing health work at county Level 
According to the opinion of leaders interviewed, the 
most important problems were: a. lack of money; b. unreasonable 
prices as evidenced by the cost of some health service items, 
which were lower than the charges for patients; c. the rural 
residents were too poor to afford the medical expenses (Figure 
4.6). 
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Figure 4.6. The Crucial Problems in 
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On the health management system side 53% of leaders 
thought that the main problem was the low salaries of health 
staff. Another problems mentioned were poor medical service 
quality and the low quality of management cadres. We also asked 
leaders "do you think that the county government subsidies will 
be increased in the future or not". Only one person answered 
"Yes", the remaining, sixteen leaders thought the government 
health investment would be kept at its current level or reduced a 
little allowing for inflation. 
4.6 Summary of Chapter 4 
Following the order of the analysis, there are five 
points which summarize the main problems in health care at county 
level now. 
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4.6.1 The uneven allocation of health resources 
According to the findings of the study, there is an 
uneven distribution of health personnel between the urban areas 
and the rural areas, the medical expenditure of peasants was also 
far less than that of workers and cadres, and the peasants had 
to pay for health care themselves. By contrast, workers and 
cadres were covered by free health services. These freedoms 
produced 'moral hazard' which caused an increase in National 
Health Insurance's expenditure. Because of peasants' lower incomes 
they stayed in hospital for a shorter time than workers and 
cadres. This indicates that the peasants enjoyed fewer medical 
services than the workers and cadres. As a consequence, an 
inequality of access to health service between the urban residents 
and the rural residents occurred, which in turn produced health 
differentials. The mortality of rural residents was higher than 
that of urban residents. The gap between the rural areas and the 
urban areas was still increasing during health reform because of 
the privatisation of Chinese rural health system. 
4.6.2 Effects of the economic responsibility system 
During the health reform period, county hospitals 
introduced a system of market competition, --the economic 
responsibility system. As a consequence staff became more 
productive and the cost of the hospital was controlled. This 
solved some financial problems and the county hospital changed 
from being in deficit to a profit situation. But there were some 
awkward consequences. The county hospital profited by selling 
more medicines, added payments for tests and increased the charges 
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for services. This produced a heavy financial burden load rural 
residents and limited their utilisation. It also increased labor 
insurance expenditure and national health insurance. As a 
result, the latter equated approximately to the financial 
expenditure of county health enterprise. Therefore, 42% of county 
leaders thought the economic responsibility system was only a 
temporary answer to their difficulties. The market competitive 
system should not affect the quality and quantity of health 
services. 
The best measure to improve the situation would be to 
increase the amount of government subsidy. Nevertheless, it seems 
impossible to do so on the basis of the present national 
resources. However, the government could control the health care 
market continuously, as in the UK 'the internal market' (see 
Chapter 1), where the government introduces the system of market 
competition but controls the health care market in such a way as 
to guarantee that people obtain basic health services. 
Another way is to adjust the price of health services. 
This means charging patients at cost. There is no doubt that this 
would replace selling medicines as a means of making up the 
deficit of the county hospital, but it would produce a larger 
economic burden to the peasants, and would destroy the concept of 
social benefit in health. This also seems unfeasible. Finally, the 
charges for technical services (the operation fee) could be 
increased, to reduce the expenditure on medicines. The profit from 
technical service would then replace the profit from selling 
medicines. The merits would be that hospital income would 
increase, the burden on peasants would not increase, the real 
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value of doctors work would be embodied in the charges, doctors 
salaries would increase and wastefulness would be eliminated. 
4.6.3 The feasibility of the CCTH 
The policy of the Ministry of Public Health to build 
the CCTH in all counties had positive effects in improving Chinese 
traditional medicine and increasing accessibility to medical 
services for rural residents. However, our comparison of six CCTHs 
shows that it is unfeasible to build the CCTH in all counties, 
ignoring geographical distribution, the population and the 
wishes of residents, the limitation of national resources and 
lack of local health resources. The investigation showed that the 
profitability and efficiency of the CCTH was obviously lower than 
that of the CH. The CCTH had to rely on government investment 
and preferential policies to maintain its running. 
No feasibility study was carried out before the 
decisions regarding CCTH were made. Among six CCTHs, half were 
constrcting new buildings. The average investment was over 
400,000 yuan in each hospital. Chong Yen county constructed a new 
CH building in 1987, and also a new building for the CCTH in 
1988. Because of lack of money, construction work on both 
buildings had to stop. This was very wasteful. Where resources are 
limited, the county should concentrate upon the development of the 
department of Chinese traditional medicine in the CH. In this way 
full use of the health personnel and medical equipment of the CH 
can be made, and traditional medicine developed. In those counties 
which have already built the CCTH, the CCTH's internal structure 
could be adjusted or combined with the CH, to be managed jointly. 
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Briefly, the current policy appears to be waste of 
resources. The reason for its having occurred is because of the 
lack of consultation with society, community organizations and 
individuals. The whole process of policy-making is 'top-down' in 
China and has also been affected by the political change towards 
a free market system. To transfer a model of economic reform into 
the health care market without thinking of the social 
consequences., to destroy the CMS and encourage the privatisation 
of rural health care are all exsamples of policies applied top 
down regardless. 
4.6.4 The future of the CHS 
The development of rural health personnel was adversly 
affected by the health reforms. The barefoot doctors had been the 
main rural health force before health reform. But now, most of the 
barefoot doctors were replaced by private doctors. This produced a 
huge alteration to the structure of rural health personnel. At the 
same time, there was a lack of policies for stabilising rural 
health personnel. Many rural health personnel returned to the 
towns (Hu Zhao Ming, 1990,11). The results of this investigation 
have indicated that the number of health personnel in seven 
counties was lower than the average level for all counties. There 
was a particular shortage of middle level personnel. However, the 
greatest difficulty was the relatively low educational level of 
health personnel. The percentage of rural doctors who had 
graduated from university was only 5.6%. A strategy for solving 
the problem of providing adequately trained staff could be to 
enrol rural students, give them special training which is 
suitable to rural health work in the future and to assign them 
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back to the place where they come from Wian Kang Bao, 1990,11). 
The county health school should play the main part in 
the training of rural health personnel, for, whilst civic and 
provincial health schools can train them easily, it is rather 
difficult to guarantee that students will be assigned to rural 
areas. Even if they are, most are working at county level, with 
only a few students in township hospitals and village health 
stations. By contrast, most of the students trained by the county 
health school were sent to township and village level. The county 
health school trained many barefoot doctors for the village health 
station during "the 1960's Cultural Revolution period". Since 
health reform, the development of the county health school has 
been slow. The biggest difficulty was that the county health 
schools had a financial crisis because government health 
investment was not enough to keep them open. So the county health 
school had to charge for tuition. According to our survey, this 
was an unsuccessful venture, because in poor rural areas, self- 
financing students were not able to pay their full tuition fee and 
their living expenses. 
Numbers of students were also limited because of 
competition from the civic and provincial health schools. There 
were no effective assignment policies. Health schools should be 
reorganised away from enrolling self-financing students towards 
giving advanced study for rural doctors. To make a long term 
change in health personnel in the rural areas, the government 
needs to increase health investment to the county health school so 
as to stabilise the teaching staff, to improve the teaching 
quality and to provide adequate numbers of students and 
appropriate assignments. 
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4.6.5 Tssues in preventive health and service quality 
From the survey, it can be seen that the economic level 
and a majority of the health targets in seven counties were 
similar to the average of the whole country. There were basic 
health organisations in the seven counties. County health 
directors thought that the health organisation which most needed 
to be strengthened was the county epidemic station. After health 
reform, the rural preventive system was affected severely by the 
collapse of the CMS. Therefore it was not only the county 
epidemic station, but all three levels of the rural preventive 
system which needed to be strengthened. 
From the health services point of view, the survey found 
that the county hospital has basically satisfied the demands of 
rural residents. The main focus in the development of the county 
hospital should not be placed by adding beds and health staff but 
improving medical service quality, by replacing out of date 
medical equipment and giving opportunities for staff to have 
access to advanced study. The reforms of health services, 
therefore, whilst giving some impetus to providing sustainable 
hospital services, have done little beyond this in supporting the 
expertise which is supposed to exist at county level, as the apex 
of the 3-tier system. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE CHANGES IN TOWNSHIP HOSPITALS 
Township hospitals are units of the rural health 
service. They are responsible for guidance, health education and 
the monitoring of primary health work, such as public health 
campaigns, preventive services including immunisation, maternal 
and child health and family planning. Township hospitals occupy 
the axis position in the three tiers of rural health work. 
5.1 General Conditions of 9 Townships 
Nine township hospitals in Jiangxi province, and three 
township hosptials in Shen county of Zhejiang province were 
investigated. 
First, three Jiangxi counties, Fenyi, ShangGao and 
Tonggu were surveyed according to their economic level (high, 
middle and low income). Second, three township hospitals were 
chosen by random sampling from each category making nine in all. 
These hospitals were compared on a number of criteria for the 
period 1986 to 1988. The main investigation included: 
a. Health service, finance and health personnel 
condition in township hospital. 
b. Standard and availability of medical equipment. 
c. Attitudes of 20 township leaders and 162 township 
hospital staff. 
d. The basic conditions of the township. 
5.1.1 Geographic and economic conditions 
One third of the townships are located in mountain 
areas, the others are located on low lying land. There are 128 
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villages and a total population of 188,017. The gross national 
product of the 9 townships was 180 million yuan. In 1988, average 
income per capita was 630 yuan, which places it at the middle 
level for Chinese rural areas (Table 5.1). The literacy rate of 
those over 12 years old was 6.6% in 1982. The school enrollment 
rate of those children below 14 years old was 73.6% in 1988. 
Table 5.1 The basic condition of the nine townships in 1988 
Name Population Average income 
per head(yuan) 
Financial income 
(ten thousands yuan) 
1. DongChun 11,784 466 19.0 
2. YangQiao 39,654 578 77.1 
3. HuZhe 16,424 669 101.0 
4. TianXin 37,530 653 82.4 
5. SiXi 36,070 700 116.0 
6. jianJiang 21,876 710 59.7 
7. SanDu 9,028 491 56.0 
8. DaDuan 11,468 601 63.1 
9. ErYuan 4,183 602 18.4 
Average 20,890 630 65.9 
5.1.2 Health condition in the 9 townships 
The infant mortality rate was 32.8 per thousand, which 
was higher than the average 23.6 per thousand for all rural areas 
in 1988 (ZGWSTJ, 1988). The maternal mortality was 0.4 per 
thousand. 6.0% population had a safe water supply, which was low 
compared with the 20% in all China's rural areas in 1988 (CHSD, 
1988). 'Safe water' means water which is disinfected and produced 
by a water factory or from a deep well. The rural residents were 
basically covered using private doctors' services. There were only 
1.9% people enrolled in the Cooperative Medical System. There 
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were no CMS administrative unit nor any special investment in the 
CMS by township hospitals. 
5.2 The Conditions of Township Hospitals 
Since 1988, the township hospital management system has 
changed. In the past financial responsibility for the township 
hospital was transferred from the county health bureau to the 
township government. The county health bureau allocated health 
investment to the township government, then the township 
government allocated the money to the township hospital. The 
purpose of the reform is to enhance the management duty of the 
township government and to increase health resources. The township 
government can receive revenue from township industry to support 
the township health care system. In fact, these nine township 
governments did not allocate new health investment for the 
hospital. They were only able to transfer the money from the 
county health bureau to the township hospital. So this health 
investment from the county health bureau was the sole outside 
revenue source for the township hospital. It was very stringent 
and only covered 40% or 60% of staff salary. This did not satisfy 
the development needs of township hospitals. The township 
government was also in charge of the personnel matters within 
township hospitals. 
5.2.1 The basic condition 
In 1988, average fixed assets in the nine township 
hospitals were 129,027 yuan. The average number of staff and beds 
was 20 and 27 respectively. There was an average of 67 outpatients 
per day. An average of 958 inpatients per year was discharged 
from 
hospital (Table 5-2). 
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Table 5.2 The basic condition of the nine township hospitals in 1988 
Name Fixed assets 
(Yuan) 
Staff Beds Outpatients 
(year) 
Patients of 
discharged from 
hospital (year) 
I. DongChun 64,885 11 4 14,935 902 
2. YangQiao 140,000 29 32 23,910 1,285 
3. HuZhe 65,000 18 12 21,871 452 
4. TianXin 331,890 49 45 27,350 2,141 
5. SiXi 370,671 56 50 41,129 2,858 
6. JianJiang 84,077 20 5 10,312 123 
7. SanDu 13,939 10 2 23,140 34 
8. DaDuan 77,781 29 12 28,637 507 
9. ErYuan 13,000 24 15 27,400 320 
Average 129,027 27 20 24,298 958 
YangQiao, TianXin, SiXi and DaDuan township hospitals are 
key township hospitals, which means these hospitals receive more 
money and better medical equipment from the county health bureau 
and township government than common township hospitals. The scope 
of service in the key township hospital covered several townships. 
More comprehensive services are provided by the key township 
hospital than the common township hospital. Table 5.3 shows that 
Table 5.3 Comparison of key township hospital with common 
township hospital 
Items Key hospital 
(average) 
Fixed assets(yuan) 230,085 
Staffs 41 
Beds 35 
Patients(per year) 30,256 
Discharge from 
hospital(per year) 1,698 
Common hospital 
(average) 
48,180 
17 
8 
19,532 
366 
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the fixed assets, the staffs, the number of beds and the number of 
patients treated were greater in key hospitals than in the common 
township hospitals. 
An analysis of income shows that average income from 
selling medicine was the main income of township hospitals, which 
accounted for 66-25% of total income. Health investment from the 
county health bureau accounted for only 7.19% of total income. 
An analysis of outpatient and inpatient services shows that the 
fees from the former accountd for 57.54% of medical income; the 
fees from the latter, 22.37%. This analysis reveals two 
characteristics of the health services in township hospitals, 
firstly, the main health services supplied were outpatient 
services; secondly, the main income was derived from selling 
medicine. 
Comparing expenditure with income gives similar results. 
Medicines are also the main item of expenditure, accounting for 
62.6% of the hospitals' total expenditure. In contrast, 
expenditure for staff training and basic hospital repair and 
construction work was very small, accounting for 0.15% and 1.80% 
respectively. Expenditure on retired staff accounted for 2.06% of 
the total. These payments do not bring any direct benefit to the 
hospital. other 'expenditures' including administrative fees 
accounted for 17% (more detail financial analysis to be seen at 
the 5.3). 
The running of township hospitals relied on too few 
staff. Most health services were supplied by two or three doctors. 
For example, in SanDu township hospital, one doctor did almost all 
the medical work. Self financing patients could choose their own 
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doctors under the responsibility system. The more patients a 
doctor treats, the more money he gets. Technically competent 
doctors would be more likely to be chosen, and consequently would 
bear a greater share of the work. 
5.2.2 The quality and quantity of medical facilities 
The equipment of township hospitals was very limited. 
Between them, the nine township hospitals had 8 X-ray machines, 2 
centrifuges, 4 ECG, 3 ultrasound scanner type A and 1 type B, 5 
microscopes and 2 refrigerators. In addition, there were no 
regulations to monitor the use of fixed assets and no policy for 
calculating depreciation. The township hospitals had no enthusiasm 
or responsibility to improve the management of fixed assets and 
medical facilities. The result was an invisible deficit of fixed 
assets. 
In 1988, township hospitals spent an average 2,427 yuan 
to buy new medical equipment. Maintenance expenditure was on 
average 811 yuan per hospital. This indicates that township 
hospitals can not depend on themselves to get good medical 
equipment because most health investment was spent on staff 
salaries and there was no special investment from the county 
health bureau and township government for buying new equipment. 
5.2.3 The building and development the hospitals 
When interviewed, nearly all leading cadres at the 
township level said that hospital facilities should be increased, 
but less than half felt that it should be the responsibility of 
the township government to support the hospitals, leading to 
expansion, capital construction, and so forth (more detail to be 
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seen at the 5.5.3). It is very difficult to increase health 
investment for township hospitals. One possibility might be to use 
fixed assets to develop the township hospital. If we compare fixed 
assets utilization in the nine township hospitals (the factors of 
medicine and health investment are excluded), we see that their 
average income was 0.58 yuan from 1.0 yuan fixed assets, but the 
expenditure was 0.71 yuan to maintain 1.0 yuan fixed assets. The 
deficit is 0.13 yuan This is a common problem in the township 
hospitals in Chinese rural areas. The property of township 
hospital is of less and less value as time goes by. 
An analysis of hospital construction shows the same 
problems. All of the hospitals in the study were built in the 
sixties and seventies, as part of the hospital expansion at that 
time. Now the fabric was shabby, and as many as a third of the 
buildings had been given over to staff accommondation. 
5.2.4 The structure and quality of health personnel 
In the nine township hospitals in 1988, the number of 
doctors was greater than the number of nurses, the proportion was 
2.02: 1.00. According to guidelines issued by the Ministry of 
Public Health "The Size of Health Personnel in Hospitals" in 
1978, the proportion of doctors to nurses should be 1: 2 (Peng Yui 
Chong, 1988,3). These were not enough nurses for the township 
hospital. At first glance, the number of senior doctors looks very 
promising in terms of expertise; however most of these doctors did 
not have any higher medical education but had been promoted as a 
result of long service. It is very difficult for township 
hospitals to recruit a doctor who has graduated from a university 
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Figure 5.1 The Structure of Health 
Personnel in 1988 
other 
6% 
Junior do( 
33% 
Junior nurse 
13% 
Senior nurse 
2% 
Table 5.4 The education level of health personnel in 1988 
Level Number 
Undergraduate (5 years) 1 0.62 
Undergraduate (3 years) 13 8.02 
Middle health school 53 32.72 
High school 19 11.73 
Middle school 54 33.33 
Primary school 22 13.58 
Total 162 100.00 
medical school. There was only one such doctor among the 9 
townships (Figure 5.1, Table 5.4). 
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At the end of 1988 the statistics on staff turnover 
showed a tendency for health personnel to flow outwards rather 
than joining the hospital staff. A further analysis of staff 
changes over a 5-year period showed that more people left the 
township health service than joined it (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5. The employment flow of health personnel over 5 year 
period 
Name Entering Leaving Entering-Leaving 
Senior Doctors 9 23 -14 
Junior Doctors 12 25 -13 
Senior Nurses 0 0 0 
Nurses 19 16 3 
Other 11 12 -1 
Total 51 76 -25 
Township hospitals had no control over personnel 
matters. Some non-professional people were employed at the 
hospital. Some of the doctors had previously retired, but were 
now re-employed to plug the gaps left as younger doctors quit the 
health care system, either to set up private practice, or to leave 
medicine altogether. 
Therefore, we have a situation where quality of service 
may be affected by relatively modest educational standards, and by 
the degree of staff turnover. 
5.3 The Crises of Development in Township Hospitals During Health 
Reform 
As the above analysis shows, township hospitals were 
developing many difficulties and becoming poorer and poorer. 
Below, the reasons for their predicament and some ways in which it 
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might be brought to an end are examined. To the nine township 
hospitals in Jiangxi province were added three township hospitals 
in the richer Zhejiang province. This was to balance out the whole 
sample and make it representative of all types of economic 
conditions. 
5.3.1 The analysis of management within township hospitals. 
If fixed assets are included, the revenue and 
expenditure of township hospitals approximately balanced in 1986 
(+1.027), but by 1988 showed a slight deficit (0.972). Although, 
between 1986-1988 the average total income of the township 
hospital increased by 49.3%, total expenditure also increased by 
57.7%. Net income decreased by 2.6 times. The health investment 
from government increased 44.4% (Table 5.6). But the proportion of 
total income from government investment decreased from 10.0% in 
1986 to 9.6% in 1988. The profits from selling medicine increased 
by 63.5% from 1986 to 1988, which added to income much more 
dramatically than health investment from the government. This 
suggests that improving management in township hospitals by 
transferring responsibility to township government did not 
extricate hospitals from their predicament. In other words, the 
Table 5.6 The financial condition of township hospitals* 
Year Income Expenditure Net income Ratio of revenue Health 
(Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan) to expenditure investment 
1986 130,977 127,583 3,394 1.027 13,040 
1988 195,604 201,139 -5,535 0.972 18,828 
Increase M 
49.3 57.7 -263.1 -5.4 44.4 
* This is the average financial condition in township hospitals. 
It includes fixed assets. The rate of depreciation is 2% (Guo Zhi 
Heng 1983). 
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root of the problem in township hospitals is not due to faulty 
management, but to some objective economic factors. 
Looking at the standard patient charge, if we deduct the 
proportion derived from government and that which comes from 
selling medicine, and consider only the benefit from medical 
service, township hospitals could recoup 55.8% of the cost. The 
average deficit of township hospitals reached 24,122 yuan in 1986. 
But in 1988, the township hospitals recouped only 46.3% of their 
costs from patient charges. The deficit has increased to 48,025 
yuan which was double to that of 1986. Even though government 
subsidy is included, the average deficit of the township hospital 
still increased from 11,082 yuan in 1986 to 29,197 yuan in 1988. 
This indicates that township hospitals' losses were increasing. 
Therefore, in 1988, township hospitals had to make up 60.8% of 
their deficit by themselves. Why was the situation getting worse? 
One reason lay in the complex relationship between fixed charges 
set by the government for each patient's health, and the costs to 
the township hospital of providing such care. The governmental 
standard charge for patients is lower than the costs . This is 
main reason why the township hospitals suffer deficit. Another 
cause has already been referred to - since its deliberate 
limitation health investment from government has increased only a 
little. The percentage of health investment which made up the 
deficit in township hospitals decreased year by year. Finally, 
medical inflation took its toll-the cost of medicine, and medical 
salaries rapidly increased, the latter in an attempt to offset the 
wastage of staff. 
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5.3.2 Methods of financial management in township hospitals 
In 1988, the average increase of total income in 
township hospitals was 64,627 yuan, an increase of 49.3% compared 
with 1986. Of this amount, 91.1% was due to the enhancement of 
medical income in hospitals, 8.9% was due to the increase of 
health investment from government. The township hospital chose to 
increase its medical income because there was no alternative means 
of making up the deficit. Analysis of this increase shows that 
76.8% was due to selling medicine, 10.1% was due to adding other 
items of service like examination and treatment to the patient 
charge. Table 5.7 shows these to be the two main ways of making 
up the deficit in township hospitals (Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7 The causes of income growth in township hospitals 
Items % 
Total money 64,627 (Yuan) 100.0 
Selling medicine 76.8 
(Chinese medicine) (62.3) 
(western medicine) (14.5) 
Examination and treatment fee 10.1 
Health investment from government 8.9 
Registration fee 3.0 
Other 1.2 
If the income from Chinese traditional medicine and 
Western medicine are compared, the income from Chinese medicine is 
much higher. From 1986 to 1988, the average number of out-patient 
attendances decreased by 5.9% (from 23,964 in 1986 to 22,550 in 
1988), but the average gross income from selling medicines 
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increased by 62.3% (from 67,032 yuan in 1986 to 108,784 yuan in 
1988) in the out-patient department. The average prescription 
value went up 72.1%, from 2.80 yuan in 1986 to 4.82 yuan in 1988. 
Inpatient charges also went up. 
However, it is difficult to understand why the strategy 
of selling medicines was used to make up the deficit in township 
hospitals. According to this investigation, the rate of profit 
from medicine sales was 21.2% in 1988. In order to make up the 
average 29,197 yuan deficit, it is necessary to sell 137,000 yuan 
of medicine. The average total expenditure of township hospitals 
increased by 73,556 yuans from 1986 to 1988 (57.7%), of these 
expenditures, only 12.8% was used for staff welfare, 18.4% for 
medical instrument repair, 57.0% was spent on buying medicines for 
resale. 
5.3.3 The problems of development in the township hospitals 
It is government policy that the charge for patients is 
lower than the cost. Also health investment by government is lower 
than the deficit. This means that the township hospital which has 
average fixed assets of 126,000 yuan must fall into debt of 
approximate 30,000 yuan per year. 
In recent years, hospitals have implemented a series of 
reform methods, for instance, the director has management 
responsibility for the hospital, and prices have been made more 
rational. The purpose of these reforms was to improve hospital 
management in order to solve financial crises. But these reform 
methods could only reduce waste caused by poor management. They 
were inadequate for any broader purpose. The paradox for directors 
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is that the more and better medical services they produced, the 
greater the deficit. 
The financial condition of township hospitals has become 
one of means by which directors' achievements are evaluated, and 
the achievement of a balance of income and expenditure has been 
the directors' target. But there are problems in trying to reach 
it. As shown above, increasing service quantity is not the answer. 
The township hospitals have sell more items of service in the 
clinic and more medicine, especially Chinese traditional medicines 
and expensive medicines. Tn these sales, the township hospitals 
are in competition with city and county hospitals and their 
medical facilities are limited in comparison. During a period when 
patient attendances stayed constant, or in some cases actually 
decreased, the income from selling medicine increased 62.3% in the 
outpatient departments and 52.9% in the in-patient departments. 
When the wholesale price of medicines went up, the profit margin 
stayed the same and the cost was passed on the the patient. Of 
course the doctors liked to give big and expensive prescriptions. 
The question as to how the problem of the solvency of 
township hospitals is to be addressed has two possible theoretical 
answers. One would be to ask for more money from government. This 
depends on governmental financial resources. Another is to raise 
the cost of medical services to patients. But this method will add 
to the patient's financial burdens. 
The ability of the national economy to undertake the 
development of health care enterprise has not been given full 
consideration. The WHO standard is that countries' total health 
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expenditure should account for 5% of GNP. In China, total health 
expenditure accounted for approximate 0.5% of GNP Mang Zhi Kuan, 
1988). and less 3% of national financial expenditure (Zhou Shou 
Qi, 1988). The proportion of health investment from the national 
budget was very small. Looking at this from the other side, the 
health expenditure of peasants only accounted for 3% of their net 
yearly income (Du Le Xun, 1988). Both government and peasants have 
a potential to pay for the supply of health resources. The key to 
solving the insolvency of the township hospitals is that the 
government must pay more attention to developing them. This can 
improve the national economy, because the value of a healthy 
population is far greater than any health investment by 
government. In addition, people should be prepared to pay more for 
their medical services. Both these approaches are good in theory, 
but they are very difficult to implement since they depend on the 
national economy and the level of understanding of both village 
and township governments, and peasants themselves. This is not 
likely to happen in a short period of time. Therefore there are 
some specific crises developing: 
1. The false prosperity of township hospitals. It was 
true that township hospitals increased their income by selling 
medicine and giving patients more tests. They used the surplus to 
give increased welfare benefits to staff and renew and maintain 
medical equipment. Yet this is a faulty strategy to combat 
insolvency. In the first place, it increases medical costs and 
wastes health resources. Although there was the average 29,197 
deficit in township hospitals in 1988 (including health investment 
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from government and deducting income from selling medicines), the 
income and expenditure would balanced if the government should 
increase this amount of health investment for township hospitals, 
rather than the hospital relying on medicine sales. In the second 
place, it adds to the financial burden on patients. The false 
prosperity that results from selling medicine gives the government 
and the Ministry of Public Health the erroneous impression that 
township hosptials could continue to exist even if the government 
failed to increase or even reduced its subsidy. 
2. If supervision of the hospital is strengthened and 
controls on the price of medicines are instituted, township 
hospitals cannot rely on sales of medicine to survive, nor can 
they compete with larger hospitals. Therefore they may go out of 
business altogether. 
5.4 A Comparison of Reformed and Unreformed Township Hospital 
Seven of the nine township hosptials had introduced a 
a system of market competition which was the system of economic 
responsibility in 1988. The exceptions were DongChun and HuZhe. 
This means these seven tonwship hospitals were reformed. To 
describe a hospital as 'reformed' means that it is independent of 
the county health authorities or township government; such 
hospitals make their own decisions about staffing, budgeting and 
administration. Their staff are under contract for specified tasks 
and hours of work, and the hospitals themselves are under contract 
to the township authorities to provide medical services. 
Unreformed hospitals still received their subsidies from the 
county health authorities or township 
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government and had their deficits made up from the county and the 
township governemnts. 
The introduction of responsible management was intended 
to bring a new lease of life to enterprises. This has been one of 
the most important and widespread reforms to be carried out in the 
health system especially in township hospitals. The managerial 
method of township hospitals is now similar to that which pertains 
in other enterprises--that of economic responsibility. We 
investigated the difference between reformed township hospitals 
(RTH) and unreformed township hospitals (URTH) in 9 township 
hospitals. 
5.4.1 The economic effect of the reform 
The ratio of revenue to expenditure went down from 1.052 
in 1986 to 0.982 in 1988 in the RTH. The net income reduced 1.6- 
fold in the RTH. It meant that the RTH was in deficit. On the 
contrary, the net income increased 0.67-fold in the URTH. From the 
accounting viewpoint, the method of responsible management may not 
bring much benefit for township hospitals. What is the reason? 
It is because the health investment of the RTH increased only by 
12.8%, which was much lower than the 73.3% of the URTH growth rate 
(Table 5.8). The URTH got strong financial support from the 
government. 
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Table 5.8 Comparison of average revenue and expenditure between 
reformed and unreformed township hospitals 
Items Reformed Unreformed 
1986 1988 1986 1988 
Average total 
income (yuan) 138,679 211,686 52.6 97,077 139,387 43.6 
Expenditure 131,772 215,619 63.6 90,108 127,717 41.7 
Net income 6,907 -31933 -156.9 6,969 11,670 67.5 
Ratio of revenue 
to expenditure 1.052 0.982 -6.3 1.077 1.091 1.3 
Health investment 15,941 17,988 12.8 10,134 17,560 73.3 
Ratio of revenue 
to expenditure 
deduction health 
investment 0.931 0.898 -3.5 0.965 0.954 -1.2 
Income from selling 
medicine account 
for average 
total incomeM 66.86 68.68 2.7 71.04 72.01 1.4 
Rate of profit 
from selling 
medicineM 19.4 20.0 3.1 22.1 27.6 24.8 
Medical service charges in township hospitals cover 
only about half of their costs. Their deficit consequently will 
become gradually heavier. The percentage by which patient charges 
covered the cost reduced from 55.4% in 1986 to 51.2% in 1988 in 
the RTH (-7.6%). In the URTH, this percentage reduced from 53.5% 
to 43.0%, (-18.2%) (Table 5.9). The main reason for the change is 
that the increase of medical service charges in the RTH was more 
rapid than that in the URTH. This will be discussed below. Another 
reason is that the economic responsibility system may have reduced 
unnecessary medical service costs. This indicates that the 
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economic responsibility system in township hospitals can not stop 
the deficit, but it can improve the economic atmosphere of 
township hospitals. 
Table 5.9 Comparison of medical service revenue and expenditure 
in township hospitals* 
Items Reformed Unreformed 
1986 1988 % 1986 1988 0-0 
Income 45964 66309 44.3 28155 39017 38.8 
Expenditure 54107 94324 74.3 33610 49036 45.9 
Net income -8143 -28105 244.0 -5495 -10019 82.3 
Ration of 
revenue to 
expenditure 0.850 0.707 -17.3 0.837 0.796 -4.9 
Percentage 
charge 
covering cost 55.4 51.2 -7.6 53.5 43.8 -18.2 
Percentage of 
compensation 
of government 66.2 39.1 -40.9 64.8 63.7 -1.7 
Percentage of 
compensation 
of hospitals 33.8 60.9 80.2 35.2 36.3 3.1 
*The income and expenditure of selling medicine have been 
deducted from total of income and expenditure. The income included 
the health investment from government. 
As a result of the reforms, the responsibility of 
government subsidy to the RTH reduced by 40.9% in two years, which 
meant that the RTH had to work harder and harder to make up its 
deficit, which increased from 8,143 yuan in 1986 to 28,015 yuan in 
1988, (+2.44). The government subsidy in the URHT changed very 
little, and consequently there was only a small increase in the 
deficit (+0.82). 
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As we can see from the above analysis the management of 
economic responsibility can lighten the burden of government 
because the health investment from government increased much less 
in the RTH than the URTH. 
5.4.2 The different methods of making up a deficit in two kinds of 
hospital 
This section describes the methods used by the RTH and 
URTH in balancing income and expenditure. Between 1986-1988, an 
average total income of the RTH increased by 53% from 138,679 Yuan 
to 211,686 Yuan, that of the 44% in the URTH (97,077 Yuan to 
139,387 Yuan) (Table 5.8). It seemed that reforms were working, 
and the government could afford to reduce its investment in 
township hospitals. 
The main income increases came, predictably, from selling 
medicine (72.1% in the RTH and 69.2% in the URTH) (Table 5.10). 
Table 5.10 Comparison of the cause of the increased of total 
income between reformed and unreformed township 
hospitals in 1986-1988 
Items Reformed Unreformed 
Increment (yuan) 73,007 42,310 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Percentage of 100.0 100.0 
increment M 
Selling medicine 
The test and treatment fee 
Registration fee and 
hospitalization expenses 
Government Health investment 
72.1 69.2 
8.9 13.4 
3.3 
2.8 17.6 
Other 12.9 1.2 
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The income increase happened despite only a slight 
increase or even decrease of the quantity of medical services 
in township hospitals. For example, outpatient visits only 
increased by 1.6% in 1986-1988 in the RTH. In the URTH, it 
decreased by 21.5%. As indicated above, the increase in medicine 
sales offset the decline in services. Income from medicine sales 
increased by 72% and average prescription price increased from 
2.88 yuan in 1986 to 4.8 yuan in the RTH in 1988. Income from 
medicine sales increased by 41% in the URTH as well. Expenditure 
of medicine on inpatients at the RTH was double that of the URTH 
(36 yuan compard with 18 yuan). The RTH was more likely to stress 
medicine sales. It indicated the RTH and the URTH also sought 
profit from selling medicine. But the RTH paid more attention to 
this point than the URTH did. This can be understood, because the 
duty of making up the deficit in the RTH was more pressing than 
that in the URTH. The RTH has to use many methods to get more 
financial support in order to solve its deficit. There is no doubt 
that there were some hazardous factors among these methods. 
Given the above statements, it is not surprising that 
there were more complaints from patients in the RTH. When 
interviewed, there were significant differences in patient 
responses with the majority of patients finding more satisfactory 
care in the URTH rather than the RTH (Table 5.11). 
205 
Table 5.11 Patient satisfaction with township hospitals 
Patient type Reformed Unreformed 
(96) (%) 
Satisfactory 
I. Out-Patient 
Unsatisfactory 
2. In-Patient 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
38.3 84.4 
61.7 15.6 
28.3 94.7 
71.7 5.3 
22 
I. X =41.9 P<0.01 2. X =91.9 P<0.01 
5.4.3 Analysis of pros and cons of the reformation 
The system of economic responsibility can improve the 
productive efficiency of enterprises in both rural and urban 
areas. But its wholehearted transfer into the township hospital is 
certain to have some undesirable side effects, as has been shown. 
By implementing the system of economic responsibility, 
township hospitals indeed made a profit. The RTH paid more 
attention to maintaining and replacing its fixed assets, with an 
increased spending on building of 25% at the RTH compared with 
minus 3.5% at the URTH. The RTH also seemed to have a less 
bureaucratic system of patient throughout-although there comes a 
point where this produces diminishing returns. Regarding salaries 
and the social welfare of staff, staff in the RTH increased their 
salaries on average by 29 yuan in two years. In the URTH, staff 
salaries were raised by average 27 yuans. So it is wrong thesis 
to criticize the RTH to charge patient more and unreasonable for 
staff to increase their salaries and social welfare. 
There are, however some disadvantages: 
1. The system of economic responsibility encourages 
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township hospitals to obtain more profits from selling medicines. 
However, selling more medicine does not necessarily improve 
medical service quality. 
2. It transfers the economic burden to the patients. The 
system does not ensure that patients can get better quality and 
more medical services due to paying more. 
3. The RTH was still able to balance revenue and 
expenditure after the reduction of government health investment. 
This fact confuses many people including the leaders of health 
sections. It allows them to believe that without an increase or 
even with a decrease in government health investement, the RTH is 
able to survive. Yet, the more medical services which are 
provided, the poorer the hospital becomes. 
4. Actually, the charges for medicines at present in the 
RTH are too high. The government of price control severely 
regulates medicine prices, this will produce more running 
difficulties for township hospitals. 
5.5 The Attitudes towards Changes of the Township Leaders and the 
Staff in Township Hospitals. 
To study the attitudes of people towards the changes, we 
chose 20 township leaders by random sampling in 9 townships. They 
included directors and vice directors of townships and Party 
secretaries of townships. Their average age was 38.4 years old, 
and the educational level was that 3 leaders graduated from middle 
school; 9 leaders, high school; 8 leaders had experienced three 
to five years University education. We investigated also 162 
technical staff in 9 township hospitals, which accouted for 66% of 
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total health staffs. These staffs included a few administrative 
leaders, such as 5 directors of township hospital. Their average 
age was 32.5 years old. Their educational level and title of 
profession is shown in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.1. 
5.5.1 Managerial problems in the township hospitals 
1. Under the reform policy, the township government was 
now in charge of the township hospital; the financial 
responsibility for the township hospital had been transferred from 
the county health bureau to the township government. 35% leaders 
approved this policy, 35% leaders did not. 25% leaders thought it 
was an expedient measure. Of the technical health staff, only 5.6% 
approved this policy; 18.5%, objected; 21.6% thought it was an 
expedient measure; the rest of them did not have any particular 
view. The number of technical health staff who approved of the 
health reform was so small that it suggests that the reform policy 
did not bring more benefit for them. In actual fact, these nine 
township hospitals had not received any extra money from the 
township government. The number of leaders who approved the 
reforms was not large. This is because they have almost no 
experience of implementing health policy, since until recently the 
township hospitals were under the administrative direction of the 
County Health Bureau. Hospital management is a new, and probably 
difficult task. For example, when we asked them to give an 
evaluation of the overall working of township hospitals, 35% of 
leaders had no idea because they were not familiar with health 
work. There is no clear answer as to how China's 47,529 township 
hospitals will continue to function (ZGWSTJ, 1988). The government 
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policy regarding township hospitals seems to be to allow them to 
sink or swim, depending on their relationship with their local 
authority. Such an approach however does not involve a rational 
assessment of local health need, and bypasses any form of health 
planning. 
2. The economic responsibility system in the township 
hospital: the health staff in reformed township hospitals 
evaluated their income, amount of work and its quality and the 
competition for patients with village health stations after health 
reform. Nearly half of the staff thought that their income was 
unaffected, and only a small number (4.3%) thought that their 
income had increased a lot. However, the majorities (83%) thought 
that the amount of work they did had increased (Figure 5.2). 57% 
of staff thought that the quality of medical work was improved, 
but this view was not shared by patients (Table 5.11). 47% of 
staff thought there was now competition for patients with the 
village health station. In summary, 46% staff thought that the 
township hospital should end the economic responsibility system; 
9.3%, did not agree to end it; 44.4%, had no comments (Figure 
5.3). So the economic responsibility system may not be suitable 
for the township hospital. The township hospitals are limited by 
their lack of facilities, and cannot compete with the county and 
city hospitals in the range of saleable examinations they have to 
offer. From the point of view of geographical accessibility, they 
are not as good as the village health station. They have 
difficulty in getting enough self-financing patients. In the 
staffs mind, the economic responsibility system did not bring much 
benefit. 
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Figure 5.2 The Income and Amount of Work 
of Staff after Health Reform 
Decrease 25% 
No change 22% 
Increase 48% 
Obvious Increase 4% 
Decrease 4% 
No change 14% 
Increase 3B% 
ObvIous Increase 44% 
I ncome Amount of Worý 
Figure 5.3. General Evaluation of the 
Staff to Reformed Township Hospital 
Cancellation 
A /-, Cý, 
Approbation 
90/0 
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5.5.2 The working attitude of staff 
We interviewed the staff about their attitudes to their 
work, their income and the future development of the township 
hospital. The most striking finding was that 80.1% wanted to leave 
the township hospitals. 52.5% said that their incomes were less 
than those of peasants in the surrounding countryside and less 
than rural doctors in the villages, who could at least earn from 
sideline production. Not all of their income was guaranteed as 
before. When questioned about possible future developments, 34% of 
staff were optimistic that the government plans for township 
hospitals would improve them, but most were pessimistic, or did 
not care. These attitudes made a notable impact on the 
development of the township hospital, which caused many people to 
leave their jobs. 
5.5.3 The development of township hospitals 
When questioned about the main problem in developing 
township hospitals, 70% leaders held the opinion that the scope of 
township hospitals should be enlarged, but that the key is to 
improve the quality of service and increase medical equipment. 
They saw the problems in developing the hospital, as firstly 
capital shortage; secondly, poor management; thirdly, patient 
costs are fixed, but the charges are less than covering costs. 
Heatlh staff thought the first problem was poor management, the 
second was shortage of money. Although the opinions of leaders and 
staffs were different as to priority, both agreed that the 
shortage of money and lack of efficient management were the main 
problems. Looked at from the outside, it is the lack of confidence 
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of both staff and leaders which makes innovation and development 
difficult. 
5.6 Summary of Chapter 5 
5.6.1 The crises of township hospital development 
Government policy, as espoused in the State Council 
document, was to render hospitals, as far as possible, independent 
of government investment apart from that already received and to 
achieve expansion and financial solvency. As we have seen, the 
township hospital's main approach to doing this was to increase 
medicine sales and medical tests like X-ray or pathology tests. 
The real paradox lies in the fact that seeing more patients merely 
increases the hospitals operating costs, and therefore, when 
patient costs are fixed, the deficit. Theoretically, the 
government could make up the deficit by spending a little money 
(for example, 29,197 yuan), but now township hospitals have to 
spend several times or several ten times the amount spent by 
government health investment to make up this deficit, which is 
wasteful and costly to patients. Further, deriving income from 
increased medicine sales suggests that there is an infinite 
demand; in reality however income derived from sales of medicine 
gives an air of false prosperity, promotes the impression that 
township hospitals are more solvent than they really are, and 
inhibits further subsidy from government, either directly or 
through the township government. 
In addition, township hospitals are the second level of 
the health network. Their medical equipment and techniques are not 
as good as those of the county hospital; and they are less 
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accessible than the village health station. With the collapse of 
the CMS, patients were no longer referred to township hospitals. 
The township hospitals lost out to private doctors who were also 
more geographically accessible. Thus the number of patients fell. 
Despite a reform in their management systems, i. e. the transfer of 
the financial responsibility for the township hospital from the 
county health bureau to the township government, the aim of which 
was to recieve subsidies from both, the majority of townships have 
failed to invest in their hospital. They say they do not have 
enough money. So township hospitals have become financially 
insolvent because of policy deficits. Therefore we should realize 
that policy-making is very important in the development of 
Chinese health care, but the process is controlled by a few 
officials, and advice is rarely sought from any other sectors. 
This makes unfeasible health policies. Community participation in 
policy-making, which is the basis of the WHO model, does not exist 
in China. 
We have to recognize the fact that township hospitals 
have worked hard in making up their deficits. The system of market 
competition did indeed bring vigour to township hospitals. 
Initially, most moved from a deficit to a profit. Doctor's 
motivation improved, and hospital costs were controlled. This 
system reduced the financial burden of the government and 
perfected the management of hospitals in some degree. 
But the economic responsibility system forces the 
township hospital to pay a lot more attention to profit. Suffering 
from the lack of health investment from government, the 'reformed' 
township hospitals relied strongly upon medicine sales and 
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clinical tests compared to the 'unreformed' township hospitals. 
Leaders of the reformed township hospital paid more attention to 
economic benefit and economic targets. They have to use these 
methods to guarantee an economic benefit that is used only for 
making up the deficit and paying running costs, rather than 
improving the quantity and quality of medical services. As a 
result society and patients are not satisfied with the economic 
responsibility system and find it difficult to understand this 
health reform. 
5.6.2 Sources of instability for the health staffs in township 
hospitals 
For a township hospital to run normally, it must rely 
on an appropriate amount of manpower, money and facilities. Of 
these, health personnel is an important resource. Our 
investigation suggests there are enough hospital beds to satisfy 
need--indeed utilization is probably inefficiently low, at about 
50% (Table 4.4, Chapter 4). The situation with staff is more 
serious. Over 80% of health staff wanted to leave the township 
hospital. Without a stable working environment for health staff, 
any improvement in facilities in the township hospital would not 
be efficiently used. Low pay and poor working conditions cause 
out-flow of staff from township hospitals, and this can only be 
rectified by creating those conditions which meet the reasonable 
needs of health staff. 
The following conclusions can be made: 
1. The deficit of policy is an objective national 
problem linked to the development of the national economy. The 
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township hospital has no ability to solve its economic and 
development problems on its own. 
2. The system of economic responsibility merely 
transfers the problem of solving the deficit on to the township 
hospital. This placed the leaders of the township hospital in a 
difficult position of financial loss. Staff became depressed and 
patients dissatisfied. 
The fact that the increase in medical service caused 
bigger deficit taught the leaders of township hospitals a 
valuable lesson ie. that the economic responsibility system may 
not be suitable for the township hospital. 
3. A fundamental way to extricate the township hospital 
from its poor position is that the government must pay more 
attention to health care, and have a definite policy towards the 
township hospitals. Rather than relying on ill-thought out 
applications of the responsibility system, township hospitals 
should tap more reasonable financial resources in order to reduce 
their dependence upon selling medicine. Now that township 
hospitals belong to township governments, if the health investment 
from central government cannot be increased at present, the 
township government can produce the extra financial support. This 
makes the township government a worthy owner of the township 
hospital. 
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CHAPTER 6 FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
HEALTH ORGANISATION AT VILLAGE LEVEL 
The 3-tier system which was described at the definition 
has the village as the basic level. However, this hierarchical 
approach tends to disguise the fact that the village is the 
crucial focus for improvements in health work. This was emphasised 
by the World Health Organisation at the 1980 Alma Ata Conference 
and subsequently elaborated in its document 'Health for All by the 
Year 2000' (WHO, 1980). Chinese health policymakers have, since 
the 1960's tried to build up health services in the villages, and 
redress rural/urban inequities in health care. In 1990, the 
Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Agriculture issued "the target of health for all by 
the year 2000 in Chinese rural areas", which had detailed 
regulations for building up the village health station (VHS). 
Their emphasis on this point reflects the particular 
characteristics of rural health work in China. 
The 'three tier health network' is one in which the 
county health organisation is the 'dragon's head', the township 
hospital is at an axis, and the village health station is the 
base and fundamental structure of the rural health work system. 
The VHS, therefore, has a number of functions beyond the simple 
provision of curative services; it must plan community health 
care, monitor environmental health, especially water quality, 
engage in health promotion, as well as a whole range of preventive 
activities-Maternal and Child Health immunisation, family planning 
and occupational health. Clearly, the demands on the village 
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health station are great, and resources generally are small. 
In 1989,21 village health stations in Jiangxi province 
were studied , looking at the range of medical activities they 
undertook, staff attitudes and tasks, and the relationship between 
the health stations and the village leaders. 
The purpose was to understand how far medical staff were 
able to carry out their work, and what such work entailed; the 
economic situation of the village health station; and how far 
village leaders saw themselves as responsible for supporting 
health care in their villages. The aim was to draw some 
conclusions about various types of village health station. 
6.1 The General Conditions of Village and Village Health 
Organisation 
In the 21 villages, the following areas were considered: 
1. The basic condition of the 21 administrative 
villages, e. g. geography, population, economy, education, health 
targets and the type of health system. 
2. The Village Health Station: Number and type of 
medical staff, (rural doctors and health workers), medical 
equipment, medicine, managerial characteristics and style, income, 
expenditure, the number of patients, infectious disease reports 
and immunisation. 
3.44 medical staff at the village station: working 
time, advanced study (content, time and place), personal income, 
working attitude, their opinion of the managerial characteristics 
of the village health station. 
4. Interviews with 59 village leaders: their attitudes 
towards the support of village health care; their evaluation of 
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medical service quality and income of village health workers, 
their opinion of the managerial characteristics of the village 
health station. 
6.1.1 Geographical and economic condition 
87% of villages which were investigated are scattered 
upon hilly land. There is an average of 452 households in each 
village, 1999 population, and this size is average for Chinese 
rural areas. Most peasants in this area are engaged in 
agricultural work, only 3.2% work is rural industry. Therefore 
these villages are more or less representative of China's rural 
areas. 
In 1988, the total GNP was 21.11 million yuan in 21 
villages. The village collective fund was on average 11,907 yuan 
per village in 1988, but average village health investment 
(including village station, preventive health work and so on) was 
only 489 yuan which accounted for 4.1% of the collective health 
and welfare fund. This was lower than 7.1% average for rural 
areas as a whole (MOPH 1986). 
6.1.2 The development of health care 
The infant mortality rate was 35 per thousand in these 
villages in 1988, which was higher than average 23.51 per 
thousand in rural areas (ZGWSTJ 1988). There were no recorded 
cases of maternal death. Only 12 infants received the "one child 
certificate" among 677 infants in 1988 (1.8%). By comparison over 
90% of infants received a "one child certificate" in the city. 
This indicated difficulties in implementing the "one child 
policy" in rural areas. Looking at health care coverage, 85% of 
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the population were covered by self-financing system, 8.2% of 
total population were covered by a version of the CMS. This means 
that, in common with most Chinese, the majority of the population 
were paying fee-for-service for medical care. This is the general 
condition in China's rural areas at present. 
6.1.3 The condition of the village health station 
Most village health stations were built at the 
beginning of the 1970's. By the 1970's the CMS had evolved into a 
well-developed pre-paid medical service, providing a limited 
pooling of health risk. Primary health care was available through 
the CMS at the village health station, all of its inhabitants 
automatically joined the system. 
I. The general condition of the village health station 
(Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1. Basic condition in the village health stations 
Item Mean S. D. Median 
Service radius(Km) 3.9 7.8 3 
Rooms 3.0 3.5 2 
Staffs 2.8 1.8 2 
Rural doctors 1.7 0.9 1 
Health workers 1.0 1.4 1 
Numbers of western 104 94.9 65 
Medicine in stock 
Numbers of Chinese 101 122.0 30 
Tradional medicines 
in stock 
K *Kilometer m. 
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Figure 6.1. Comparison of Health 
Management System at Village 
So 
49 Ilective 10% 
1 '/o 
Rural Areas in China 
The level of facilities in the village health station 
was similar to the average level of rural areas in China. For 
example, 81% of village health stations had a sphygmomanometer, 
71% had disinfectant equipment, but the average number of health 
personnel per thousand was 1.4, slightly lower than 1.8 found in 
the health service investigation in Chinese rural areas in 1986 
(MOPH, 1986). 'Health personnel' means those rural doctors and 
health workers who worked at the village health station and 
excludes any doctors who worked mainly at township hospitals. 
There were three types of managerial systems in the village health 
stations. One of them was 'solo', which accounted for 48% of total 
village health stations. Others were 'group' and 'collective', 
which accounted for 42% and 10% (Figure 1)(see Definitions). 
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2. Financial condition of the village health stations 
Table 6.2 shows that the income of all villages was 
slightly greater than expenditure. The collective fund in the 
village was rather weak because of the rural economic reform, an 
average subsidy for village health station from village committee 
was 173.3 yuan per village in 1988. 
Table 6.2. The economic condition in 21 village health stations 
Item Money (Yuan) % 
Total income 158,702 100.0 
*Special subsidy 61,656 38.9 
Village committe subsidy 3,640 2.3 
Other 221 0.1 
Medical income 93,185 58.7 
a. Injection fees 9,528 (10.2) 
b. Register and treatment fees 8,883 100. 0[ (9.5) 
c. Medicine 
----------------------------- 
74,774 
----------- - -- 
(80.3) 
Total expenditure 
- - -------- 
115,833 
--------- 
100.0 
Salary 35,501 30.6 
Medicine 75,637 65.3 
Equipment 4,695 4.1 
*Special Subsidy: An additional budget allocation from county 
and township for special heal th work; such as prevent ive work witý 
improving sanitation. 
The village healt h stations' income is derived from 
three types of fee (injection fee, registration fee and treatment 
fee), "one profit" (selling m edicine) and "one subsi dy" (special 
subsidy). Regardless of inco me and expenditure, the profit from 
selling medicines was the main economic activity at village 
health stations. The total expenditure in all the villages for 
purchasing medical equipment was 4,695 yuan in 1988, and 50% of 
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villages had not purchased any medical equipment. This resmbles 
the condition in the township hospitals and probably has a similar 
influence on the development of health enterprise at village 
level. 
3. Health service at the village health stations 
In 1988, village health stations treated a total of 
78,563 peasants. Each village health station saw on average, 10 
peasants per day (including patients who stayed at home and were 
visited). This volume of work was not enough to occupy 
approximately three health workers in the village health station, 
with the exception of those solo health stations, which had only 
1 doctor. Most peasants were paying for their own health care and 
had the right to choose their own doctor. Since the average 
service radius of the village health station was 3 Kilometer, it 
was not very convenient for peasants. So some peasants preferred 
to go to the township or county hospital rather than the village 
health station. County hospitals provided the strongest 
competition for the village health station. Bearing this point in 
mind, it seems important to consider a more rational geographical 
distribution of township hospitals and village health stations. 
The question arises as to whether a hospital in each 
township or a health station in each village is necessary. Perhaps 
some township hospitals and village health stations should be 
closed rather than falling into financial deficit. This viewpoint 
would be a source of heated dispute among Chinese health planners 
because the existence of health facilities is held to be an aspect 
of social welfare. In general, this is correct. Health 
organisations should do their best to supply enough good quality 
222 
health services for peasants. But the best way to embody the 
social welfare aspects of health organisation is by increasing 
health investment from the government and the collective. As shown 
above, financial support from the government and the collectives 
was very limited. It appears unfair and unrealistic to allow 
township hospitals and village health stations to solve financial 
problems by themselves in order to give an appearance of 
comprehensive social welfare, when most rural areas are covered 
by a self-financing system for health care. It is a reasonable 
option to close some township and village health units which are 
in deficit. This will, of course limit the health access of 
peasants, but the key to solving this problem could be to enlarge 
the coverage by collective health services and to increase 
government health investment. 
6.2 An Analysis of Health Care Providers--Rural Doctors 
Village health workers are the primary health care 
provider in rural areas. They consist of rural doctors and health 
workers. Their former name was 'barefoot doctor'. If the barefoot 
doctors passed an examination, they were retitled 'rural docor', 
if not, they are called 'health worker'. 44 medical staffs at 
village stations were investigated. 34 had qualified as rural 
doctors, the rest were health workers. It might be more accurate 
according to their work content and function, to call all rural 
doctors 'Primary Health Care Doctor' which is much more exact than 
'rural doctor'. Their work, unlike that of hospital doctors does 
not solely consist in diagnosis and curative treatment. They are 
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also responsible for a wide range of preventive health work and 
associated tasks (for example, a joint policy submission). During 
the sixties and seventies, while the cooperative medical service 
was in operation, these rural doctors received training, which was 
sometimes only adequate-for this work. But the decline in the CMS 
means that no designated pool of money available for training 
exists now. The appropriateness of some of the training could also 
be questioned. The argument is developed below. 
6.2.1. Basic condition 
Among 44 village health workers, 35 were male, 9 were 
female. According to the norms set down regarding village health 
personnel, female health workers should comprise one third of the 
total. 53% were graduates of middle school. There were only two 
people who had received higher education (including 3 years health 
school) (Figure 6.2). Their average age was 39 years old, with the 
majority (54%) of people in the age group 31-40. Average 
working years were 16.4,70% of health workers had worked for 11- 
20 years. 
Continuous advanced study is the main training method 
for improving the village health worker's skill. There were few 
medical students from medical college in the village health 
station. Even if these medical students are sent to the village 
health station, they do not keep their mind on their work and 
leave for township and county level health units quickly. It is 
the village health workers who are the most directly in touch with 
peasants. The quality of these health workers is of vital 
importance to the quality of primary health care. 
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Figure 6.2. Educational Level of 
Village Health Workers 
College 5% 
High School 23% 
MIddle School 52% 
Primary School 20% 
Rural Areas in China 
A brief consideration of how this situation came about 
is set out below, and illustrated in Table 6.3. 
1. Training history. 73% of health workers began 
training during the "Cultural Revolution", in 1965-1976. The 
Cultural Revolution, with its strong political impetus was an 
important period for developing the team of rural health workers 
(barefoot doctors) and cooperative medical system (Hillier S. M. 
and Jewell, 1983). The average accumulated length of advanced 
study was 2.7 years, which was higher than the 1.4 years in the 
rural health services survey and 43.2% of the rural doctors had 
accumulated 2 years of advanced study, which was also higher than 
the 12% of rural doctors in the 1986 survey (MOPH, 1986). 
Therefore, on average, these rural health workers had a higher 
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than average training period. Most were trained for 1-2 years 
which was divided into several stages, after which these rural 
health workers could undertake basic health work. It was more 
usual for the first advanced study period to last only 3-6 months, 
In the long run, rural doctors who graduate from medical college 
will be necessary. They may become directors and organizers of 
village health stations. 
Table 6.3. The condition of advanced study of village 
health workers 
The first time Accumlative time 
%- U It IU It-, lit_; q= IIIt:, - 11 t, No. of doctors Year No. of doctors 
<1960 5 <1 15 
1960- 1 1- 10 
1965- 10 2- 6 
1970- 13 3- 3 
1975- 9 4- 3 
1980- 3 >5 7 
>1985 3 
Total 44 Mean=2.27 44 
2. Place of training. 23% of rural health workers were 
trained at the township hospital; 73%, in county hospitalf 4%, in 
other health units. Basic training for rural health workers can be 
carried out by the rural areas themselves, which is a convenient 
and economical method. of training rural health workers. 
3. Content of training. The curriculum included internal 
medicine, preventive medicine, MCH, Chinese traditional medicine 
and pharmacy. However, the exposure to different subjects varied, 
66% of health workers received basic medical training (western 
medicine), but only 27-41% of them had other training (prevention, 
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Figure 6.3. Training Content for 
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pharmacy and so on) (Figure 6.3). It is quite clear that it is not 
enough for rural primary health care workers especially 
considering their range of work, which involves prevention and 
MC-H. 
Because China is a big country and is also a developing 
country, it is difficult to satisfy the demand of rural health 
services for rural doctors who are graduates of medical colleges 
and health middle school. One solution would be to choose some 
young people from amongst rural residents, who have obtained 
middle school education, and give them a short period of training 
to master basic primary health care and general medical 
techniques. In that case, they would know how to treat common 
diseases and undertake preventive health work. This method of 
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training rural doctors has four advantages: it saves time, works 
quickly, and is cheap and easy to implement. These rural health 
workers would have been born and raised in rural areas, so they 
understand patients and are familiar with their economic 
conditions, social and psychological factors, family and previous 
health conditions. They would be less tempted to move elsewhere 
and could concentrate on their task. These training methods may be 
useful to those developing countries which have the same 
conditions as China. 
4. Payment for training costs in money and time 
The survey data shows that 91% of rural health workers 
had not received any training in the last two years. This was 
closely linked to the disintegration of the CMS. Because of the 
reduction in collective funds, the training fees paid by village 
committees almost disappeared. Rural health workers working 
privately had to pay 76% of the training fee themselves. Rural 
health workers in the collective village health station had to pay 
62% because funds from village committees were not enough for 
support their training. Since most rural health workers have 
recently been working in solo or group private practice, they were 
probably unwilling to pay for their further training. A further 
reason was related to the economic responsibility system in rural 
areas. Rural health workers now owned their own land. As well as 
medical service, they would spend time doing farming and side-line 
production work. This was usually their main of income. 
If we analyse the ratio of time on two kinds of work for 
all rural health workers in 1988, on average 9.32 months were 
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spent on medical work and 2.68 month on farming and side-line 
work. This use of time seems to support the contention that health 
workers have not time to pursue advanced study. Lack of time, 
money and organization were the three factors reducing training in 
recent years. So when rural health workers were asked what was the 
most important feature of their work, only 9.1% thought that 
advanced study was important to them. It occupied the second 
position from bottom in the list. If the situation does not 
change, the quality of rural health workers will be affected and 
peasants will experience a crisis in rural health workers. 
6.2.2 Health service condition of work 
43.2% of village health workers worked in solo practice, 
45.5%, at the group village health station, 9.1%, in the 
collective village health station. It is interesting to consider 
what influence the working environment, had upon the health 
services supplied. First, the varying amounts of time spent by 
rural doctors on their work are considered (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4. Time spent by village health workers on farming and 
medical work (average month per year) 
Item Medical work Sideline/Farming 
Solo/Group 9.1 2.9 
Collective 10.8 1.2 
The study compared the time spent in medical work by 
doctors in private practices (either solo or group), with those in 
the village collective health station. The groups differed 
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widely. Private doctors spent 24% of their time in agricultural 
work, compared with the 10% spent by doctors working for the 
collective. Money, especially income, is a crucial factor which 
affected the work of all the rural doctors in our sample. In the 
sixties the original concept of the 'barefoot doctor' was that of 
a part farmer, part health worker, with up to a third of time 
spent on medical work. In practice, this division of labour proved 
difficult-sickness is not readily predictable, and the 
organisation of preventive work often had to give way to more 
pressing demands for curative work. The newer type of rural doctor 
was better trained, with a greater commitment both in time and 
proportion of income derived, to medical work. Generally speaking 
however farming and sideline work produced more income and the 
pressure to undertake it, especially after the collapse of 
guaranteed income following the decline of the CMS, has been a 
factor which has dominated the lives of rural doctors. So the 
private doctors would get more income from three months farming 
and sideline work than the collective doctor (Hillier S. M. and 
Xiang Zheng, 1994). 
Figure 6.4 shows the content of medical work(excluding 
curative treatment), and also indicates that medical workers did 
not carry out all tasks. Their reasons for neglecting certain 
kinds of work (notably MCH, family planning and prevention) were 
because the majority (89%) of the rural health workers thought 
that the pay was too low. Because these tasks did not involve 
clinical work, rural health workers were not paid a fee from 
peasants. When the CMS was in operation, barefoot doctors received 
their salaries from the village committee, and were obliged to do 
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primary health work. But now most of the income of rural health 
workers was from the sale of medicine and fees for registration, 
treatment and injection. The cost of implementing these primary 
health tasks was usually borne by a special subsidy from the 
county and township, but the subsidy was small. In any case the 
subsidies from townships were usually supplied in the form of 
goods and materials and did not include the salary of rural health 
workers. It is therefore understandable that without guarantees of 
adequate payment for these tasks, rural health workers would 
neglect them. 
6.2.3 Economic condition of the rural doctors 
The rural doctors were asked what they thought their 
ideal income should be, compared with their actual income as 
derived from farming and medical work (Table 6.5), and observed 
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important differences. Private doctors derived far more of their 
income (50%) from farming and sideline work; for the collectives, 
it was 27%. Again, the difference lies in the fact that collective 
doctors received a larger income subsidy from their villages; The 
village subsidy for collective doctors accounted for 58.0% (669 
yuan) of their yearly income, for private doctors, it accounted 
for 24.2% of their yearly income (they did some preventive health 
work); overall, collective doctors had a slightly higher income 
than private rural doctors. Yet the temptation still exists for 
collective doctors to undertake more farm work than they do at 
present. With a guaranteed subsidy from the village they could 
potentially increase their earnings still more. But this subsidy 
for collective doctors was lower than 742 yuan received by village 
leader's subsidy. For encouragement of the rural doctor, their 
subsidy should not be lower than the leader's subsidy. It should 
perhaps the equivalent to the rural teachers standard (see 
Chapter 1). 
Table 6.5. Ideal and real income and their sources (Y) for 
collective and private doctors 
Item 'Ideal income' 
per annum (Y) 
Real income (Y) 
Health Farming Total 
Solo/Group 
Collective 
1,300 
1,688 
736 
1,154 
728 1,464 
430 1,584 
Total Average 1,666 1,040 511 1,551 
We get two points from rural doctor's income: 
The subsidy of collective rural doctors from village 
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committee was obviously higher than that of private doctors. It 
ensured that collective rural doctors spent more time on medical 
work. They supplied more medical services to peasants than 
private doctors did. 
2. From the total income of view, the income of collective 
rural doctors was slightly higher than that of private rural 
doctors due to financial support from the village committee. But 
if the characteristic and form of income is analysed, it is seen 
that the average income from medical work was 111.5 yuan per 
month, which was lower than the 190.6 yuan from farming and side- 
line work according to this study. This was rather a big 
temptation to collective rural doctors. With more time to do 
farming and side-line work, their income would be higher. Clearly, 
this economic pressure was one of the factors likely to affect the 
development of village health organisations. If the village 
collective economy could not support the existence of the village 
health station, and make up the economic loss of rural doctors 
who worked in the collective village health station, these 
collective village health station would finally collapse. 
6.2.4 Factors associated with working in village health 
organisations. 
Most (71%) village health workers were satisfied with 
their work, but the percentage of those satisfied decreased from 
84% working in the solo practice village health station; to 65%, 
in the group practice village health station and 50%, in the 
2 
collective village health station (Figure 6.5), (X=55.72, P<0.001). 
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Figure 6.6 Influence Factors 
on Working 
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Three factors seemed to influence satisfaction levels 
(Figure 6.6). The first was the financial factor which includes 
income and the subsidy of village health workers. The second was 
the degree of support from the village leader. The third was 
peasant trust. It seems very important that village leaders and 
peasants are able to have confidence in rural doctors. Private 
rural doctors were especially anxious about trust and support. The 
difference was 7.6 times greater than for other doctors. 
Financial reasons were a more powerful influence in the case of 
doctors working for the collective. The difference was 1.7 times. 
It may be that collective doctors believed that if they were not 
in a collective clinic, they might be doing a lot better 
235 
economically, although a sideways glance at private doctor 
earnings (assuming that they have been truthfully reported) would 
suggest otherwise. 
These findings suggest that rural doctors have a variety 
of needs and are not simply motivated by money, although this is 
clearly important. Relationships with peasants and with the 
village administration are also salient. With the various forms of 
health organisation there are different problems and pressures 
upon rural doctors. 
6.3 Village Leaders Views on the Development of Village Health 
Care 
Village leaders are organisers of the health enterprise 
in the village. Like county and township level leaders, they have 
an important effect on the development of rural health care. 
6.3.1 The relationship between village leaders and health work 
The average age of village leaders in the study was 38 
years old. Their educational level was the same as the rural 
doctor's, 71.2% of them had attended primary and middle school. 
The vice-director of the village committee was usually in charge 
of the village health work. 
In directing health work, village leaders mainly helped 
rural doctors to draw up health plans and to complete certain 
special taskes, for example an immunisation programme, changing 
the quality of water and improving environmental sanitation. In 
most cases (70%) village leaders were directly involved in the 
direction. For example, it would be impossible to build a village 
health station or to buy and repair medical equipment without the 
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village leader's support. As far as health administration was 
concerned, normally, township hospitals produced evaluative 
targets for the village health stations to achieve. 97% of village 
health stations recieved these targets. It was the task of the 
village leader to organize the inspection of the village health 
station by the township government and township hospital. 
6.3.2 Leaders attitudes to the development of health care 
The attitudes of leaders from three levels (county, 
township and village) about collective and solo/group health 
stations were investigated. There were 17 county leaders, 20 from 
the township, 59 from the village. The percentage of County 
leaders (89%) were most in favour of collective health care at 
village level, 73% of township leaders, and 42% of village leaders 
were in favour. The county and township leaders believed that the 
collective village health stations could bring general benefit to 
peasants. The majority (89%) of village leaders on the other hand 
considered that medical services should be payed for by those who 
used them. Most of the village leaders remembered the old CMS 
system, with its often disastrous debt problems. These village 
leaders had a lot of opinions, which affected their enthusiasm for 
implementing the CMS, and they are the key to its effective 
implementation. 
From the financial point of view, the attitudes of 
village leaders towards private or collective organisation and 
their duties with regard to health was found to be unaffected by 
2 
the incomes of their villages (Table 6.6) (X=0.3139, p>0.05). 
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Table 6.6. Relationship of peasant income with attitudes of 
village leader (%) 
Item Average income<600 
yuan per year 
47 
53 
Average income>600 
yuan per year 
43 
57 
Approve collective 
Approve solo/Group 
0.31 P>0.05 
In addition, the attitude of village leaders in two 
types of county were analysed. One was a primary health care 
'model county' selected by the Ministry of Public Health as a 
model to implement health work in term of the WHO target "health 
for all by year 2000". These counties paid important attention to 
primary health work. But the Ministry of Public Health did not 
increase health investment to them. The other was an ordinary 
county (non-model county). The economic level was approximately 
the same between the model and non-model county. The attitudes of 
village leaders towards the organisation was different, however. 
Those in the model county were significantly more likely to 
approve of collective organisation (Table 6.7). 
Table 6.7. The attitudes of village leaders towards two types of 
health management system(%) 
Item Model county Non-model county Total 
Approve collective 49.4 39.7 44.6 
Approve solo/group 50.6 60.3 55.4 
2 
X-4.31 P<0.05 
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Since the health work in the model county was based on 
the WHO target "health for all by year 2000", the Ministry of 
Public Health made detailed regulations for these counties, and 
there was an emphasis on primary health care at county, township 
and village level. Leaders were partly evaluated on how far they 
reached primary health care targets. Therefore, leaders in model 
counties paid more attention to rural health work than those in 
non-model counties, and were more willing to work and invest in 
health. Their policy stance would emphasize the running of health 
care, believing this had other social benefits as well. This 
finding suggests that policies, as much as economic questions, 
affect attitudes. Perhaps clear and decisive policy making is the 
most effective way to ensure effective and feasible minimum health 
services in developing countries. 
6.3.3 An analysis of factors influencing village leader's interest 
in health work. 
When questioned abut actual practical problems, 61% of 
village leaders thought that the main difficulty with rural health 
work was the lack of health investment. others complained that 
there was no money for preventive health work, and no clear policy 
guidelines. A small number mentioned that peasants were hostile to 
the health services, found them unsatisfactory and consequently 
did not use them (Figure 6.7). 
In health management work, rural doctors play an 
important role. How did the villlage leaders evaluate rural 
doctors? Table 6.8 shows the basic evidence. 
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Table 6.8. The village leaders' evaluation of rural doctors 
Dissatisfaction factors Income of rural doctor 
Education Skill Commitment Time High Middle Low 
Solo/Group 50.0 
Collective 38.5 
30.0 
30.8 
0.0 
23.1 
0.0 
7.7 
44.6 
33.0 
53.0 
63.2 
2.4 
3.8 
Total Average 42.1 36.8 15.8 5.3 34.8 61.5 3.6 
*Percentage of Leaders giving these as reasons. 
Village leaders criticised rural doctors for their low 
educational level, poor skills and lack of commitment. Although 
they saw doctors in the collective system as better educated, they 
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were more likely to be critical of their lack of commitment, and 
the time they spent on medical work. Lack of commitment is a 
general problem in the collective health station and with the CMS 
previously. This phenomenon is called 'all eating from the same 
pot' which means that all will get the same, irrespective of what 
they contribute. This attitude has been much criticised in recent 
years. It was believed to be a disincentive to effort, leadership 
and change. 
Certain steps could be undertaken to improve the quality 
of rural doctors in the collective village health station. On the 
basis of increasing their income, managerial work could be 
stengthened. For example standands of treatment could be checked 
and a system of rewards and penalties for rural doctors 
introduced, such methods are already in use in city hospitals and 
amongst rural teachers, with a series of regulations covering 
examinations, promotion, leaving and retirement. Those rural 
doctors who achieved high levels of skill, with plenty of clinical 
experience could progress to become a fully qualified national 
doctor, to provide incentives ower a gradual period. 
In evaluating the income of rural doctors, village 
leaders believed that doctors as a whole were poorly paid, with 
only 'middle level' incomes. They maintained that the rural 
doctors' income was not satisfactory. It was lower than that of 
the village leaders because rural doctors are not recognized as 
intellectuals, which would result in a higher income. To change 
their status is not impossible. For example, today the treatment 
of rural teachers is better than that of rural doctors, but this 
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ým 
came about as a result of policy readjustment. Following 
directives from central government to local government, all 
leaders concentrated upon the development of educational 
enterprise and increased educational investment. The salary of 
rural teachers increased 10%. Education is not dissimilar to 
health, and perhaps the policy applied to education could be 
extended to health. This would speed up the developments in rural 
health care. 
6.4 Comparison of Various Health Management Systems at Village 
Health Stations Level 
After the collapse of the CMS, the Ministry of Public 
Health encouraged a variety of health systems in the rural areas. 
The Ministry of Public Health promoted collective, solo practices, 
group practices and township hospitals setting up village health 
stations. a) Collective village health stations resemble the 
earlier CMS, but the proportion of reimbursement and amount paid 
in advance is less than the previously. The village committee is 
in charge of the collective village health station. b) Group 
village health stations were organized voluntary by a few private 
rural doctors and health workers. Sometimes they could get a 
little financial support from the village committee by undertaking 
various contracts, but generally, if peasants went to this type of 
health station, they had to pay themselves. A large proportion of 
health stations are now like this in China. C) At the solo 
village health station, there is one private doctor, who is in 
charge of everything, and recieves no financial support from the 
village committee. Again peasants have to pay for themselves when 
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they visit this type of health station. d) Township hospital sets 
up a health station in the village. This organisation is the same 
as the collective village health station except in terms of its 
management. The township hospital runs this station including its 
finances and programmes for training rural doctors. This kind of 
health station accounts for only a small proportion of all village 
health stations. Below, the advantages and disadvantages of 
various types of village health station organisation are 
considered. Solo, group and collective types of organisation are 
analysed, but not that of the township, since there were none of 
this type in the samples. 
6.4.1 Comparison of basic conditions 
In the villages investigated, average population and 
average income per head were about the same. The size of the 
group village health station (GVHS) and the solo village health 
station (SVHS) was the same; they were both smaller than the 
collective village health station (CVHS). Western medicine was the 
main kind of medicine used at the CVHS, which was 3.3 and 1.9 
times that at the SVHS and the GVHS. Chinese traditional medicine, 
especially the packaged varieties which sell very profitably was 
the main kind of medicine used at the SVHS and the GVHS. The 
tendency can not be controlled, because private rural doctors 
prefer to sell Chinese traditional medicine in order to obtain a 
high profit, because it was very difficult to control the price 
and the kind of medicine at the SVHS and the GVHS (Table 6.9). 
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Table 6.9. Comparison of the three types of villages and their VHS 
Items Solo Group Collective 
Average population 1958 2102 1739 
Average income 
per capital(Yuan) 632.8 623.8 634.7 
Room of VHS 1.3 3.6 10.0 
Varieties of western 
medicine 68 119 223 
Varieties of Chinese 
tradional medicine 95 126 22 
The educational level was the same among the three kinds 
of village health staffs, graduated from middle school and 
received training from township hospital and over township 
hospital level. But 10% and 20% the health staffs worked at the 
SVHS and the GVHS had not received training. The collective 
village health workers seem to receive more professional training 
than these private doctors, because the village committee paid 
Table 6.10. Comparison of educational and professional level 
of rural health workers M 
Items Solo Group Collective 
Education 
>High school 
Middle school 
Primary school 
Training 
Yes 
No 
The Content of training 
Western medicine 
Chinese medicine 
Prevention 
MCH 
Pharmacy 
26.4 30.0 25.0 
63.2 40.0 50.0 
10.4 30.0 25.0 
90.0 80.0 100.0 
10.0 20.0 0.0 
65.4 65.0 75.0 
20.0 60.0 50.0 
20.0 45.0 50.0 
10.0 55.0 75.0 
25.0 50.0 50.0 
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most of the training fees for collective health workers. This is a 
key measure in guaranteeing the quality of rural health services 
(Table 6.10). 
6.4.2. Comparison of health services 
1. According to Table 6.11, the CVHS implemented health 
services comprehensively, including immunisation, family 
planning, MCH and infectious disease reporting. All of these 
activities were more likely to be undertaken at the CVHS. Health 
staff worked longer at the CVHS (10.8 months per year) than those 
at the SVHS and the GVHS (9.02 and 9.0 months per year 
respectively). On average peasants saw doctors 3.74 per year at 
the CVHS, over twice as many as at the SVHS and GVHS. The average 
number of treatment episodes each doctor at the CVHS were 2.3 
times and 3.1 times as many as that at the SVHS and the GVHS. The 
Table 6.11. Percentage of various activities undertaken by three 
types of VHS in 1988 
Items Solo Group Collective 
Special Tasks(%) 
Immunisation 85.0 80.0 100.0 
Family planning 40.0 45.0 75.0 
MCH 40.0 50.0 75.0 
Health propaganda 60.0 45.0 50.0 
Infectious disease 80.0 75.0 100.0 
report 
Working time(Months) 9.02 9.0 10.8 
Average times per year 1.50 1.86 3.74 
peasant seeing doctor 
The average number 
of treatment patients 
per doctor 1397 1065 3250 
The number of home visits 
by doctors 97 85 350 
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number of home visits were 3.6 times and 4.1 times that of the 
SVHS and GVHS respectively. It seem that health services at the 
CVHS had two advantages compared with the SVHS and the GVHS. One 
is that the health services were of a wider range. Another is that 
the volume of health services was larger. 
2. According to the data in Table 6.12, the average infant 
mortality rate at the collective health care villages was 33.7 per 
thousand, a little lower than 35.7 per thousand at the solo and 
the group health care villages. The percentage of patients seeing 
the doctor was 93.6% at the collective health care villages, which 
was the highest among the three kinds. However, peasants at the 
solo and the group health care villages had more choices, as to 
the place of treatment, and more of them went to the county 
hospital than peasants in collective health care villages. The 
Table 6.12. Comparison of health service condition 
Items Solo Group Collective 
Infant mortality 35.7 33.7 
(per thousand) 
Percentage of patients 
visiting the doctor 91.4 89.1 93.6 
Places to see doctor 
VHS 66.2 79.0 72.5 
Township hospital 25.7 10.5 24.1 
County hospital 8.1 10.5 3.4 
Health service to 
high risk populationM 35.2 35.7 47.2 
under 12 years old (19-7) (19.1) (24.5) 
over 60 years old (9.3) (8.9) (10.4) 
Peasants suffering 
from Chronic disease (6.2) (8.7) (12.3) 
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proportion of high risk population was high, accounted for 47.2% 
of total population that attended the CMS, which was higher than 
35% of total population obtaining health services at the solo and 
the group health care villages. This was because these collective 
health care villages had open access to health care. So the 
peasants who had disease experiences preferred to attend the CMS. 
The proportion of children and elderly were higher in 
the CMS group, generally speaking, the health service utilisation 
of these people is higher than that of young people. But it is not 
only reason for the high health service utilisation in CMS group. 
Because the people (including young people) who enjoy the CMS 
have paid a little money, they would not like to waste the money. 
They think that they have paid for CMS, they should use it, 
whether they need health services or not. In other words, even 
though it is not necessary to have health services for young 
people sometimes, these young people still see the doctor and 
recieve medicine. It is an example of "moral hazard", which causes 
the health service utilisation in the CMS group to be higher than 
in the self-financing group. It is the general psychological 
status of Chinese peasants (Zhu ao rong, 1988). 
It seems that the CMS can satisfy more easily the health 
service needs of rural residents. It allows most peasants, 
especially the vulnerable ones to get basic health services 
without undertaking more economic risk. Obviously the CMS has 
social benefits. 
3. The data in Table 6.13 show that the cost of each 
visit to the GVHS and the SVHS were 8.4 and 5.6 times 
respectively as much as at the CVHS. In contrast, yearly average 
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Table 6.13. Comparison of the medical expenses of peasants 
Items Solo Group Collective 
Cost of one visit (Yuan) 
VHS 6.15 9.11 1.09 
Yearly medical expenses 
Per person(Yuan) 
Collective fund 0.17 0.17 2.88 
Peasants raise funds 0.00 0.00 3.44 
Self-Pay 22.29 21.96 7.50 
Total Average 22.49 22.13 13.82 
Medical expense accounted 
for yearly incomeM 3.50 3.60 2.20 
medical expenses per peasant were 13-82 yuan at the CVHS. Of 
these, the collective paid 2.88 yuan, the fund raised by peasants 
paid 3.44 yuan, the peasants paid 7.50 yuan. Because the income of 
the SVHS and the GVHS relied on medical services mainly, 
increasing the charges to patients would raise the income of the 
rural doctors, but the financial resource was fixed at the CVHS 
and increasing the expenditure of patients would decrease the 
rural doctor's income. The CMS can effectively control medical 
costs after it has basically satisfied the health service need of 
peasants because it does not need to make a profit. With the 
exception of service attitude, the health service level was higher 
at the CVHS than at the SVHS and the GVHS. Especially with regard 
to preventive health the CVHS had obvious advantages compared with 
the others. 
6.4.3 Analysis of the merits and demerits of three kinds of 
village health station 
As explained before, solo and group village health 
stations charge patients, who are self financing. 
They can 
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utilize the idle capital of the society to supply basic health 
services for peasants. Besides, this kind system gives the 
peasants more right to choose the place of treatment. The health 
service attitude is better than the collective rural doctors'. In 
both the SVHS and the GVHS, no matter what the scale of the health 
station (the quantity of doctors and health service content) the 
GVHS was better than the SVHS. 
Comparing the CVHS with the SVHS and the GVHS, the main 
difference is that medical expenses can not be reduced at the solo 
or group health station. Private medical systems can not help 
peasants when they have serious health problems and accidents. 
The CVHS had a satisfactory variety of health service items. It 
paid attention to preventive work as well as to demands for 
curative treatment. Unlike the self financing system, there was no 
pressure on doctors to derive their income from the patient in 
order to get more personal income. At same time the CVHS supplied 
some free health services. The rural resident especially those 
with at high risk or with a large family, could afford to visit to 
clinic. These advantages meant that the CMS should not be replaced 
and abolished. If we consider a survey of infant mortality in 
China, which reduced from 67 per thousand in 1982 to 34.7 per 
thousand in 1985, the rural areas showed an unbalanced 
distribution of the reduction, depending upon the various health 
systems. Infant mortality reduced very slowly in those areas 
covered by the self-financing medical system (Zhu Ao Rong, 1988). 
Table 6.14 sums up the merits and demerits of the three 
kinds of village health station. 
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Table 6.14. Comparison of the merits and demerits of three kinds 
of village health stations (summary data from VHS 
surveys) 
Items 
1. Utilization of idle 
capital 
2. The scale of VHS 
3. VHS' s mangement 
4. VHS' s capital 
5. VHS' s equipment 
6. VHS' s room 
7. VHSs service items 
8. VHS's service time 
9. VHS's amount of service 
delivery patient 
10. VHS's doctors 
educational level 
11. Training time 
12. Training content 
13. Medical level 
14. Service attitude 
15. Expenditure of peasant 
for medical services 
Solo Group Collective 
Yes Yes No 
Small Medium Large 
Difficult Less difficult Easy 
Less Medium Plenty 
Less Medium Much 
Less Medium Many 
Less Medium Many 
Medium Medium Longer 
Less Less Much 
Same for the Three Types 
Medium Medium Much 
Medium Medium Much 
Medium Medium High 
Good Good Bad 
Medium Medium Less 
6.5 Summary of Chapter 6 
6.5.1 General condition of village health care 
1.85% of peasants used a private medical service. These 
privately run village health stations assumed sole responsibility 
for their profits or losses, and had little surplus to expand 
their services. Patients now had the right to choose where to be 
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treated or to be referred. As a result, market competition existed 
between the county, township and village. The county hospital 
obviously was the most attractive health facility, and the number 
of patients decreased at the township hospitals and village health 
stations, resulting in loss of work for the doctors. This problem 
might be counteracted by closing down some health facilities (e. g. 
township hospitals) to increase the activity of the basic level of 
the three level medical network. 
2. Rural doctors are the direct suppliers of basic rural 
health care. What they do is far more than simple curative work 
because they are also in charge of primary prevention, health 
propaganda and so on. They require a set of skills that are not 
characteristic of clinically trained health personnel. Like social 
workers, they appear to need a range of various skills that extend 
beyond the realm of narrowly defined clinical practice. Then, the 
rural doctor could be called the 'primary health care doctor', and 
given appropriate incentive and training. 
The survey results showed that only about 50% of rural 
doctors were working on preventive work (with the exception of 
immunisation), which falls far short of what is necessary. Less 
than 10% had taken an advanced training recently. Because of the 
economic responsibility system in rural areas, rural health 
workers owned their own land, so it was very difficult to get 
financial support from collective funds, since there were none 
availabe. Therefore, lack of time, money and organization were 
three factors which affected rural health workers' advanced 
training and health work. As a result, neither their preventive 
health care knowledge nor their basic medical techniques could be 
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enhanced. The long run effect of lack of training has been to 
weaken the capacities of rural doctors, undermine the confidence 
of peasants in their skills, and lead to a downward spiral. 
6.5.2. Importance of insisting on and developing collective 
health care for building the base of the rural health network. 
Compared with private health care, collective health 
care performed better on a number of health indices. The private 
health system cannot guarantee rural residents basic health 
services especially preventive health services. The reasons for 
favouring the development of a collective health care system are 
as follows: 
1. It is suitable to the national situation. During 
rural health reform, the Ministry of Public Health encouraged a 
plurality of health systems. But the policy increased the 
financial burden of peasants without supplying a corresponding 
health service for them. As a result, it damaged the health care 
of rural residents. The economic conditions of Chinese rural 
residents are still low at present. The CMS which is an example of 
a risk-sharing scheme seems the best system to satisfy all types 
of economic conditions. Because the CMS exists on mutual aid and 
cooperation, it is one of the most effective health care 
management systems, which helps the peasant who cannot defray the 
expenses of medicine and treatment The CMS does allow uninsurable 
people to become insurable, although there are some examples of 
"moral hazard". 
2. It is a means of instituting primary health care. 
Primary health care is included in the organization of village 
health. Though there is no income from preventive work, it still 
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has to be financed. When the government is unable to finance 
preventive work, the private health system does not want to do, 
and the collective economy is not strong enough, the CMS is a 
practical and effective measure to finance essential preventive 
measures though a collective health care system. 
3. It increases peasant and government awareness of 
health care and results in effective participation in its 
organization. Through running collective health care, part of 
the capital is obtained from peasants, and governments at all 
levels can put in more health investment. In this way, the peasant 
and the government can acknowledge that primary health care is an 
important aspect of arrangements for health and well being in 
society, and that it is everyone's responsibility to perfect the 
organization of rural health care and to improve peasants' health 
conditions. 
In all, collective health stations in the rural areas 
can be controlled effectively by village committees and other 
health units, and can implement government's health work in the 
rural areas. Therefore, collective health stations can obviate 
the adminstrative disadvantages due to the shortage of effective 
management in the self-financing medical system. Then the health 
organization of the village virtually becomes the basis of a 
three level medical network. 
Factors influencing the Re-establishment of collective health 
care: 
1. Health policy is the first factor. Income differences 
did not influence village leaders towards favouring any particular 
model of health care organisation. What did seem to make a 
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difference was whether or not the leader's village was in a model 
county, because a different Policy was implemented in the primary 
health care model county and non-model county. In addition, looked 
at historically, during the Cultural Revolution, the economic 
conditions of rural areas were worse than at present, yet the 
speedy development of collective health care meant that the 
peasant could gain basic medical services although the CMS of 
that time suffered from imperfections. This was a definite 
consequence of policy making. Above we have seen that the CVHS has 
more advantage than the SVHS and the GVHS. Therefore, perhaps it 
should be possible to copy and improve the health policies of the 
Cultural Revolution, which stated that 'in medical and health 
work, put the stress on the rural areas'. 
Initially, the Ministry of Public Health should 
recognize the advantages of the collective organisation of health 
care, and produce health policies for every level of government 
county, township and village. For example, a regulation should be 
made that county, township and village governments must distribute 
a certain amount of health investment from their own financial 
budgets as well as the financial allocation from central 
government; at same time, managerial organizations controlling 
collective health care needs to be built up at the three levels. 
These organisations could then make detailed formal and official 
regulations covering the ratio and range of reimbursement, and the 
wages of rural doctors so that it is clear, where authority lies 
in the matter of running collective health care. As long as 
rational administrative methods are used, many of the evils of the 
previous CMS could be prevented. In this way, without a great deal 
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of increase in government health investment, the organisation of 
collective health care could be carried out. The use of clear 
policy and clear administrative guidelines are especially useful 
to these areas which are lacking in money. It also might be an 
useful method for other developing countries as to how to enhance 
the quality and quantity of rural health services. A basic 
position that it is difficult to carry out primary care on large 
scale without government participation and direction. 
2. Man made factors cannot be ignored. The results of 
investigation among the leaders of the three levels showed that 
the percentage of those approving of the collective organisation 
of health care decreased from county to village. Therefore, it 
appears that the main resistance comes from village level. This 
can only be rectified by education among the village leaders and 
peasants when the managerial and administrative problems of the 
previous CMS are recognized, and improvements in the new system 
demonstrated. It also a suggests that central government and 
local government should obtain advice from county, township and 
village administators when they make health policies. The policy 
is more easily understood and implemented if there is a community 
participation in the process of policy-making. 
3. Finally, economic factors are also important. Policy 
adjustment and administrative intervention are necessary to 
increase health investment, because economic development and the 
increase of the proportion of the budget allocated to the 
collective fund are essential for running collective health 
care. However, this should depend on each village's economic 
condition. When poor rural areas set up the cooperative medical 
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system, most of the resources will come from rural residents 
themselves. The areas which are a little more prosperous can pool 
other resources. This would mean that the collective fund 
contribution is more than the peasants' contribution. Useful 
soures for example are township hospitals and rural industry 
which can give some money. As economic improvement and collective 
health investment increase in the rural areas, the right of 
peasants to choose and control their most appropriate medical 
service can be made a reality. 
256 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
7.1 Conclusions 
The three tier rural health network (county, township 
and village) built in the 1950s and described in previous pages, 
has had considerable durability, and has proved appropriate to the 
Chinese situation. Its structure was that Chinese rural health 
enterprise was run by the county, the collective and the peasants 
together which has contributed to its vitality. This kind of 
structure has been crucial in implementing Primary Health Care in 
Chinese rural areas, and PHC is the necessary basis for making 
health policies for China, especially in the rural areas, 
inhabited by the majority of the population. PHC has become 
increasingly institutionalized in developing countries and the 
approach provides essential health services, mainly to dispersed 
rural populations which often do not have regular access to public 
or private health care. 
Survey results from this study showed that the 
Cooperative Medical System, the basic funding form for rural 
inhabitants declined markedly during the reform period. Private 
doctors replaced the barefoot doctor. At the time of the survey, 
most village health stations were run as private enterprises, 
almost 'medicineshops', compared with their more comprehensive 
functions a decade before. The reasons for this change are 
political --- the CMS was associated with the disastrous Cultural 
Revolution. It was judged as one of products of the Cultural 
Revolution and removed. This decision paid no attention to its 
value as the 'glue' which held rural health care together; 
in 
addition, the changes in rural economic structure induced major 
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changes in the funding of the CMS- The Chinese ministry of Public 
Health could not find a correspondingly alternative model for 
rural health care. The village health stations which were the 
most local and smallest part of the three tier health network, 
due to lack of availability of collective funds had been moving to 
private enterprise automatically. This change meant that 
individual peasants were obliged to finance health care 
themselves. Although the rural economy had developed as a result 
of economic reform, the living standards of peasants were still 
comparatively low. It is a principle of HFA/2000 that disease risk 
should not be linked, as productivity is, to the individual's 
economic ability. 
The thesis shows that privatisation of village health 
stations seriously affected rural residents' utilization of health 
service and restricted their demand artificially. Opportunities 
for a wide ranging set of health related activities based in the 
village were removed. Rural health care did not develop ---- rather 
it was weakened during health reform. This weakness affected not 
only the village level, but the hospital services in the township. 
Health reform has caused a crisis in township hospitals by 
producing bankruptcy for some and indiscriminate sales of 
medicines as a survival strategy for others. It is obvious that 
simple privatisation of the Chinese health care market is not 
helpful for improving the health of rural residents. 
Privatisation's non-collaborative and non-intersectorial dynamic 
affects the implementation of PHC in Chinese rural areas. If we 
consider the priciple of equity in health care and the goal of the 
HFA/2000 in Chinese health care, privatisation of the health 
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system will not be an adequate Policy. Therefore the question 
remains as to what health policy for Chinese health care can be 
made and how health services for the rural residents can be 
supplied. A number of possibilities can be considered, based upon 
the range of approaches to health care funding discussed in the 
opening chapter. 
option one is free government health care for rural 
residents. This is impossible, because workers and cadres can get 
a salary from the factory or the government, peasants have no 
fixed incomes. The social benefit is different. National health 
insurance which currently pays benefits to those working for the 
state has to reform because the government cannot undertake this 
large financial burden (see chapter 4). It is highly unlikely 
therefore that such a scheme would be extended to peasants. 
Option two is the private health system for example 
private health insurance or fee-for-service. The problem here is 
that peasants cannot afford the levels of medical expenditure 
associated with severe disease, without ruining their family 
finances (3089 Chinese yuan/average family yearly income-chapter 
3), although they are probably able to produce some increase in 
their health expenditures. 
Therefore, despite the drawbacks noted in Chapter 1, the 
best model of health service financing and delivery is the CMS 
which is an example of a risk-sharing scheme applied to the rural 
areas of China. This model would mean that neither the individual 
nor the government is solely responsible for payment. The CMS is 
financed by peasant prepayment and collective funds, organised by 
the village committee or the township hospital. From a comparison 
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of various health management systems at village level, the thesis 
showed that the medical services which were supplied by the 
collective health station consisted of more items especially in 
primary health care and preventive medicine. Costs were lower and 
organisation easier than those of the privately run village 
station. The major advantage compared with the fee-for-service 
system is that the CMS allows uninsurable rural residents to 
become insurable, and gives them a greater sense of security. In 
addition, it reflects that management should be the responsive to 
peasants' needs as they are expressed at each particular level. 
Although the survey found that money was not the prime factor in 
determining utilisation, as discussed above, the relationship 
requires further explanation. Users of the CMS were more 
satisfied with this method of payment than those who depended 
upon the private system. This suggests again that the 
predictability which results from the CMS structure of prepayment 
is an importment factor in guaranteeing peace of mind from 
catastrophic illness expenses. 
Careful policy-making is also a key factor in the 
development of Chinese rural heath care. The investigation found 
that the village leaders have different objectives as to how to 
run health care depending upon whether they were in a PHC model 
county or a not with the former giving more prominence to national 
policy objectives like preventive health and family planning. This 
reflects the structures of economic development, and the fact that 
the methods of health care delivery and health care policies are 
still largely centrally determined. The process of health policy 
making is 'top-down' in China and has also oscillated according to 
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the political atmosphere. Community participation of the type 
descibed in Chapter 1 is non-existent. The coordination of the 
peasants and workers and professional health personnel which is 
the basis of the WHO model, does not exist in the same way. 
Local health cadres and community health workers who work in 
rural areas are largely concerned with implemention of central 
directives rather than formulating local health policy. The policy 
of building a County Chinese Traditional Hospital in all counties 
is good example of the 'blanket objective' applied top down 
regardless of its appropriatness. 
The concept of community participation is complicated 
in China. Historically, there have been 'mass movements' locally 
organised by community health workers such as barefoot doctors and 
involving all the local inhabitants as participants. These 
community health workers play a very large part in Chinese health 
care and they are a very important source of community based 
manpower. These mass movements for example, the Patriotic Health 
Campaign, are 'one off' events, with limited, centrally defined 
objectives eg, eradication of a particular insect pest or rodent, 
or where rural residents and health workers physically work to 
'clean up' the environment. However that is not complete 
participation as understood in the extant literature on 
international health policy. Tn China, another aspect is required 
i. e. community participation in policy-making and community health 
workers who have a diverse range of skillst not only to implement 
health activities but to participate in local health policy- 
making. Therefore, coummunity health workers must not only have 
the characteristics of clinically trained health personnel, but 
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they must be organizers, coordinators and promoters of health 
activities. If a process of health Policy-making is set up in this 
way, which is responsive toward various sectors, policy will be 
more feasible. Community participation in health policy making may 
encounter some obstacles in China because, once community 
representatives want to share power with authorities, they are 
unlikely to be well accepted, however a gradual involvement with 
the process is still necessary. 
Health reforms have introduced the system of market 
competition which is the economic responsibility system. The 
quantity of hospital services are linked with profits, determined 
by contract. This competition has brought economic vigour to 
hospitals, reduced the financial burden of the government and 
improved the management of hospitals to some degree. The system 
has also forced hospitals to pay more attention to profit, at 
the expense of social benefit. The county and the township 
hospitals increased medicine sales and clinical tests for profit. 
Some were probably unnecessary, and added to health care costs for 
the rural residents. These sales, registered as annual income, 
gave an air of false prosperity to hospitals and made government 
health investment even less likely. However, a more important fact 
is that China's rulers are committed to introduce a free market 
economy now. Under this situation, it is very difficult to decide 
whether to limit or to expand the system of market competition 
in 
Chinese health care. Many are a aware that health care market is 
different from the free economic market in which services are 
supplied for profit only. The supply of health services 
in market 
has to consider social benefits. Health care 
is a 'public good' to 
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be met for all people and is not same as a commercial good 
exchanged depending on individual's financial ability. So the 
government cannot simply copy the free market economy when 
constructing government policy --- this would merely repeat the 
mistakes of health reform over the last dozen years. The 
government should control health care market continuously and 
actively because this action can guarantee people the means of 
obtaining a basic health service and is useful for the 
implementation of PHC. Whatever systme prevails, a primary 
objective must be to safeguard the quality and quantity of health 
services. Probably, a reasonable market competitive system in 
Chinese health care is 'the internal market' of the UK as 
mentioned on Chapter 1, which is controlled by the government, but 
not the free market model currently in operation in the U. S. A.. 
These points are closely associated with the issue of equity in 
Chinese health care, as we shall see below. 
The health reforms weakened the development of rural 
health care and strengthened urban health care. The gap between 
the rural areas and the urban areas continues to increase. The 
survey indicated that there is an uneven distribution of health 
personnel between the urban areas and the rural areas. The medical 
expenditures of peasants were much less than that of workers and 
cadres because peasants had to pay for medical care themselves. 
Workers and cadres enjoyed free health care which contributed to 
a situation of 'moral hazard' which is defined as the abuse of 
free health care by people seeking health care not because they 
need it but because the health care is free. The reasons of this 
long standing rural/urban inequity are: 
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------ Historically, during the Cultural Revolution, urban health 
care was run down, in tune with the the Maoist slogan 'put the 
stress on rural areas'. Post-Mao, there was an enormous political 
impetus to improve urban health care. Leaders and officials, the 
city dwellers in China's all powerful bureaucracy, have ensured 
that after a brief flirtation with egalitarianism, the welfare of 
the cities stays paramount. 
-----Though the Chinese Ministry of Public Health has recognised 
the HFA/2000 is the goal of Chinese health care and issued PHC 
targets, it has not pursued detailed policy-making. The Ministry 
of Public Health did not make a distributive policy in favour of 
the rural areas during health reform. This reflects the fact that 
Chinese health policy makers did not completely understand the 
important principle of PHC i. e. the equitable provision of health 
care to all people. Equity in health care was not confirmed in 
practice in China, not was it ever discussed as a principle. 
------ Chinese economic development can not achieve equity complete 
in health care, for the country does not have enough health 
resources to reduce the gap between urban areas and rural areas 
now. In the absence of major policy change in favour of massive 
redistribution, that situation is likely to continue. 
------ Finally, the survey also shows that the privatisation of the 
health system in the rural areas produced inequality of access to 
health services, which expanded the gap. 
What calls for special attention is the privatisation 
of health care following the introduction of market competition. 
What assessment can be made? Firstly we must know that 
privatisation is by nature characterised by inequity. It is not 
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only this survey but an abundance of literature, discussing for 
example, the private health insurance system in US, which has 
shown that privatisation in health care has no positive effect in 
improving people' health status. Secondly, equity in health care 
does not mean that everyone can reach the same health status. 
Equity in health care is only a means of giving people fair 
opportunities to obtain health services and to reduce man-made 
health differentials. Therefore Chinese health policy-makers 
should be following the principle of equity, increasing health 
investment to the rural areas and limiting the development of 
private health enterprises in order to reduce the health 
differentials between urban and rural residents. Detailed 
suggestions for implementation are given below. 
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7.2 Suggestions 
7.2.1 Health work should again put the stress on the rural areas. 
80% of China's population live in the rural areas, 
therefore laying the stress on the health of rural people, 
provides an excellent opportunity to improve the health of the 
majority of the population. Developing rural health organisations 
should become a basic rule in health policy. 
The Central Government and the Ministry of Public Health 
know that health reform has weakened rural health work. At the 
beginning of 1991, they started to change course again, saying 
that the stress should be placed on the rural areas once more. 
Several important developments illustrate this: 
1. The 7th Plenary Session of the 11th Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee adopted "Suggestions concerning CCPCC 
producing the 10-Year Plan (1991-2000) of the National Economy and 
Social Development and the 8th 5-Year Plan (1991-1995)" in January 
1991, which emphasised the need to strengthen the construction of 
rural health organisation and consolidate and develop the three 
tier rural health network (People's Daily, 1991,1,29). 
2. The State Council approved a report from the Ministry 
of Public Health , Agriculture, Planning, Education and Personnel 
"Concerning the Reform and Strengthening of Rural Health Work" on 
January 17,1991. In the report, the Ministry of Public Health and 
4 other ministries acknowledged, that rural health care had not 
developed but was weakened during health reform, and that the gap 
between the quality and quantity of urban health care and rural 
health care was increasing. They emphasised the need to develop 
the three tier rural health network because 30 years practice 
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shows that this fits the Chinese conditions. The report also 
discussed the need to solve the problem of shortage of health 
personnel in the rural areas; to look for some means to keep rural 
health personnel at their posts, to strengthen the management of 
rural health care and, most importantly to continue the CMS in 
rural areas (State Council of the PRC, 1991,1). 
This is the third shift in health policy, and may mark a 
new phase. In the 1960's-1970's, health work was directed to rural 
areas to build the three tier rural health network and the teams 
of barefoot doctors. In the 80's, the stress was on building up 
the urban areas. Now the policy stresses the rural areas again. 
This suggests that the data which was been presented by the thesis 
is true reflection of the situation. 
However this third phase is not simply a copy of the 
rural health system of 30 years ago. On the basis of learning 
the lessons of history and respecting peasants' wishes, the CMS 
must be suitably adapted to the local economy. The means that the 
method of collection of health expenses might be varied. The 
money collected from the peasant and the proportion of 
reimbursement will be determined according to local conditions. 
Collective village health stations will be encouraged, and where 
that is not possible the rural doctor should be responsible to the 
village committee for the management and organisation of the 
village health station. 
7.2.2 The three tier health network should implement a reasonable 
management system. 
The county health organisation and the central township 
hospital might best be governed by the county health bureau. At 
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present, the township hospital usually belongs to the township 
government. If the township government has difficulty in managing 
the township hospital, the county health bureau could oversee the 
township hospital continuously or the county health bureau and the 
township government manage it together. In practice this means 
that the county health bureau would give financial and technical 
support, the township government would administer the hospital. 
Unprofitable township hospitals could be closed or merged with 
other township hospitals. Generally, the village health stations 
are responsible to the village committee, but in some rural areas, 
the township hospital is in charge of the village health 
stations. This usually occurs where a few villages are too small 
to provide the necessary resources, and seems to work quite well. 
Private doctors could be supplementary health personnel allied to 
and monitored by the three tier health network. The county and 
township health sections could strengthen the role of private 
doctors and provide incentives for them to undertake primary 
health work. 
7.2.3 A more effective method should be found to solve the 
problem of the shortage of health resources in rural areas. 
The prime means to solve the shortage of health 
resources is to be aware that everyone should have a fair 
opportunity to attain their full health potential, and the HFA is 
not only the medical doctor's duty, but requires the alliance of 
central and local government, social organizations eg. factory 
worker union and woman association and individuals. HFA cannot be 
realized if any of these sections absent. Once the government, 
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social organizations and individuals are aware of HFA objectives, 
they would be more likely to increase investment in health care. 
In the meantime, the distribution of health resources would need 
to follow the principle of equity. In detail, this means that 
when the government increases financial input, the rate of 
increase in the health budget is slightly higher than that of the 
increase in the government budget, and the rate of increase in 
the preventive budget is slightly higher than that of increases 
in the total health budget. At the same time, both collectives and 
individuals should increase financial inputs. For example, the 
township factories could assign more health investment from their 
yearly profits. 
The uneven distribution of health personnel in rural 
areas can be changed in several ways: 
1. The urban areas should support the rural areas. This includes 
preferential policies of health investment, and technical 
personnel. Urban health personnel could be encouraged to spend 
time in the rural areas. It could be a condition of further 
education or promotion for urban doctors that they have had rural 
health work experience. Medical students could also go to the 
rural areas for 1-2 years after graduation. The policy would need 
an earmarked budget in order to ensure a certain quantity of urban 
health personnel in the rural areas. 
2. One method is to enroll, and train students at all 
levels on the basis of assigning them back to the areas where they 
came from. Therefore, enrollment will particularly favour students 
from rural backgrounds. The courses should include special 
training in rural health work. 
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3. The provincial and county government need to improve 
teaching quality in the county health schools so that they may 
become the base for training rural health personnel. 
4. Rural doctors need to have the opportunity of further 
study and refresher courses, with training fees paid jointly by 
the government, the collective and the individual. A system of 
retirement insurance for the rural doctors who worked in the 
collective health village station could be set up to reduce the 
number of people leaving the job. 
7.2.4 Price structures must be adjusted. 
The prices of health services must not depend on the 
free market completely. Market competition can increase economic 
benefit but at same time, health service delivery in the market 
must consider social benefit. The government should manage the 
health care market actively. By controlling the price of health 
services, the government can adjust the charges. It is necessary 
to increase the price of technical services such as operations. 
The registration fee can also be increased. The costs of medicines 
and charges for clinic tests should be reduced. The profit from 
medicine sales will therefore be replaced by the profit from 
technical services. Patient charges should also exclude labour 
costs, for the salary of medical personnel is already paid by the 
State. Implementing these measures can reduce the dependence of 
the hospital upon medicine sales, cut the profits to 
pharmaceutical companies, increase the income of hospitals and 
change their economic situation without adding to the patients' 
economic burden. The real values of doctors work would be embodied 
in the charges. 
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7.2.5 To implement primary health care is the general goal. 
According to the Chinese situation, the stress in rural 
health work should be put on implementing primary health care 
fully. It is an important means by which to strengthen rural 
health work by the Ministry of Public Health. But rural 
preventive work is also a pressing matter at the moment. Rural 
preventive working teams should be set up to control infectious 
diseases quickly. The spread in infectious diseases has been noted 
over the last decade. The reason is that most village health 
stations were private enterprises and the basic preventive team is 
replaced by the private doctors. 
In general, the development of rural health care must 
rely on central and local government and the support of society. 
It should embody the principle that the stress of health work is 
put on the rural areas in policy making and arrangements for 
health expenditure. The uneven allocation of health resources 
between the urban areas and the rural areas needs to be gradually 
changed so that rural health care will show real development and 
progress by the year 2000. 
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APPENDIX: QUESTIONAIRES 
1. Health service investigation for rural residents (household) 
1) . Sex a- male 
2) . Age 
3). Occupation 
b. f emale 
a. peasants b. private business c. cadre 
d. worker e. other 
4). Education a. illiterate b. primary school 
c. middle school d. high school 
5). The kind of medical system used 
a. solo b. group c. collective d. other 
6). How do you feel the self-finance medical system? 
a. satisfactory b. unsatisfactory c. other 
7). If unsatisfactory: What are your reasons? 
a. if you are ill, you can become impoverished. 
b. the poor level of preventive work. 
c. the rural docters are unsupervised. 
d. the 3-tier network lacks coordination. 
e. other. 
8). Number in family 
9). The number of people suffering from the chronic disease in the 
family 
10). The age of each family member 
11). Health condition in last two weeks 
a. Number of times 'feeling ill' 
b. Number of days in bed because of illness 
12). Medical contacts in the last 2 weeks 
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a. Characteristic of the village health station: 
times, costs of treatment, running costs, levels of satisfacion 
with the service. reasons for unsatisfaction (high medical 
expenses, poor technical level, poor health service attitude, low 
doctor's technics, other). 
b. township hospital: times, medical expense, satisfactory 
level, unsatisfactory reasons (high medical expenses, poor 
technical level, poor health service attitude, low doctor's 
technics, other). 
c. county hospital: times, medical expense, satisfactory 
level, unsatisfactory reasons (high medical expenses, poor 
technical level, poor health service attitude, low doctor's 
technics, other). 
13). Reason for hospital residence: 
a. disease b. other 
14). Number of patients requiring hospital admission who did not 
go 
15). Reasons for non-hospitalization: 
a. no bed available b. expensive 
c. did not like to stay in hospital 
16). Would you want to join an out-patient health insurance? 
a. yes b. no 
17). If yes, how much would you pay for medical insurance per 
family member per year? 
18). Would you want to join an inpatient health insurance? 
a. yes b. no 
19). If yes, how much would you pay for medical 
insurance per 
family member per year? 
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20). What was your family's gross income in 1988? What was 
your family's net income in 1988? 
2. The basic characteristics of the County 
I. Geography and population 
1). Gegraphy a. mountain areas b. hilly land c. land 
2). The size of whole area 
3). The number of townships and villages and 
4). The number of households the numbers of agricultural 
households 
5). The total population 
population 
II. Economy (1988) 
1). GNP 
2). The gross value of industrial 
output 
3). The gross value of industrial output 
value of industrial in townships and villages 
4). The gross value of agricultural output 
5). Average personal income the yearly income of 
workers in county and township 
6). The yearly income of peasants 
III. Education 
1). The rate of 
2). The rate C 
1988) 
illiteracy (children 12+ in 1982) 
school enrollment (children 
the agricultural 
and agricultural 
; the gross 
below 14 
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IV. Health condition 
1). Infant mortality rate in 1988 
2). Maternal mortality rate in 1988 
V. Health organizations and staffs 
1). The number of county health organization 
bed staff among them health professional 
personnel doctor ; clinical technician 
nurse graduated from medical university (5 
years) graduated from medical university (3 
years) graduated from middle health school 
2). The number of preventive health station 
staff among them health professional personnel 
-3 -- A- - -- -- -2 -! ---! -- --- 'I -- 
I 
UOC U or CJLInIC Lecnnician nurse 
graduated from medical university (5 years) ; graduated 
from medical university (3 years) graduated from middle 
health school 
MCH 
personnel 
nurse 
(5 years) 
(3 years) 
staff among them health professional 
doctor ; clinical technician_ 
graduated from medical university 
graduated from medical university 
graduated from middle health school 
4). Township hospital beds staf f among 
them, health professional personnel doctor I 
clinic technician nurse graduated from 
medical university (5 years) graduated from medical 
university (3 years) graduated from middle health 
school_ 
S 
I 
I 
 
I 
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5). Village health station rural doctors 
health workers , midwives 
VI. Health services 
1). Number of patients who were treated in county 
hospital in township hospital in village 
health station 
2). Number of patients who were discharged from 
hospital ; township hospital 
3). Bed occupancy days in county hospital 
in township hospital 
4). The bed utilization rate in county hospital 
township hospital 
5). Bed turnover in county hospital 
hospital 
VII. Medical expenses 
1). County governmental financial income 
expenditure 
I 
county 
in 
in township 
r 
2). County health expenditure among them, 
hospital expenditure If expenditure 
activities , townwship hospital expenditure 
on 
f inancial 
county 
preventive 
3). Special health expenses national 
insurance labour health insurance 
planning expenses 
4). Health capital construction_ 
health 
;f amily 
VIII. The financial balance of health organizations 
1). The income of county hospital ; among them, from 
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medicine sales I from clinical tests , from 
examination and treatment 
2) The income of township hospital among them, 
from medicine sales from clinical tests from 
examination and treatment 
3). The expenditure of county hospital among them, for 
medicine for other medical materials 
4). The expenditure of township hospital among them, 
for medicine bought , for other medical materials 
3. County hospital and county Chinese 
characteristics 
I. General condition 
1). The size of hospital 
2). The amount of fixed assets 
equipment 
traditional hospital 
, the value of medical 
II. Health personnel 
1). The number of health staff among them, 
administrators clinical technician 
personnel 
2). The structure of health personnel 
a. senior doctor I b. 
junior doctor 
c. nurse 
3). Education 
a. medical university (5 years) 
b. medical university (3 years) 
c. middle health school 
health 
ancillary 
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d. high school 
e. middle school 
f. primary school 
4). Service characteristics: 
a. the number of departments in hospital 
b. the number of beds r 
C. the annual number of out-patients 
d. the annual number of in-patients 
e. total hospital stay (days) 
f. the number of patients discharged 
annually A, 
I 
I 
from hospital 
g. the bed utilization rate bed turnover 
h. medical income: inpatient service outpatient 
service medicine sale operation on 
patient other_ 
5). The balance of income and expenditure. 
4. The medical expenses of out-patients in county and county 
Chinese traditional hospitals 
1). Name 2). Sex 3). Age 
4). occupation a. worker b. peasant c. cadre 
d. teacher e. other. 
5). The kind of disease 
6). Medical system 
a. national health insurance b. labour health 
insurance 
c. CMS d. self-financing. 
The medical expenditure of the outpatient service; among 
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them registration fee medicines tests and 
treatment other 
5. The medical expenses in-patients in county and county Chinese 
traditional hospitals 
1). Name 2). Sex 3). Age 
4). occupation a. worker b. peasant c. cadre 
d. teacher e. other. 
5). The kind of disease 0 
6). Medical system 
a. national health insurance b. labour health insurance 
c. CMS d. self-finance. 
7). Number of days in hospital 
8). How much did the patient pay for hospital expenses (Chinese 
Yuan) from his own pocket? 
a. western medicine b. Chinese medicine 
c. treatment fee d. bed fee 
e. examination f. operation 
g. material h. X-ray 
i. ultrasound scanner io ECG 
oxygen 1. other 
9). The distribution of diseases in various departments 
a. internal medicine b. paediatric 
c. surgical d. gynaecology and obstetrics 
e. infectious f. Chinese traditional 
9. eyes, ears, nose and throat 
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6. Township characteristics 
I. Basic condition 
1). Geography a. mountain area b. hilly land c. land 
2). The amount of villages households 
3). The total population among them, the agricultural 
population 
4). The number of villages which have public transport 
II. Economic condition 
1). The gross value of industrial and agricultural 
output , net output 
2). The value of agricultural and side-line output 
the gross industrial value in townships and villages 
3). The township government financial income_ 
and the expenditure .1 among 
them, health investment 
for township hospital other health investment 
4). The average peasant income an average income of 
workers in townhship and village 
III. Education 
1). The rate of illiteracy (children 12+ in 1982) 
2). The rate of school enrollment (children below 14 in 1988) 
IV. Health condition (1988) 
U-Infant mortality 
2). Maternal mortality 
3). The amount of peasants were supplied by safety water 
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V. Medical system 
1). The amount of peasants attending the CMS collective 
labour health insurance 
2). Is there the township managerial department of the CMS in 
township? 
a. Yes b. No 
if "yes, staff salary 
3). The amount of financial support from the CMS township 
hospital . township government , other 
7. Township hospital characteristics 
I. Health personnel (the end of 1988) 
1). The number of health personnel 
health professionals 
2). The structure of health personnel 
a. senior doctor b. junior doctor 
c. senior nurse d. junior nurse 
3). Retired staff 
4). Number of staff working in prevention 
senior doctor . junior doctor 
II. Health service (1988) 
U. the annual number of out-patients 
2). the number of beds 
3). the number of patients were discharged from 
annually 11 
4). length of patient stay 
5). average bed occupancy (days), 
6). the utilization rate of beds_ 
among them, 
, among them, 
hospital 
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7). medical income: 
service 
patient 
inpatient service 
medicine sale 
; other 
i ou pa lent 
operation on 
III. The source of medicines supplied: 
1). County medicine company 
2). Other resource 
3). Western medicine Chinese traditional medicine 
IV. Fixed assets and health investment 
V. Price changes in 1980,1987,1988 
1). Registration fee 
2). Hospitalization fee 
3). Test and treatment fee 
4). Operation fee 
VI. The balance of income and expenditure in last five years 
1) Income a. county health bureau investment 
b. township government investment 
C. health service income 
i. outpatient service medicine and treatment 
ii. inpatieny servie medicine and treatment 
d. other 
2). Expenditure a. medicine 
b. salary of staff 
c. salary of retire staff 
d. medical equipment bought 
e. medical equipment repaired 
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--"q 
f. capital construction 
I 
g. staff training 
h. other 
f 
VII. Medical equipment. 
1). What kind of medical equipment? 
2). Details of purchase source of payment (resource, date of 
purchase, imported, or made in China) 
VIII. Retired staff 
1). Name 2). Sex 3). Age 4). Professional title 
5). Education 6). Department 7). Whether or not re-employed. 
Doctors in township hospital 
1) . Age 2). Professional title 3). Education 
4). Following health reform, what do you think about be following? 
Your income has a. increased a lot b. increased little or 
somewhat 
c. no change d. decreased 
Your work has 
a. increased a lot 
c. no change 
The quality of medical care has 
a. increased a lot 
c. no change 
b. increased little or 
somewhat 
d. decreased 
b. improved little or 
somewhat 
d. gone down 
Your technical level has 
a. improved b. gone down 
c. no change 
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Do You think your hospital is competitive with the village health 
station? 
a. yes b. no c. not clear 
5). Do you think the responsibility system on applied to hospitals 
should cease? 
a. yes b. no c. no comments 
6). The townhsip hospital belongs to township government: What do 
you think about that? 
a. approve b. object c. no comments 
7). Do you want to leave the township hospital if possible? 
a. yes b. no 
8). What do you think about possible future developments in 
township hospitals? 
a. optimistic b. pessimistic 
9). What problems are there in developing township hospital? 
a. poor management b. lack of money 
c. unclear/don't know 
10). What do you think about preventive work since health reform? 
a. improving b. becoming worse 
9. Township leader 
U. Tital 2). Age 3). Education 
4). The township hospital belongs to in township government. What 
do you think about that? 
a. approve b. object c. an expedient measure d. no comments 
5). How do you think the scope of township hospitals should 
be developed? 
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a. enlarged b,. kept as they are now c. decreased 
The medical equipment should be 
a. increased b. kept as they are now c. decreased 
How do you judge the quality of medical care at present? 
a. it should be improved b. it is not too bad 
c. it has been improved 
6) . Do you think that township government can increase gradually 
the health investment? 
a. yes b. no c. do not know 
7). Which problem is the biggest problem in the development of 
township hospital? 
a. capital shortage b. poor management 
c. low charge for medical service d. do not know 
8). Are you satisfied with the management of township hospital? 
a. yes b. no c. do not know 
9). Which medical system do you think should be implemented in 
your township? 
a. the CMS b. self-finance 
10. Village health stations 
I. Basic condition 
1). geography a. mountain areas 
c. land 
2). The number of natural villages, 
3). The total population 
population 
b. hilly land 
d. other 
v households 
among them, the agricultural 
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II. Economic condition (1988) 
1). The gross value of industrial and agricultural 
output 
__, 
net output 
2). The value of agricultural and side-line output_ 
the gross industrial value in village_ 
3). Average peasant income Average income of 
workers in village industry 
4). Amount of collective fund amount of health 
investment from the village committee 
5). How much did peasants pay for health last year? 
III. Education 
1). The rate of illiteracy in 12+ in 1982 
2). The rate of school enrollment of children below 14 years old 
in 1988 
IV. Health condition (1988) 
1). Infant mortality rate 
2). The maternal mortality rate 
3). How many families have received a "one child certificate"? 
Percentage of all families 
V. Medical system 
1). The number of peasants who have attended the CMS 
How much did they pay for it? 
2). The number of peasants using the self-finance medical 
system 
3). The number of peasants with medical health 
insurance How much did they pay for it? 
f 
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VI. Compensation in the CMS 
1). The proportion of compensation for outpatient services 
a. in village health station 
b. in township hospital 
c. in county hospital 
2). The proportion of compersation for inpatient services 
a. in township hospital 
b. in county hospital 
c. over county hospital 
VII. Village health station 
1). When was village health station built? sevice 
radius 
2). The number of rooms 
proprietary rights: a. village committee b. rental c. private 
3). Dose the clinics have: 
a sphygmomanometer a. yes b. no 
disinfectant equipment a. yes b. no 
4). Who owns the village health station? 
a. solo b. group c. collective d. township hospital set up 
5). The number of health staff among them, rural 
doctors , health workers 
6). Total income how much, from village 
commitee , medical service 
township or county (immunisation, 
planning) , other 
7). Costs of medical services: 
a. injection fee 
b. register and treatment fee 
, special subsidy from 
health education, MCH family 
0 
I 
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c. medicine 
8). Total expenditure how much, salary 
medicine , equipment 
9). The number of patients who were treated in the village health 
station I of these, how many outpatients I 
patients who stayed at home and were visited transferred 
to township hospital and county hospital 
10). How many kinds of western medicine does the clinic 
possess? 
_ 
Chinese traditional medicine? 
11. Village leaders 
I: Village leaders 
1). Title 2). Age 3). Education 
4). Did you receive any document about your village health station? 
a. yes b. no 
5). Did you get any guide about how to run the village health 
station from your township in the last two years? 
a. yes b. no 
6). What factors influence the village leaders to 
undertake health work? 
a. poor economic condition 
c. peasant does not support 
e. different opinion among 
7). Which medical system do 
your village? 
a. the CMS 
b. no preventive fee 
d. health policy is unclear 
village leaders 
you think should be implemented in 
b. self-finance 
8). How did the village leaders evaluate rural doctors? 
a. mainly satisfied b. mainly dissatisfied 
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if dissatisfied, what was the reason? 
a. doctors' low education b. poor skill 
c. no sense of duty d. less time to do health work 
9). What did you think about the rural doctor's income? 
a. high b. middle C. low 
10). What health work have you done in the last two years? 
a. re-established the village health station 
b. introduced health insurance 
c. set up or organised preventive work 
d. other 
11). How much capital did your village put into health in 
1988? 
12). Who was in charge of health work among leaders? 
13). Was the village health station checked usually? 
a. yes b. no 
If yes, who did this? a. township hospital, b. township 
government, c. county health bureau. 
Are there evaluative targets for the village health station? 
a. yes b. no 
14). How much subsidy did you get from the village committee? 
12. Rural doctors 
1) . Name 2) . Sex 3) . Age 
4). How many years have you worked in health care 
5). Education 
a. primary school b. middle school c. high school d. college 
6). When did training begin 
7). Accumlative time of advanced study 
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8). The date of advanced study in last two years 
9). Place of training a. county b. township 
10). Training components 
a. western medicine b. Chinese medicine 
d. preventive medicine e. pharmacy 
11). How was the training paid for? 
a. individual b. collective fund 
12). Did you obtain the rural doctors certificate? 
a. yes b. no 
13). Working place 
a. solo village health station 
b. group village health station 
c. collective village health station 
14). Working time 
c. other 
MCH 
a. an average work time each year (months), 
b. an average work time at farm each year 
_(months). 
15). Working content (exclude basic medical work) 
a. immunisation b. infectious disease reporting 
c. health education d. MCH 
e. family planning 
16). If you did health work whole day (8 hours), how much is your 
ideal income each year? (Chinese yuan) 
<200,300,400,500,600,700,800,900,1000 1100,1200, 
1300,1400,1500, >1500. 
17). How much was your income last year? how 
much, from medical work . from farming work 
18). Do you receive any health documents? 
a. yes b. no 
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19). Do you satisfied with your work? 
a. yes b. no c. no comment/don't know 
20). What factors have produced your answer? 
a. economic factor 
c. peasant trust 
e. chance for advanced study 
b. leader trust 
d. co-ordination with colleages 
f. the benefit for retirement 
13. County leader: the developing policy concerning the rural 
health three tier network 
1). Sex 2). Age 3). Education 4). Title 
5). What do you think about your county health organization? 
i. level of medical equipment 
a. needs increasing 
c. no comment 
ii. beds 
a. need increasing 
c. no comment 
iii. health personnel 
a. need increasing 
c. no comment 
iv. medical quality 
a. reasonable 
c. unclear 
b. keep present status 
d. needs reducing 
b. keep present status 
d. needs reducing 
b. keep present status 
d. needs reducing 
b. should be improved 
6). Is it necessary to build a Chinese traditional hospital in 
your county? 
a. yes no 
If yes, what sort of hospital should it be? 
a. solely of Chinese traditional medicine. 
291 
b. western medicine and Chinese medicine together. 
the scale of hospital 
a. the number of health staff 
b. the number of bed 
7). Whic h health organisation should be strengthened first in 
your coun ty? 
a. county hospital b. county Chinese traditioal hospital 
c. county epidemic station d. MCH station 
e. other 
8). Is it necessary to implement the economic responsibility 
system in hospital? 
a. yes b. no 
c. a makeshift measure d. unclear 
9). Do you approve of the fact that the township hospital belongs 
to the township goverment 
a. yes b. no c. unclear 
10). Which medical system do you think should be implemented in 
your county? 
a. self-finance system b. the CMS c. unclear 
11). Which level of health work do you think should be strengthened? 
a. county b. township c. village 
12). The main problems of developing county health organisations 
are: 
a. lack of money b. patient charges are too low 
c. the rural residents are too poor to afford the medical 
expense. 
d. management problem 
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13). Looking at the financial resources in your county, will it be 
possible to increase the health investment in future years? 
a. yes, but not too much 
no. 
c. health investment will be reduced. 
d. unclear. 
14. National health insurance conditions 
1). County name 
2). Total expenditure 
3). Population are covered 
4). An average expenditure each person 
5). How much did people pay for health services? 
6). How much did work units pay for their staff's health 
services? 
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